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SUMMARY 
 
ESSAYS ON LONG-RUN SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
IN PAKISTAN 
 
 
The essays presented in this dissertation aim to explore the effects of political regime 
on long-run sources of economic growth in Pakistan. First chapter examines the 
factors responsible for the regime change. Second chapter explores the long-run 
sources of economic growth under various regimes of Pakistan. Last chapter 
investigates how duration of a democratic regime affects economic growth. Main 
findings from each chapter are as follows: 
Chapter 1: Factors Influencing the Regime Change  
Since Pakistan became an independent state, it has experienced 
frequent change in political regimes, moving from democratic to 
autocratic regime three times. These frequent changes in regime 
motivate us to investigate systematically factors responsible for regime 
change. We use process-oriented approach to identify the exact timing 
and factors that explain regime transition. Our analysis show that 
regionalism, constitutional weakness, leadership crises, confrontation 
with the military and economic fragility are the main causes of regime 
change from democracy to autocracy. Similarly, the main factors that 
have forced the military to hand over charge to a civilian government 
are regional inequity, politicization of military defeat, judiciary 
confrontation and active media.  Military’s objective of ‘nation-
building’ followed by institutional and corporate interests have been 
the main motives for a military coup d’état. 
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Chapter 2: Long-Run Sources of Economic Growth  
What are the main drivers of economic growth for Pakistan? Using a 
growth accounting framework and econometric technique, a regime-
wise analysis for the period between 1951 and 2011 is conducted. We 
noted that the growth rate under the autocratic regime was higher than 
that under the democratic regime.  When output growth is decomposed 
into factor inputs and productivity, we found that fifty percent of output 
growth comes from labor. In terms of growth per worker, the share of 
factor inputs and productivity is same. Decomposition of per worker 
growth by regime shows that productivity growth was the main source 
for the first two autocratic regimes; whereas it was human capital for 
the last autocratic regime. Overall, we found that the main driver of 
the Pakistani growth has shifted from productivity to human capital. 
Econometric analysis shows that increase in life expectancy, public 
spending in development projects, and exports of goods and services 
are the main determinants of the level and the rate of growth of 
productivity. Investment in health facilities, net general government 
spending, and foreign assistance in development projects significantly 
determine only the level of productivity.  In contrast, foreign direct 
investment, domestic credits to private sector and imports of goods and 
services have insignificant impacts on the level and the rate of growth 
of productivity. Our main finding is that, in the short-run, political 
regime matters in determining the level and the rate of growth of 
productivity. However, in the long-run, there are no systematic 
differences between democratic and autocratic regimes in determining 
productivity.  
Chapter 3: Political Regime and Economic Growth 
How does the duration of a democratic regime affect a country’s 
income growth and distribution? Using an instrumental variable 
technique and Pakistan’s time series data for the last six decades 
(1950-2010), we attempt to address this question systematically. A 
longer time may be needed to build good institutions. Alternatively, a 
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longer time may be required in pursuing policies persistently. 
Econometric analysis shows that economic growth is negatively 
related to the level of democracy. Duration of a regime matters but 
only as an auxiliary. If democratic government fails to provide an 
environment which is conducive for economic growth, then a longer 
duration of democratic government may reduce the growth of per 
capita GDP and worsen the income distribution. The results appear 
robust in various estimation techniques and descriptions.  
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Chapter 1  
Factors Influencing Regime Change – An 
Investigation for Pakistan 
1.1. Introduction 
It is a common phenomenon that a country moves between one political regime to 
another. Huntington (1991) observes three waves of democratization1 and two of its 
reversal 2 since 1825. This frequent back-and-forth transition remains a puzzle to 
which historians, researchers and analysts devote resources and time to understand the 
motive and factors for regime change (see Rustow, 1970; Geddes, 1999; McFaul, 
2002; Diskin et al, 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Acemoglu et al, 2010; Bave 
and Kingston, 2010; and Samuel, 2012).  
In this global wavering between democratization and anti-democratization, Pakistan is 
no exception. Since it became an independent state in 1947, it has been politically 
unstable and has experienced a number of regime changes, from democratic to non-
democratic and back again. In its total life span of 67 years, there have been three 
military governments and four democratic regimes. This frequent regime change 
inspires concern to identify the factors that motivate regime change. The prime 
concern of this study is to explain why Pakistan has so often transited to and from 
democracy, and what factors can explain the transition from democratic regime to 
non-democratic regime and vice-versa.   
The term ‘regime’ here refers to a political state which may be democratic or non-
democratic. A democratic regime is one that puts substantial constraints on its chief 
executive, who is recruited through an open and competitive process (Marshall et al, 
                                                          
1 First Wave: 1825-1925; Second Wave: 1945-1960; Third Wave: 1974 on. 
2 First Reversal Wave: 1925-1945; Second Reversal Wave: 1960-1974.   
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2012). By contrast, a non-democratic regime is one where the executive has 
unrestricted authority and gains the position by forceful seizure of power (ibid). 
Although a non-democratic regime may take various forms, for the purposes of this 
study we define a non-democratic regime as a military3 regime that has forcefully 
overthrown a democratic government. We consider a regime to be non-democratic if 
power has been forcefully seized by the military and the head of the state is a member 
of the military.4  
According to Gurr (1974), a regime is said to be changed if there has been substantial 
change in the country’s political institutions. Regime change has been observed all 
over the world; regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America have changed not only 
from democracy to non-democracy but also from non-democracy to military 
dictatorship. However, in case of Pakistan, the regime is changed only from 
democracy to military dictatorship or vise-versa. Military action to change the 
political regime is known as a military coup d’état.5 Samuel (2012) defines a military 
coup as “[When] a country’s armed forces overthrow a democratically elected civilian 
government and take control.” In this study we count it as regime change when a 
regime transit to or from democracy.6 
Kitschelt (1992) distinguishes two approaches for understanding regime change: 
structural and process-driven. A structural approach views regime change as mainly 
driven by institutional constrains and resources (see Lipset, 1959; Rogowski, 1989; 
Huntington, 1991). A process approach views regime change through the choice of its 
                                                          
3 Though the term ‘military’ include Army, Navy and Air Force but for the sake of this study we mean 
‘Pakistan Army’ only and we consider the terms ‘military’ or ‘army’ as interchangeable.    
4 For this study analysis, the terms non-democracy, autocracy and military dictatorship are 
interchangeable.  
5 Coup d’état is a French word which translates as “a blow against the state.”  
6 We do not count it as regime change if a regime transits from one democratic to another democratic 
regime. 
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actors and their relative strengths (see Di Palma, 1990; Przeworski, 1991). These two 
approaches differ in methodology and research design. The structural approach 
focuses more on macro-level quantitative data or compares a country’s regime via 
conceptually-driven qualitative data. The process-oriented approach relies on 
individual cases of regime change with trivial systematic comparison across countries. 
The prime advantage of the process approach is that it can identify exact timing of 
transition and characteristics of both existing and new regimes (Kitchelt, 1992). Since 
we have a country-specific time series, this study follows the process-oriented 
approach to identify the exact timing and factors that explain regime transition to and 
from democracy in Pakistan.  
The literature has identified socio-economic factors that may influence regime change. 
For instance, Samuel (2012) classifies internal and external factors that can explain 
transition to and from democracy. The internal factors are civic engagement, political 
equality, solidarity, class conflict, modernization theory and resources, whereas 
external factors include US and Soviet Union foreign policies, globalization and the 
role of the European Union. Diskin et al (2005) empirically investigate socio-
economic and politico-institutional factors that may be responsible for the collapse of 
democracy. He concludes that there is no single variable that explains this collapse, 
but that unfavorable history, malfunctioning economy, cleavage and foreign 
involvement are the most crucial variables.      
For Pakistan, most studies investigate regime change from either an historical 
perspective (see Noman, 1990; Salamat, 1992; Jalal, 1995; Talbot, 1998; Amin, 2007) 
or a political one (see Wilcox, 1965; Heeger, 1977; Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 2011). A 
few studies investigate economic reasons for a military coup d’état (see Siddiqa, 2007 
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and Ibrahim, 2009), and only one study examines reasons for military intervention in 
Pakistan with a theoretical model (see Bhave and Kingston, 2010). This lack of 
studies provides an incentive to re-examine possible factors for regime change. 
Interestingly, most studies focus on the reasons for a military coup d’état; to our best 
knowledge, no study focuses on both transitions, from democratic to autocratic and 
vice-versa. Thus, we systematically investigate not only reasons for a military coup 
but also for the military handover to a civilian government.  
The study progresses as follows: the next section briefly sketches Pakistan’s political 
development from independence to the present. Section 1.3 reviews the regime 
change literature. Section 1.4 investigates factors responsible for regime change. The 
role of the military and its economic interests are examined in Section 1.5 and the last 
section concludes the discussion.   
1.2. Background: Pakistan’s Political Development 
Pakistan’s journey as an independent country began in August 1947, when it 
comprised two regions separated by a thousand miles, with no common boundary. 
One part was recognized as the West Wing, the current Pakistan; the other was the 
East Wing, the current Bangladesh. In language, culture and custom, the East and 
West Wings were entirely different; the only common element was religion. Figure 
1.1 shows a brief timeline of Pakistan’s major political events.  
At the time of independence, Pakistan was politically and economically weak, with no 
proper constitution for the ethnically diverse country. Regionalism and provincialism 
reigned, which made the country politically weak. Weak political institutions and lack 
of political cohesion provided the opportunity for bureaucracy as well as the military 
to control civilian governments. With military or bureaucracy intervention, civilian 
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governments changed frequently. In its first decade the country had six prime 
ministers. This frequent change of political government put Pakistan on an unstable 
path and opened the door for a military take-over, which occurred on October 7, 1958, 
under President Iskander Mirza7 and General Ayub Khan.   
The major issue for this military regime was to gain legitimacy, so the military ruler 
initiated economic and land reform with a Green Revolution program and by boosted 
industrialization through export promotion. It introduced ‘Basic Democracy’ at the 
village or union/town level. In 1962 it promulgated a new Constitution for a 
Presidential form of government. However, their policies and negligence raised 
regional inequality, which was exploited by the political parties. Wars with India over 
Kashmir also raise questions about the military regime. Eventually, mass pressure 
compelled the military to hand over to a civilian government in December, 1971. 
The newly-elected civilian government under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto promulgated a new 
Constitution in 1973, diluting the power of the President and confirming a 
parliamentary form of government. It initiated labor, land and economic reform and 
nationalized almost all large-scale industries, education, banking and financial sectors. 
It minimized the role of the military and tried to bring the military under civilian 
control. However the government lost control when accused of rigging an election. 
Law and order began to break down, which triggered a second military coup d’état, 
led by General Zia-ul-Haq, on July 5, 1977.  
This military regime used coercive powers to control deteriorating law and order, 
including the arrest of political leaders such as Prime Minister Bhutto for alleged 
involvement in a murder case. The military banned all political activity and put limits 
                                                          
7 Before partition, he was a Major-General in the British Indian Army; he became Joint Defense 
Secretary (a bureaucrat) in 1946. After partition he was appointed Defense Secretary.    
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on the media; banned student and labor unions; and used force to crack down on the 
growing protests and demonstrations. The military introduced an Islamization policy 
with a corporate culture and Islamic banking, and Zia amended the Constitution to 
legitimize a Semi-Presidential form of government. The regime also benefited from 
US assistance to fight the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. During this regime 
the economy performed well, but the regime ended when Zia was killed in a 
mysterious plane crash on August 18, 1988. 
A new civilian government was elected on November 16, 1988, when Benazir 
Bhutto8 became Prime Minister. Within two years her government was dismissed by 
the President as a consequence of corruption allegations, and on October 24, 1990, 
Nawaz Sharif9 became Prime Minister. The President again exercised his powers and 
dismissed the Sharif government on April 19, 1993 after accusations of misdeeds and 
mismanagement. However, Sharif successfully challenged the Presidential Order in 
the Supreme Court and was reinstated. Relations between President and Sharif 
worsened, and persuaded by the military hierarchy, both resigned from their posts on 
July 18, 1993.  
The resultant election re-established Benazir as Prime Minister. This time she moved 
very carefully and elected a President of her own choice. Nevertheless, differences 
between the President and Benazir arose over time and on November 5, 1996 the 
President dismissed her government on accusations of misdeeds and corruption. 
Sharif won the next election with an overwhelming majority of two-thirds of seats. 
His strong mandate enabled him to reduce the presidential powers by amending the 
Constitution of 1973.  
                                                          
8 A well-known politician from Pakistan’s Peoples Party (PPP) and daughter of former Prime Minister  
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
9 A well-known politician from Pakistan Muslim League 
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The country went to war with India over the Kashmir issue began at Kargil Post, with 
initial success, but the international community intervened and forced Sharif to 
withdraw his troops from their occupied area. The military, however, perceived this 
withdrawal as damaging to their institutional repute. Later, Sharif tried to sack 
General Pervez Musharraf – a military chief, which sparked another military coup on 
October 12, 1999.  
Like his predecessors, General Musharraf abrogated the Constitution and declared 
himself Chief Executive. He introduced a number of economic and financial reforms, 
further deregulating and liberalizing the economy. His tenure enjoyed high economic 
growth with increased capital accumulation. However, a confrontation with the 
judiciary arose in March 2007, when he tried to sack the Chief Justice, sparking 
massive protests and demonstrations. He declared a national emergency and again 
abrogated the Constitution, which resulted in massive protest against military rule. 
The military had lost credibility, and Musharraf handed over regime to a civilian 
government on August 8, 2008. Since then Pakistan has enjoyed democracy, with 
substantial political power resting in the hands of the Prime Minster.  
1.2.1. Political Regime and US – Pakistan Strategic Relationship 
 Pakistan’s economic and political positions are of concern to the US, which considers 
that an economically and politically weak Pakistan would be a security threat. The US 
believes that a weak state and a fragile economy are fundamental causes for the 
promotion of extremism and terrorism (Tellis, 2005). Recognizing Pakistan’s geo-
political importance in the strategic regional interest, the US started civil and military 
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assistance to Pakistan just the nation became independent. By 2010, the US had 
provided around US$ 53.4 billion (2011 constant dollar) to Pakistan10.   
US economic assistance began just one year after Pakistan’s independence; military 
assistance started in 1955 after Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Agreement with the 
US (May 1954).  However the flow of funds has not been constant (see Figure 1.2). 
Economic assistance peaked in 1962 (US$ 2.4 billion) and thereafter declined up to 
1979 (US$ 132.4 million). Military assistance peaked in 1956 (US$ 1.1 billion) and 
then fell to US$ 0.43 million in 1972. The reasons for this assistance volatility may 
include Pakistan’s joining the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and 
the Central Treaty Organization (early 1950s), signing of a bilateral cooperation 
agreement with US (1959), aid for containing the spread of communism in the region, 
politically unrest, separation from East Pakistan, spreading of communism by Bhutto 
and Pakistan’s nuclear enrichment program.  
In 1979, President Carter suspended all assistance to Pakistan except food aid because 
of Pakistan’s nuclear enrichment program. Later the same year the former USSR 
invaded Afghanistan; the US changed its strategy and revived economic assistance in 
1981. Recognizing Pakistan’s strategic geo-political importance, US aid again started 
to climb, reaching US$600 million (military) in 1985 and US$791 million (economic) 
in 1988. To reward Pakistan’s support in the Cold War, the President Bush in the 
early 1990s tried to persuade Congress about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons issue. 
However, he did not get success, and Congress suspended most aid.   
The US 9/11 catastrophe was very beneficial for Pakistan economy. It received a 
substantial amount of foreign aid from the international community and foreign 
                                                          
10 Economic assistance of US$ 41.5 billion  and military assistance of US$ 11.9 billion 
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remittances from overseas Pakistanis. When the US initiated its War against Terror, 
Pakistan became an important strategic ally; economic and military aid shot up, 
reaching the 1962 peak in 2010: economic aid was worth US$2.1 billion and military 
aid US$946 million.  
Reviewing Pakistan’s US-led foreign assistance by regime, it is seen that around two-
thirds of economic and military assistance was given to an autocratic government 
(Table 1.1). The three autocratic regimes received US$41.5 billion (economic) and 
US$12 billion (military) assistance.  The most economic aid was for the first 
autocratic regime (General Ayub) and the most military aid was for the third 
autocratic regime (General Musharraf). Note that aid received by the current 
democratic regime is more than that received by the previous democratic regimes; this 
is assumed to be because of the US-led War against Terror, in which Pakistan plays 
an active role.  
1.3. Regime Change – Theory and Past Evidence  
Acemoglue et al (2010) provides a theory of military dictatorship by examining 
behavior of democratic and non-democratic regimes which use military as a tool for 
strengthening their regimes. They explained theoretically the conditions under which 
military act as an agent for elites. They argued that non-democratic regimes require 
power to maintain their regime but this strategy creates a moral hazard problem; a 
strong military may simply follow the instructions of non-democratic regimes (act 
like an agent) but stronger military may have incentives to create its own regime for 
protecting their own interest/objectives. One implication is that the prevalence of 
moral hazard problem may raise the cost of preventing coup because in political 
moral hazard problem non-democratic regimes need to pay higher wages or 
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concessions to military for avoiding coups. Another consequence is that when regime 
is changed from non-democratic to democratic, strong military continue to provide a 
threat to new democratic regime unless it is reformed. The expected future reform 
may motivate military further to go for coup against democratic regime. 
Bhave and Kingston (2010) using game theoretic model explain the reason for 
military coup d’etat in Pakistan and Turkey. By following Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2010), they introduced military as a third player in the model. They argued that 
military though having enough power will not intervene into the political system and 
change the regime unless there is a threat on military institutional interest and elite 
group(s) ensures support to the military in post-coup society. Thus, a coup will occur 
in a national crisis when elite group(s) collectively supports the military action for 
regime change. The elite group has incentive to cooperate with the military because in 
this way, elite group become part of the government machinery and gain de jure 
power which can be utilized for protecting their own interest.   
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) explained how after the coup a non-democratic regime can 
sustain. In other words, they explain a motive for initiating action against non-democratic 
regime. They started their analysis by assuming that rich elite are in power and argued that the 
elite ruling group choses those policies that maximized their utilities. However, under the 
non-democratic regime, there is always a threat from other social groups or within the same 
non-ruling elite individuals for an attempt to overthrow the ruling regime. Thus, ruling elite 
has to choose those policies that maximized their own utility and also satisfied non-ruling 
individuals.  
Lipset (1959) provided a theory of modernization which explains how regime changes from 
non-democratic to democratic. He argued that regime is more likely to be changed when 
economic development encourages people to change their behavior for the support of 
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democracy. In other words, regime change is a function of culture change that arises 
from economic development which increases citizen’s income, reduces literacy, 
encourages people to go for better education, increases urbanization and exposure to 
mass media which make people aware about the public affairs and going politics. 
Rising education and awareness about the surrounding politic encourage people to 
fight for their rights and support democracy. Thus, as country becoming richer and 
richer, people stand for democratic regime.  Lipset (1959) hypothesis has widely been 
debated and tested. Olsen (1968), Jackman (1973), Bollen (1983), Bollen and 
Jackman (1985), Muller (1988), Diamond (1992), Barro (1999), Epstein et al (2006) 
and others find positive linkages between economic development and democracy 
while Arat (1988), Sirowy & Inkeles (1990),  Przeworski and Limongi (1997), 
Przeworski et al (2000), and Acemoglu et al (2009) and others fail to validate Lipset’s 
hypothesis. 
Bollen and Jackman (1985) estimate economic and non-economic determinants of 
political democracy 11 . They found economic development is the main economic 
determinant whereas Protestantism and British colonial experience are the main non-
economic determinants of political democracy. They found cultural pluralism 
negatively while New Nation effect is positively related with political democracy.  
Przeworski and Limongi (1997) determined various threshold of per capita income for 
the survival of democratic regime. Their findings suggest that when country’s per 
capita income is larger than $6000 a year, democratic regime is more likely to survive. 
Similarly, a growing economy with per capita income is less than $1000 has more 
                                                          
11 They measure political democracy as an index which consists of two major components: popular 
sovereignty and political liberty. For further details see Bollen and Jackman (1985), p.36-37. 
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chances for survival of its democratic regime than a country whose per capita income 
is between $1000 to $2000. They fail to find any evidence for ‘consolidation’. 
Globalization is an external determinant of regime change. If a country is more 
exposed to its neighborhood political, social and economic system, it is more likely 
that its domestic political regime absorb such external effects (Samuel, 2012). By 
virtue of globalization, citizens are more aware about the surrounding political affairs 
and they may learn how to deal with non-democratic forces and interest groups 
(Hungtington, 1991; Przeworski et al, 1996). This may help to build an internal force 
against non-democratic regime and resultantly democratization is more likely to be 
started. Thus, globalization may influence domestic regime.  
In contrast, there are a group of people who believe that globalization reduces the 
prospect of democracy12. Their main arguments include globalization undermines the 
state autonomy in terms of policy shift from protection of common people interest to 
foreign investors (see Gray, 1996; Cox, 1997); globalization bring about more 
domestic loser than winner which increases unemployment and distort distribution of 
income (Muller, 1995; Rodrik, 1997; Longworth, 1998) and globalization also hurt 
economy through unfavorable balance of payment problem which may undermine 
economic performance (Diamond, 1992, Dahl, 1994, O’Donnell, 1994).  
Onwumechili (1998) categorized reported causes of military coups as development 
and guardian. In his development thesis, the military generally initiates a coup when 
political government fails to manage the economy or is not nation-building. The 
military may justify its actions when there is an excessive rise in cost of living, as in 
the 1966 Ghana coup, or rising income inequality as in the 1980 Liberia military coup. 
                                                          
12 See Li and Reuveny (2003) for full details 
  
13 
 
Finer (1962) argues that an increasing industrialization process decreases the 
likelihood of a coup. Lack of success in nation-building is another justification for 
military coup, when government policy marginalizes ethnic, religious or political 
groups. Wiking (1983) argues that military action was justified in the 1973 coup 
against Rwanda’s President because of increasing disunity among the Rwandan nation. 
The guardian thesis recognizes military coups as national defense to maintain 
political stability. Political instability generally exists when there is a political power 
struggle or a bad law and order situation or government actions are illegal. Political 
power struggles generally emerge after a general election, when a losing party fails to 
accept the result. Pakistan’s 1977 coup was justified by the military for this reason. 
Military coups in 1966 in Burkina Faso and 1967 in Sierra Leone were justified as 
maintaining law and order.  
Fossum (1967) analyzed factors influencing the military coup d'état in Latin America. 
He demonstrated that country size and the level of poverty are conducive for 
occurrence of military coup d'état. He further demonstrated that military coup d'état is 
more likely to be occurred around election times and deteriorating economic 
condition and has triggering effect on neighboring countries.     
Johnson et al (1984) explained African military coup d'état. Their findings suggest 
that the states which are economically dynamic; un-socially mobilized before 
independence and have some degree of political participation and political pluralism 
have less experience of military coup d'état, attempted coups and coup plots than the 
states with the opposite set of characteristics. 
Decalo (1990) points out that ethnic rivalries, jealousies and personal fears may be 
implicit causes of military intervention. He argues that some coups mainly involve 
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ethnic rivalries when a government marginalizes an ethnic group and the military take 
action in revenge. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2005) examined the relationship between military coup d'état 
and civil wars using Africa states data. They showed similarity in causes of military 
coups d'état and civil wars.  They fail to find any significant influence of political 
repression and economic inequality on the causes of coup d'état. However, low 
income and lack of economic growth has great influence on coups and civil wars. 
They also found that higher military spending further increases the risk of a military 
coup d'état.  In 2007’s study, they theoretically and empirically analyzed the 
relationship between military spending and the risk of coup d'état using global data. 
They found a non-monotonic relationship between risk of coup and military spending. 
Their interesting finding is that in low coup risk countries, government may reduce 
military spending while in high risk countries like African states, military may 
increase military spending.   
Amin (2007) using Pakistan’s 1977 military coup d'état as a case study, compared two 
dominant approaches for analyzing causes of coup d'état – societal perspective 
approach and soldier perspective approach. Societal perspective views the degree of 
institutionalization of political system, political participation, social mobilization, 
political chaos and economic development are the main factors for determining the 
risk of coup d'état.  In contrast, the solider perspective approach tries to explain coup 
d'état by stressing on the ‘coup-makers’ grievances’. He showed that societal 
approach is better in explaining the causes of coup d'état. 
Siddiqa (2007) studied Pakistan’s military commercial interest. She showed that how 
military uses its business activities to generate personal economic stakes and loyalty 
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within and outside the military organization which military uses as a tool for pursuing 
its political ambitions.  
Barracca (2007) compared two failed military coups d'état in Ecuador (2000) and 
Venezuela (2002) with successful Pakistan’s 1999 military coup d'état. He showed 
that unity and cohesion within the Pakistan’s armed forces in support of military coup 
d'état and its division in two Latin American countries are the main causes for having 
divergent outcomes.  
Aziz (2008) examined the role of military in Pakistan. He rejected the commonly 
accepted views that “ethnic and religious cleavages and perceived economic or 
political mismanagement by civil governments triggers military intervention in 
Pakistan.” He showed that Pakistani military has become a parallel state.  
Ibrahim (2009) empirically examined the economic causes of military coup d'état in 
Pakistan. She uses four economic variables namely: real GDP, income per capita, 
defense spending and export earnings and found that low growth rate of these four 
variables are mainly attributed to the incidence of military coup d'état in Pakistan.  
Hassan (2011) investigated various causes of military intervention in Pakistan and 
come to conclusion that not a single factor can be attributed to the cause of military 
coups in Pakistan, rather a cluster of factors motivates military to intervene into 
Pakistan’s political affairs. 
1.4. Factors Influencing Regime Change 
Pakistan has experienced frequent regime change, from democratic to non-democratic 
and vice-versa. Since the nation’s independence, there have been four democratic and 
three military governments. The major case of regime change from democratic to 
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autocratic has been a military coup d’état. However, reversal of this regime change 
has been either by smooth transition or because of pressure from politicians and civil 
society. Table 1.2 summarizes the details of regime change to and from democracy. 
The following discussion examines factors possibly affecting political regime change. 
1.4.1. Regime Change: Democratic to Autocratic 
Between 1947 and 1958, Pakistan had four Governors General, seven Prime Ministers 
and one President. This frequent change in government, and particularly of Prime 
Minster, generated political instability and smoothed the path for a military take-over, 
which took place on October 7, 1958; Figure 1.3 systematically explains the reason 
for this military coup d’état. The major factors that influence the regime to change are 
as follows.    
1.4.1.1. Constitutional Dilemma 
The Constitution is a vital document that set the ‘rules of the game’ for a country. It 
specifies roles, functions and responsibilities of all political actors and government 
organizations. Lutz (1994) argues that this document plays a critical role in a time of 
crisis and clash of interests that undermine democracy. If people support a 
Constitution and the constraints that it entails, it is more likely that the political 
system will survive. However, in Pakistan’s case, the situation is slightly different.  
In early life, Pakistan had no working Constitution. Jinnah13 formed a Constituent 
Assembly in August 1947, which was asked to frame Pakistan’s Constitution within 
two years; it actually took about nine years. The delay can be attributed to three major 
reasons. The first related to provincial autonomy: East Pakistan wanted full provincial 
autonomy, but West Pakistan could not agree, claiming that it would undermine the 
                                                          
13 The founder of Pakistan 
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central power (Hassan, 2011). The second reason related to representation: East 
Pakistan wanted a bicameral legislature, with a Lower House elected on a population 
basis and an Upper House with equal representation of all provinces. This was 
strongly opposed by West Pakistan because the East Wing, having 54% of the 
population, would dominate (Khan, 2004). The third issue involved a dispute over 
declaration of a national language.14 Thus, at an early age, conflict between the two 
Wings arose on distribution of power between the federation and its units. 
Although the 1956 Constitution addressed East Pakistan’s concerns and provided 
guidelines for the legislature, it failed to achieve political hegemony over the military 
and bureaucracy mainly because of regional politics and dominance of Western Wing 
politicians. The prevailing political instability and coalition among the bureaucracy, 
the elites15 and the military paved the way for the first military coup d’état.  
1.4.1.2. Regionalism 
When Pakistan gained independence from Britain, it comprised East Pakistan and 
West Pakistan, separated by over a thousand miles, with India in-between. The 
physical distance created problems of communication and governance, with deep 
differences in culture, language, customs and economic structure. The one thing that 
united the two regions was religion: both were Muslim.  
East Pakistanis were inspired by the Lahore Resolution, which offered provisional 
autonomy (Taha, 2012). But the dreams of the East Pakistanis were never realized 
after independence because of West Pakistan’s dominance. Hassan (2011) expresses 
                                                          
14 This issue is further elaborated under Section 1.4.1.2. 
15 The term ‘elite’ here refer to those members of the society who have disproportionate political 
and/or economic power (Bollen, 1990). These members may belong to judiciary, legislature and/or 
executive branch of government. It may also include landlords, business men, members of 
professional associations, or leaders of political parties, labor union, religious bodies or local bodies. 
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the feelings of East Pakistanis as follows: East Pakistan felt that they did not have 
their due share in central government and administration; they felt that their concerns 
were neglected and that West Pakistan had a dominant role. He argues that this 
promoted a culture of regionalism and provincialism, which in turn planted the seeds 
for political instability and political vacuum.  
Conflict between the two regions arose just after the independence, when Jinnah 
showed solidarity with the Indian Muslims by declaring Urdu as the national language. 
But East Pakistan spoke only one language (Bengali) while West Pakistan was a 
multi-language region; interestingly, Urdu was not a mother tongue of any region 
(Chaudhury, 2012). Jinnah’s authoritative style, however, enabled the issue to be 
resolved for the time being, but it remained alive in the heart of Bengalis (Hassan, 
2011). The 1956 Constitution formally recognized Urdu and Bengali as the two 
national languages.  
Physical separation of the two regions created not only a communications problem but 
also hindered mobility of capital and labor (Sayeed, 1980). The restricted mobility of 
resources coupled with overall economic policies tilting to the West engendered East 
Pakistan’s economic deprivation. The issues of provincial autonomy, fair 
representation in administrative and governmental affairs and neglect of East Pakistan 
in economic development, were all constant political points of conflict. Such conflict 
made political institutions weak and unstable, which paved the way for the military to 
play a role.  
1.4.1.3. Leadership Crisis 
Another significant factor in political institution instability in the early stages was the 
fate of two prominent political leaders: Jinnah’s natural death in September 1948, and 
  
19 
 
the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in October, 1951. These two 
leaders played an important role in the foundation of Pakistan. Jinnah dreamed of a 
country where everyone enjoyed social, political and religious freedom, a democracy 
with civil supremacy. He stressed the sovereignty of parliamentary institutions and 
considered the armed forces a ‘servant of the people’ (Hassan, 2011). After Jinnah’s 
death, Liaquat wanted to realize Jinnah’s dream. He prepared the ‘Objective 
Resolution’ in 1949 as a basis for the 1956 Constitution. However, he was 
assassinated in October 1951 during a political campaign. These deaths were a great 
loss and created a vacuum (Salamat, 1992).  
Thereafter, Pakistan’s political institutions became instruments of a civil bureaucracy 
and the military. The strength of this claim can be judged from subsequent actions of 
the bureaucracy and the military. For instance, in 1953 a rift evolved between the 
army and the Cabinet over foreign policy. The military wanted a close alliance with 
the US in a Mutual Defense Agreement, but Prime Minister Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din, 
an orthodox-minded personality, was against this (Kiran 2012). The military 
persuaded Governor-General Malik Ghulam Muhammad to dismiss the Prime 
Minister,16 which he did in April 1953 without any major allegations of misdeed. This 
was the first military’s indirect action to change the regime.  
1.4.1.4. Doctrine of Necessity 
The judiciary is a vital organ of the state, providing justice and guaranteeing 
protection of individual rights. It is essential that the judiciary be independent. 
However, till the recent past, the judiciary was not independent, but rather an 
                                                          
16 Kiran (2012) argues that General Ayub Khan and bureaucrat Iskandar Mirza were very close to 
Malik.  
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instrument for the ruling regime to validate their actions. This can be verified from the 
notable case of Moulvi Tamizuddin vs. Federation.  
On October 24, 1954, Governor-General Malik dissolved the Constituent Assembly 
on the grounds that Prime Minster M. Ali Bogra had ‘lost the confidence of the people’ 
(Wheeler, 1955). Deputy Speaker and Constituent Assembly President Moulvi Tamiz-
ud-din challenged the Governor-General’s action in the Sindh17 Chief Court, arguing 
that the decision was “unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, without jurisdiction, 
inoperative and void” (Salamat, 1992).  The Court endorsed Tamiz-ud-din’s petition 
and declared that the Governor-General did not have the power to dissolve the 
Assembly because he was not a member of that Assembly (Hassan, 2011).  
The central government later took the matter to the Federal Court. Chief Justice Munir 
upheld the government position and said that the Sindh Chief Court did not have 
jurisdiction in the matter. The Court also invalidated all laws passed by the 
Constituent Assembly on the grounds that the laws did not have the assent of the 
Governor-General (Salamat, 1992). The Federal Court gave extra powers to the 
Governor-General to ‘make laws or invalidate present or past laws’ (Husain, 2010). 
Taha (2012) points out that Justice Munir confessed after retirement that he had made 
his decision after immense political pressure.    
The Federal Court made its decision on the basis of the Doctrine of Necessity. Hassan 
(2011) argues that “the higher judiciary failed to perform its basic role of guardian of 
the Constitution for a democratic polity. It fundamentally failed to check arbitrary 
actions of heads of state in violation of established democratic traditions, and 
provided legal cover to an otherwise illegal and unconstitutional role, thereby opening 
                                                          
17 Sindh is a province of Pakistan; the capital was at that time located in this province.   
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the door for subsequent military coups in Pakistan.” Khan (2004) has similar views. 
This doctrine provided legitimacy to the military takeovers of Ayub, Zia and 
Musharraf (see Khalid, 2012 for full details).     
1.4.1.5. Food Crisis and Declining External Sector 
More fuel for the fire was the deteriorating economy in 1958, with a food crisis, 
general price rises, falls in export earnings and depletion of foreign exchange reserves. 
In 1957–58, the economy entered recession. All sectors of the economy showed a 
declining trend (see Table 1.3). The main setback was in growth of major crops, 
which declined by about two and half percent. Table 1.4 explains the crop position 
one year before the military coup; it is evident that production of all crops except rice, 
bajra (pearl millet) and barley was falling. The worst falls were in jowar (sorghum), 
lentils and wheat, which were a major part of the daily diet for the poor. The situation 
was worse in the external sector and in general price levels. Overall prices rose 7.8%; 
food prices were up around 11 percent (Table 1.5). There was also a substantial fall in 
export earnings, especially manufactured exports. Foreign exchange reserves declined 
by 27%.  
The prevailing political vacuum coupled with decline in necessary food items, price 
rises of essential items and fall in foreign exchange earnings made economic 
conditions fragile, providing an excuse for the military to overthrow the democratic 
government in October 1958.   
1.4.2. Reversal of Regime:  Autocratic to Democratic 
The regime changed from autocratic to democratic in December 1971 due to both 
internal and external factors. Internally, politicization of trickledown effects and 
neglect by the military of East Pakistan grievances made the situation worse. 
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Externally, defeat by India over Kashmir challenged military legitimacy. The 
combination of factors caused deterioration of law and order; demonstrators 
demanded fresh elections and the end of the military regime. So the military handed 
over governmental affairs to a civil government (see Figure 1.4). The following 
discussion explains briefly factors responsible for regime change from autocratic to 
democratic.       
1.4.2.1. Growing Regional Inequality 
Inequality is an important factor with inherent characteristics for regime change.18 
Rising inequities may encourage a transition from non-democracy to democracy or 
vice-versa. The main explanation is that inequality increases a distributive conflict 
between the elite rich and the poor. The former want to minimize redistribution of 
resources to the poor, the latter want to maximize this redistribution. When 
distributive conflict is high, the deprived poor react and put pressure on the ruling 
elite. Boix (2003) argues that when unequal wealth distribution increases the demand 
for redistribution; when the distributive conflict rises, the likelihood of democratic 
stability and democratization sharply declines. A similar argument is made by 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), who say that regime type mainly depends on a 
balance of power between the elite rich and the poor. Although the rich have de jure 
power, the poor can challenge the regime with de facto power through effective use of 
their strength in numbers, making substantial social turmoil and chaos, possibly 
leading to serious revolutionary threat. The higher the inequality, the greater the 
chances of regime change. 
                                                          
18 See Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) for theoretical explanation of the impact of inequality on a 
tendency for regime change. 
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In Pakistan, the regime transited from non-democratic to democratic in the late 1960s 
mainly because of growing inter-regional inequality. To analyze the inter-regional 
disparity between East and West Pakistan, we first should understand the initial 
position.  
In 1950, West Pakistan per capita income was slightly higher than in East Pakistan: 
the disparity ratio19 was 1.17 (see Table 1.6). The income gap between the regions 
widened, particularly during the Ayub regime. When this regime began, the disparity 
ratio was 1.32: West Pakistan had a 32% higher income than East Pakistan. This 
became 1.68 by the end of Ayub’s regime. One could here argue that East Pakistan’s 
lower per capita income may be associated with its higher population growth. Table 
1.7 clearly shows that this argument is not sustainable: East Pakistan’s population 
share remained stagnant during the period under study.  
The growing inter-regional disparity may have been the result of strategies adopted by 
democratic as well as military regimes. The main economic strategy at this time was 
industrialization through import substitution, and the way this implemented benefited 
West Pakistan more than East Pakistan. At independence, Pakistan lacked a proper 
industrial base; both regions were more or less the same (Stern, 1968). When 
industrialization began, it was more concentrated in West than in East Pakistan (see 
Figure 1.5). Stern (1968) argues that the government focus on West Pakistan may 
have been due to East Pakistan’s poor infrastructure and the central government’s 
physical presence in West Pakistan. These two factors and others20 encouraged a 
more rapid industrial sector growth in West Pakistan.       
                                                          
19 It  is defined as the ratio of West Pakistan income over East Pakistan 
20 Such as banking and insurance facilities 
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Another factor fuelling agitation in East Pakistan against the West Pakistan 
democratic and military regimes was the transfer of resources from East to West. 
Undoubtedly, East Pakistan’s export earnings generated a chunk of foreign exchange 
in 1950-65 (see Table 1.8). But the government’s foreign exchange control and 
licensing policy encouraged more import concentration in West than in East Pakistan 
(Stern, 1968). The mechanism directing imports for either region worked as follows: 
each exporter was required to submit its foreign exchange to the central government, 
which then allocated licenses to importers (Zaidi, 2005). The government thus had 
substantial power through its licensing to direct import concentration. Table 1.8 
indicates that in 1950-65, East Pakistan had a surplus trade balance, except in the last 
two years. By contrast, West Pakistan’s trade balance was in deficit except in 1951 
(due to the Korean War). The ratios of import over export in both regions clearly 
show resource transfer from East to West Pakistan. Import spending relative to export 
earnings of West Pakistan remained substantially high. Rahman (1968) maintains that 
the physical location of the central government coupled with a larger share of 
employment share influenced allocation of scarce foreign exchange towards West 
Pakistan.  
The growing inter-regional disparity coupled with East Pakistan’s 1970 election 
victory in absolute terms put tremendous pressure on General Ayub and then on 
General Yahya to hand over regime to a civil government.  
1.4.2.2. Politicization of Wars’ Defeat 
Since independence, Pakistan felt under threat from India. Hussain (2012) points out 
four factors to explain hostile India-Pakistan relations. First is the ideological 
difference: Pakistan follows Islam and India believes in Hinduism. This was the main 
reason for the August 1947 separation of India and Pakistan. Second is Pakistan’s fear 
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of India’s sheer size and difference in endowment since independence. East and West 
Pakistan together cover an area equal to only 30% of India.21 In 1950 East and West 
Pakistan together equaled only 23% of the Indian population. A third factor 
explaining hostile relations with India is the ‘legacy of the trauma of partition.’  A 
fourth is Kashmir, which both countries claim; the issue is still pending.  
Two bloody wars with India (1965 and 1971) over Kashmir have played a role in the 
downfall of military regimes. In the 1965 war, Pakistan was substantially successful 
in restraining Indian aggression; however, United Nations pressure forced the military 
to surrender, which was unacceptable for political leaders and the general public. It 
was regarded as a national humiliation. The democratic forces politicized the situation 
and put pressure to hand over to a civil regime; the military could not resist and the 
regime changed in 1971.  
1.4.2.3. Politicization on Distributional Economic Gains 
Ayub’s bureaucratic-led policies put the country on the development path. Under him, 
Pakistan’s economy grew at an annual average rate of 5.6%. But his industrialization 
policies concentrated wealth in the hands of a few. Amjad (1982) points out that 44 
monopoly houses controlled 35% of all large-scale manufacturing assets and 77% of 
investment in the manufacturing sector listed on the Stock Exchange. It was perceived 
that 22 families held about two-thirds of all industrial assets (Zaidi, 2005). The 
unequal distribution of economic gain was highly politicized by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto22 
under the slogan “Roti, Kapra aur Makan” (bread, clothing and shelter). This Bhutto 
slogan effectively motivated the poor, working and middle classes against the regime; 
many people joined countrywide street protests, strikes and demonstrations. Another 
                                                          
21 Since the area has not changed much, the 2010 figure may resemble relative sizes of 1947 (figures 
obtained from the World Bank, 2014). 
22 A well-known politician from the Western Wing 
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important factor in the downfall of the Ayub regime was the growing dislike of the 
East Wing for Ayub policies and the West Wing’s dominance. Ayub tried to use 
coercive powers to control the deteriorating law and order situation, but failed. His 
image was severely damaged, and the military decided to change the regime face 
(Siddiqa 2007). Ayub had no option but to hand over to another general, Muhammad 
Yahya Khan.     
1.4.2.4. Deteriorated Law and Order Situation 
The military’s change of face strategy did not bear fruit. Agitation, protests and 
demonstrations continued. Yahya announced a general election for October 1970, 
hoping for a civil government acceptable to the military. However the election results 
were totally beyond military expectations. Mujeeb-ur-Rehman23 from the East and 
Bhutto from the West stood against each other. Mujeeb won an absolute majority and 
was able to form an independent government (Baxter, 1971). However, West Pakistan 
wanted a coalition government, which was not accepted by East Pakistan. A Cold 
War between the two Wings began, ending with separation of the two Pakistan’s 
Wings and a war with India. The separation of the East Wing made it impossible for 
the military to continue to rule (Talbot, 1998). Yahya handed over to Bhutto, who had 
won the Western section of the 1970 general election. Shafqat (1997) argues that “it 
was not Bhutto’s election victory but the tragic conditions caused by defeat in war 
that facilitated transfer of power from the army.” 
1.4.3. Regime Change: Democratic to Autocratic 
The military overthrew the democratic government on July 7, 1977, mostly because of 
its dislike of Bhutto’s economic reforms and confrontation with the military (see 
Figure 1.6). Discussion on each factor is in the following sub-sections. 
                                                          
23 A well-known politician from the Eastern Wing 
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1.4.3.1. Nationalization Policy 
Bhutto’s nationalization and land reform policies weakened elite groups, particularly 
industrialists, businessmen, bankers and landlords, encouraging the July 1977 regime 
change. Bhutto’s political agenda was to nationalize major units in the industrial, 
banking, insurance and education sectors. He had a firm belief that this nationalization 
policy would protect small and medium entrepreneurs against giant industrialists and 
transfer concentrations of economic power from the few to the many (Bhutto, 1979).  
Although Bhutto’s nationalization program was to be phased in gradually over five 
years, for analysis purposes we can divide the program into two phases.24 Bhutto first 
nationalized 131 large-scale manufacturing firms, most in the capital, as well as 
intermediate goods industries (Zaidi, 2005). This phase did not disturb the larger elite 
group because the nationalized industrial units contributed less than 20% of all value-
added manufacturing (ibid). His second phase altered the major structure of private 
holdings (see Figure 1.7). In this phase, he nationalized almost all the economy, from 
the financial sector to consumer goods industries, from the education sector to 
shipping and marketing firms. This rapid and massive nationalization of business 
invaded the domain of the elite, which then joined the military for regime change. 
Bhutto’s nationalization policy had two contrasting effects. He was able to gain the 
support of many lower and middle class people because his strategy offered 
employment opportunities: employment in the manufacturing sector rose from 8.3% 
in 1973 to 14.5% in 1979. The industrialization and subsequently nationalization 
created a middle class, but their participation in the political arena was almost non-
existent (Zaidi, 2005). On the other hand, he lost the confidence of the elite group, 
                                                          
24 The periods are based on policy influence on the elite group. First phase: January-March 1972; 
second phase: March 1972 to August 1976. 
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mainly comprising industrialists, bankers and small to medium businessmen. We here 
stress that these two contrasting effects were strong enough to legitimize his tenure 
early on and change the regime later. 
1.4.3.2. 1977’s Alleged Election Rigging25 
Bhutto called a general election in March 1977, assuming that the prevailing 
democratic environment was in his favor. This was soon revealed as false when, 
within 48 hours of the announcement, the major political parties formed the Pakistan 
National Alliance (PNA) to oppose him (Bhutto, 1979). The PNA incited opposition 
to Bhutto’s economic policies and coercive actions, which proved an effective 
political strategy. PNA’s public meetings attracted larger audiences than Bhutto’s 
(Weinbaum 1977), but surprisingly, the election results showed an overwhelming 
Bhutto victory, winning about 78% of seats (155 of 200 seats).26 The PNA rejected 
these results and demanded the Prime Minister’s resignation and a fresh election 
(Amin, 2007). PNA’s demands were not accepted by the PPP, whose leader 
maintained the election was free and fair.27 
Amin (2007) claims that there was well-planned vote rigging on a mass scale. Bhutto 
used coercive powers in his campaign and government machinery such as officers of 
the Commissioners, police, Federal Security Force (FSF), intelligence agencies, 
federal ministries and Prime Minister’s Secretariat. Anyone unwilling to join his 
campaign was either transferred or sent on leave. Amin (2007) further asserts that on 
polling day, PPP staff, police and the FSF played an important role in turning the 
situation in favor of Bhutto. Interestingly, in several constituencies the number of 
votes cast exceeded the number of registered voters. Schwarz (1977) asserts, “Several 
                                                          
25 This section sought information from Amin (2007). 
26 The Pakistan Times, March 10, 1977. 
27 Ibid. 
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PPP ministers themselves were seen harassing voters and stamping ballot papers 
themselves.”  
Bhutto’s prior socialist and pro-labor policies made elite groups unhappy (Talbot 
1998). They helped the PNA raise anti-Bhutto sentiment among the masses. They 
demanded a fresh election and held country-wide demonstrations and protests. The 
deteriorating law and order situation encouraged the army to take action. 
Unexpectedly, one of PNA’s renowned leaders, Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan 
formally invited the military in a signed letter to take over government (Khan, 1983; 
Ameen, 2007; Hussain, 2010). Zia overthrow the democratic government and took 
charge on July 7, 1977.      
1.4.3.3. Minimizing the Military Role 
During his tenure, Bhutto abolished the post of Commander-in-Chief and shortened 
the time of military service (Bhave and Kingston 2009). Rizvi (1988) details Bhutto’s 
steps in curtailing the power of the military, including restructuring the military high 
command to minimize their influence; reducing the tenure of military chiefs to three 
years; and establishing the FSF to help police maintain law and order. The military 
did not accept this intervention in their internal affairs and considered the FSF as a 
parallel force (Kamran, 2008). The military refused to train newly recruited FSF 
officers, and disbanded the force soon after taking power in the military coup d’état of 
1977. Starting a nuclear program against military wishes was also important in 
increasing the military-Bhutto rift.28 These factors and others created a Cold War 
between the democratic regime and the military, which only ended with the military 
take-over on July 5, 1977.  
                                                          
28 The US strongly opposed Pakistan’s nuclear program and ceased military assistance (Jalal 1995).  
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1.4.4. Reversal of Regime: Autocratic to Democratic 
The fourth transition from a military autocracy to a democratic regime was smooth, 
mostly because of the death of President General Zia-ul-Haq in a plane crash on 
August 17, 1988. However, during his tenure the political situation had remained 
tense and political parties had joined hands against the military dictatorship.  
Zia’s authoritative style motivated some to speak up against his regime. Lawyers and 
students initiated a movement against his regime; in 1981 prominent political parties 
joined in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) (Kamran, 2008); 
their main demand was removal of martial law and free and fair elections under the 
1973 Constitution (Rizvi, 1988). Initially the MRD could not get momentum for at 
least four reasons (Kamran, 2008). First, Zia used coercive powers to minimize its 
spread. Second, it was confined to one province (Sindh), and other provinces were 
neutral to the MRD call. Third, an improving economy and influx of foreign 
remittances minimized MRD’s work against the Zia regime. Finally, Zia’s strategy to 
Islamize the economy motivated many to support his regime.    
The MRD got momentum in 1985 when Zia failed to honor his promise of an election. 
Eventually, Zia decided to hold a non-political party election, which MRD boycotted; 
but results show that most winners were member parties in the MRD. Zia chose M. 
Khan Junejo as Prime Minister, wanting someone who would work under his 
direction (Kamran, 2008). At first, Junejo followed Zia’s wishes, but eventually there 
was a rift (Noman, 1990). Exercising power under the Eighth Amendment to the 1973 
Constitution, Zia dissolved the Assembly on May 29, 1988 and re-impose martial law. 
Kamran (2008) says that a possible reason for dismissing Prime Minister Junejo was 
that he signed the Geneva Accord without Zia’s support, and his open determination 
to punish army personnel found involved in an ammunition blast at the Ohjri Camp, 
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Rawalpindi earlier that year. Zia’s regime ended on August 17, 1988, when he died in 
a mysterious plane crash. 
1.4.5. Regime Change: Democratic to Autocratic 
A major contributing factor to transition from a democratic to a non-democratic 
regime has been a power tussle between political parties, the army and the President. 
The President had three times dismissed a government and the civil-military 
relationship remained unpleasant. This created the environment for military coup 
d’état in October 1999 (see Figure 1.8). The following sub-section sheds light on 
these factors.   
1.4.5.1. President’s Absolute Power 
A substantial contribution to weakening democracy in Pakistan has been the extra-
ordinary powers of the President. General Zia, to legitimize his tenure, amended the 
1973 Constitution with the Eighth Amendment. This has had far-reaching 
consequences for Pakistan’s political stability. The Eighth Amendment empowers the 
President to interfere in any administrative matter, including removal of a prime 
minister and dismissal of a parliament.  
After the death of General Zia, the regime became democratic; Benazir became the 
elected Prime Minister. During her tenure, the civil-military relationship remained 
poor. Talbot (1998) argues that the military felt discomfort in her regime and 
convinced the President to dismiss her. The President exercised his power under the 
1973 Constitution of 1973 and Eighth Amendment and dissolved the National 
Assembly. The reason given was alleged corruption but Aziz (2008) argues that the 
main cause was the mounting differences with the military. He says that the removal 
of the Benazir government in 1990 was mainly because of differences with the 
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military over “Kashmir, Afghanistan, army promotions, [and the] control of 
intelligence agencies.”  
The second Sharif government also fell victim to the President’s absolute power. 
Talbot (1998) gives two reasons for Sharif’s dismissal. First, Sharif planned to reduce 
the President’s power by amending the 1973 Constitution; second, Sharif’s apparent 
silence on support for the President’s re-election campaign. He says the President 
considered these as personal insults. Before Sharif could carry out his plan, the 
President dismissed Sharif’s government, claiming misdeeds and mismanagement 
(Khan, 2004). Sharif successfully challenged the Presidential Order in the Supreme 
Court and was reinstated. However, relations between Sharif and the President were 
exacerbated. The military persuaded both to resign their posts. 
History was repeated and Benazir became Prime Minister, but was again victim of a 
President’s absolute power. This time Benazir had been very careful to appoint a 
President of her own choice. However, differences arose between them over the 
appointment of a new military chief and court judges (Hussain, 2010). Their 
relationship worsened when the government accused the President of involvement in 
the mystery of the murder of Benazir’s brother (Kamran, 2008). The President 
exercise his power and dismissed the Benazir government in November 1996, 
alleging corruption, mismanagement and misconduct.   
Between 1988 and 1999, no democratic government completed its five-year tenure; 
all were dismissed by the President or the military. The power game between the 
military, civilian governments and the President created political instability which 
paved the way for the military to maximize its institutional and corporate interest.     
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1.4.5.2. Civil-Military Relations 
After the death of President General Zia, the regime became democratic; but the 
government-military relationship remained poor. Shafqat (1997), Talbot (1998) and 
Siddiqa (2007) point to several reasons for this. First, the Benazir government started 
to interfere in professional military matters such as the appointment of the Chief of 
Joint Staff Committee and Core Commanders, which the military considered purely 
internal matters. Second, the democratically-elected government was claimed to 
exceed constitutional limits by removing or appointing military chiefs, which under 
the Constitution is the responsibility of the President. Third, the government 
intervened in the army selection board’s promotion of personnel. Fourth, Sharif’s 
foreign policy, particularly on very sensitive issues like Kashmir or Afghanistan, did 
not involve consultation with the military. Lastly, the army initiated ‘Operation Clean 
Up’ in Karachi to control the deteriorating law and order situation. Sharif was uneasy 
because it created political problems for him (Talbot, 1998).      
 Another factor leading to the military overthrow of the democratic government was 
military feelings about the surrender of Kargil Post. As stated above, Kashmir 
remained in dispute between India and Pakistan. In the 1990s, the operations of 
Kashmiri freedom fighters brought this issue to the top of the world agenda. It became 
even more serious in May 1999 when Kashmiri freedom fighters occupied Kargil Post, 
5km inside Indian-occupied Kashmir. The Indian army claimed the Pakistani army 
was supporting the Kashmiri freedom fighters. Tension heightened at the line of 
control, ending in war between the two countries. The Pakistani army captured 
strategic posts in Kargil district, but after intervention by the international community, 
Sharif ordered the force to withdraw. The army was unhappy, feeling that this 
damaged their image and reputation (Barracca, 2007). Later, Sharif blamed army 
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chief General Pervez Musharraf for starting the incident and tried to remove him from 
his post (Bhave and Kingston, 2010). The military immediately overthrew the Sharif 
government and the regime changed from democratic to autocratic.   
1.4.6. Regime Reversal: Autocratic to Democratic 
Confrontations with the judiciary and media independence have been major driving 
pressures for the military to hand over government to a civil regime (see Figure 1.9). 
The following sub-section briefly explains these factors and their influence on 
changing the military regime.   
1.4.6.1. Confrontation with Judiciary 
One major factor pushing the autocratic regime to hand over to a democratic 
government is confrontation with the judiciary. This arose when the military ruler try 
to sack the Chief Justice of Pakistan, alleging that he had abused his office. Iqbal 
(2012) argues that the main reason for the clash was judiciary independence and 
rulings against military decisions. Most notably this involved the Pakistan Steel Mill 
Privatization Case, the Hasba Bill Case, the Missing Person Case and a case 
concerning Musharraf’s eligibility for re-election.  
Musharraf’s decision to dismiss the Chief Justice spurred protest by lawyers, students, 
human rights organizations and civil societies, claiming that it was an illegal and 
unconstitutional removal. Momentum grew when political parties joined the lawyers 
and other organizations. Demonstrations and rallies were held against the military 
regime. It got worse when over 40 protestors died in an MQM29 rally on May 12, 
2007, in Karachi (Kamran, 2008). On July 20, 2007, the Supreme Court reinstated the 
Chief Justice and rejected all allegations leveled by President Musharraf. The 
                                                          
29 Muttahida Quami Movement – a well-known political party  
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President declared a national State of Emergency Law on November 3, issued an 
Executive Order to dismiss the Chief Justice, and ordered all Judges to take a fresh 
oath under a Provisional Constitutional Order.  
It was Musharraf’s illusion that he could imposing a national State of Emergency 
which would be welcomed by the elite and other people, because of support for the 
earlier military coup d’état (Iqbal, 2012). He failed to recognize that the situation had 
systematically changed for at least three reasons. First, it had been a coup against ‘the 
man of crisis’ considered a dictator grabbing control over all institutions. 30  The 
current military move was against the judiciary, one of Pakistan’s most respected 
institutions. Second, earlier military coups were legitimized by the Supreme Court on 
the basis of the Doctrine of Necessity. This time the coup was against the Court, not a 
civil government. Finally, in the earlier coup d’état, the media was closely controlled 
by the government. When Musharraf declaring emergency law, the media was free, 
and most private media was closely analyzing his every move. His declaration of an 
Emergency Order sparked strikes, protests, demonstrations and rallies in favor of the 
Chief Justice and demanding the end of military rule. Musharraf could not resist the 
democratic pressure; he reinstated the Chief Justice and stepped down himself.   
1.4.6.2. The Role of Media 
Information is key to understanding a regime, its policies and strategies. For a 
democratization process, citizens need free access to relevant information. Downing 
(1996) says that the media are critical in power game in every regime. The media 
accelerate struggles for regime change, facilitating the transition process and playing a 
watchdog role during and after transition.  
                                                          
30 See BBC News “Opposition Happy at Sharif’s dismissal,” October 13, 1999. 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/473124.stm) (accessed on October 3, 2014) 
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In Pakistan, the media remained closely controlled by the government until 
Musharraf’s regime, which allowed press freedom. Before the military coup d’état, 
there was only one official television channel, broadcasting under government 
censorship. The military regime opened this sector to private investment in late 2002. 
This liberal media development policy enabled freedom of speech and expression 
(Iqbal, 2012). The regulatory authority of PEMRA31 by October 2014 had issued 87 
media licenses, 38 of which were news channels. After abolition of the official 
channel’s monopoly, Pakistani was well-informed which boosted the democratization 
process.  
In terms of international ranking, Pakistani media is still not completely independent32 
but there is no doubt that media efforts to increase awareness at the micro and macro 
level have been substantial. This is validated by the media role during the lawyers’ 
movement to defend the judiciary against coercive military powers. When Musharraf 
forced the Chief Justice to resign, the media helped mobilize the public. Coverage of 
information about the military action against the Chief Justice encouraged many 
people to join the lawyers and human rights organizations. Mobilization through the 
media was an effective instrument for democratic forces to pressure the military to 
hand to a civil government; the military could not resist the sustained pressure for a 
hand over.   
1.5. Military’s Motivation in Changing Regime 
The main reason for having a national army is defend the nation against aggression. 
But some countries33 may have a military with a different ideology. The military may, 
                                                          
31 Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority 
32 In 2007, Pakistan’s world ranking in the Press Freedom Index was 152 of 169 countries. 
33 Like Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, Chile etc. 
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for instance, consider that they are not subject to civil government control but are an 
independent and prestigious institution (Samuel, 2012). They may not like the 
national Constitution but consider it just a piece of paper that guides running a state. 
Military leaders may believe that they serve a higher power, which they called the 
nation. They may claim that no one is above the nation and if a government 
undermines national values, integrity or identity, then it is the military’s responsibility 
to protect those values. In countries like Thailand or Pakistan, with weak political 
institutions, the military high command may consider politicians as corrupt and 
incompetent to protect the nation and that military intervention in the government is 
necessary.  
There is no doubt that military is one of the most powerful and critical Pakistan’s 
institutions. Its strength and professionalism has been recognized time and again, both 
domestically and internationally. It is one of the institutions upon which the nation 
relies most. Its protection against Indian aggression since independence has been 
tremendous. However, Pakistan’s civil- military relationship remains poor. There 
have been three military-initiated coups against democratically-elected governments 
and the army has ruled the country for about 32 of its 67 years. Why has the military 
initiated a coup time and again against a democratic government? This is a 
fundamental question which this sub-section tries to address.    
1.5.1. Military Perceptions about Politicians  
One reason that inspires Pakistani military officers to initiate a political coup is their 
perception of the politician. They believe that politicians cannot run an economy, they 
are corrupt and particularistic, and do not protect the public interest. They believe that 
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the military is a professional institution with the ability to manage an economy; this 
the military rulers say after a successful coup d’état.  
President Mirza, after the first military coup d’état, justified his action by saying “for 
the last two years, I have been watching, with the deepest anxiety, the ruthless 
struggle for power [and] corruption [by politicians]…. Despite my repeated 
endeavors, no serious attempt has been made to tackle the food crisis…. We have 
undertaken to safeguard the security of Pakistan…”34  
Similar justifications were offered after the second military coup d’état” “It must be 
quite clear to you now that when political leaders fail to steer the country out of crisis, 
it would be an inexcusable sin for the Armed Forces to sit as silent spectators… I saw 
no prospect of compromise between the People’s Party and the PNA… It was feared 
that the failure of the PNA and PPP to reach a compromise would throw the country 
into chaos… The Army had, therefore, to act, as a result of which the Government of 
Mr. Bhutto has ceased to exist: Martial Law has been imposed throughout the 
country….”35  
The third military ruler justified his action by saying, “[Pakistan today] has reached a 
stage where our economy has crumbled, our credibility is lost, state institutions lie 
demolished…. In sum, we have lost our honor, our dignity, our respect in the comity 
of nations…”36 
                                                          
34 Cited in Hussain (2010). 
35  Ibid. 
36 General Pervaiz Musharraf: address to the nation on October 17, 1999. 
(http://fas.org/news/pakistan/1999/991017-mushraf_speech.htm) (accessed on September 12, 2014) 
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1.5.2. Perceptions about the Constitution 
Pakistan’s military, like others, puts the nation over and above the Constitution. They 
consider the Constitution as just a piece of paper helping to protect the nation, its 
identity, integrity and values. High military officials sometimes consider themselves 
independent from civil authority and have initiated actions against an elected 
government, which they strongly believe is good for the nation. The third military 
coup d’état clearly supports this argument. After the coup, the military leader 
addressed the nation, saying “the choice before us on 12th October was between 
saving the body - that is the nation, at the cost of losing a limb - which is the 
Constitution - or saving the limb and losing the whole body. The Constitution is but a 
part of the nation, therefore I chose to save the nation and yet took care not to 
sacrifice the Constitution.”37     
1.5.3. Perception about a law and order situation 
Military officials usually dislike chaos, protest and drastic change. They often 
intervene in political affairs when they perceive that the law and order situation is 
messy and disorderly, which may destroy the nation. They believe that a politician 
should behave in an orderly way and resolve political issues without risking law and 
order. The intentions of the military rulers in a coup d’état can be seen from their 
justifications given to the nation.  
When Ayub failed to control law and order, he handed over to General Yahya Khan, 
who told the nation that he intended to imposing Martial Law: “I have imposed 
Martial Law throughout Pakistan… [because] the situation has deteriorated to such 
an extent that normal law enforcement methods are totally ineffective… Serious 
damage to life and property has occurred… Production has fallen to a dangerously 
                                                          
37 Ibid – [italic are mine]. 
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low level and the economy generally has suffered an unprecedented set-back… The 
armed forces could not remain idle spectators …My sole aim in imposing Martial 
Law is to protect life, liberty and property …”38  
Zia had a similar justification: “It was feared that the failure of the PNA and PPP to 
reach a compromise would throw the country into chaos… The Army had, therefore, 
to act….”39 
1.5.4. Pakistan’s Military Corporate Interests 
Undoubtedly the main purpose of the military in any economy is to protect from 
external aggression. Pakistan is no exception; its military has played its role very well 
and protected the motherland on several occasions not only from external aggression 
but also from internal threat such as terrorism. While protecting the nation, soldiers 
risk limbs or even life. For their welfare, financial protection of their dependents and 
their retirement benefits, the Pakistan military has established three foundations: the 
Fauji Foundation (for Army) in 1954; the Shaheen Foundation (for Air Force) in 1977; 
and the Behria Foundation (for Navy) in 1982. The Pakistan military also established 
the Army Welfare Trust in 1971 to look after the 1965 war Shuhuda (martyr) 
dependents.  
The basic purpose for these organizations is very noble, but over time they have 
penetrated deeply into the economy and have become the nation’s largest industrial 
conglomerate (Bangash, 2014). They have invested in most sectors, including 
Fertilizers, Agriculture, Aviation, Oil and Gas, Sugar, Cement, Power Generation, 
Food, Real Estate, Financial, IT, Telecommunications, Garments, Education, Health 
Care, Hospitals and Private Security (see Appendix 1-A for further details).  
                                                          
38 Cited in Hussain (2010) 
39 Ibid. 
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Besides establishing the country’s largest industrial conglomerate, the military have 
direct involvement in the Construction, Transport and Communications sectors. It 
established the Frontier Works Organization in 1966 to provide manpower and 
technical support to the construction sector, particularly for building roads and bridges; 
they created the National Logistic Cell in 1978 to cater to rising demand to carry 
goods from the port city of Karachi to the rest of the country, and established Special 
Communications in 1976 to provide communication services to Pakistan’s Northern 
Area, including Azad Jammu and Kashmir.  
The Pakistani military is not only army in the world with economic investment; 
countries whose militaries have a stake in the economy include the US, the UK, 
France, China and Turkey. Siddiqa (2007) argues that what differentiates Pakistan 
from the other countries is its control over businesses. In the US and the UK, the 
military operate in partnership with the private sector and government. The Chinese 
military has partnerships with leading parties and individual leaders. In Pakistan, the 
military is a sole owner of a business.  
What drives the military to so penetrate the private sector and what are the 
consequences? The following discussion systematically tries to address these 
questions. 
The foremost purpose of the above conglomerates is welfare, social security and 
retirement benefits for serving and retired armed forces members. As claimed by the 
army, they contribute substantially to the national economy in output, job creation and 
tax. They also provide opportunities for senior military leaders to reap economic gain 
after retirement. Running these businesses makes the institution financially 
autonomous; and last but not least, as the sole owner of these conglomerates, the 
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military is a stakeholder, with the incentive for direct or indirect involvement in the 
policy making process.   
In discussing the consequences of military involvement in the private sector, Siddiqa 
(2007) argues that it has long-lasting impact on the economy, society, politics and the 
military itself. As a leading player, the military enjoys monopoly power which distorts 
markets.  
Second, since the military has a single line budget, it is likely that public funds are 
transferred to private military businesses, a burden on the exchequer.  
Third, distribution of gains from these businesses has two long-lasting impacts on a 
relationship: the distribution within the military produces loyal officers; and gains 
distributed outside the military makes long-lasting relationships with beneficiaries, 
who are often key political and economic players.  
Finally, these businesses give the military a way to interact with the corporate sector, 
businessmen, professionals, academicians, agriculturists and other key players. Since 
foreign businesses are also invested in these conglomerates, the military has good 
relationships with external players.  
In sum, from our point of view, the impact of the last two points (distributional effects 
and interaction with key economic and political players) is strong enough to support 
whenever the military initiates a coup against a democratic government. 
1.6. Pattern of Regime Change 
The regime change literature has reported that there are four main reasons for regime 
change: (i) political, (ii) economic, (iii) social and (iv) institutional. Table 1.9 reports 
the pattern of Pakistan’s regime change. We can observe from Table 1.9 that there are 
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some similarities and differences in change of regime either from democratic to 
autocratic or vise-versa. For instance, in all cases, political parties played an important 
role in changing regimes. In case of regime change from democratic to autocratic, 
uncooperative behavior among the political parties provide an opportunity to military 
to take over the regime, however, in reverse case, political parties join hands to put 
pressure on military rulers to hand-over the regime to civilian governments.  
Interestingly, in case of Pakistan, economic factors change the regime only from 
democratic to autocratic not vise-versa. One possible explanation for this pattern is 
that economic situation under the autocratic regimes remained well as compared to 
democratic regimes (see Chapter 2 for further details). 
 Literature has shown that social groups and civil societies played an important role in 
changing regime from autocratic to democratic (Aleman, 2005; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2006; Klopp and Zuern, 2007). However, in case of Pakistan, the social 
groups are mobilized not only for regime change from autocratic to democratic but 
also for democratic to autocratic. As explained in Section 1.4.3, the opposition 
political leaders mobilize the social groups against alleged election rigging of Bhutto 
in late 1977.  
Another interesting pattern emerged from the analysis is that constitutional weakness 
provides a room for regime change from democratic to autocratic. As explained above, 
in early years of independence, lack of constitution made a political vacuum which 
motivate bureaucracy and military to play role. Later, each military ruler amended the 
constitution to legitimate his tenure by empowering the President. These powers were 
utilized by civilian Presidents for removing the democratic governments in 1990s (see 
Section 1.4.5.1). The frequent change of democratic governments encourages political 
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instability which later provides an opportunity to military ruler to take-over regime 
from the civilian government.     
In sum, Table 1.9 indicates that the pattern of regime change from democratic to 
autocratic is different from autocratic to democratic. 
1.7. Conclusion 
Pakistan became an independent state without proper legislation, Constitution or 
economic base. These unfavorable initial conditions seem to have had far-reaching 
impacts on Pakistan’s political development. Pakistan failed to develop its political 
institutions early mainly due to an absence of Constitutional guidance or visionary 
leadership, coupled with unbalanced political, economic and administrative power 
between the East and West Wings. These factors enabled the bureaucracy and military 
to play strong roles.     
Pakistan’s army is professional and well-organized. However, its political 
involvement, particularly at the nation’s early foundation stage, changed its roles and 
objective. It seems willing to intervene in political affairs with the noble objective of 
‘nation building’ but its after-intervention activities show that the aim of intervention 
is to protect its own institutional and corporate interests.  
Democracy has not taken root in Pakistan mainly due to its weak political institutions, 
lack of active civil societies and middle class, ethnic politics and low education levels, 
coupled with a strong elite, bureaucracy and military. Analysis shows that Pakistan’s 
judiciary, bureaucracy and military institutions are not playing the role which they are 
supposed to play.     
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Table 1.1:Regime – Wise US Foreign Assistance to Pakistan 
(Billion US $) 
Regime US Assistance Total Economic Military 
R – I : Democratic 4.0 1.8 5.8 
R – II : Autocratic 19.6 2.6 22.2 
R – III : Democratic 3.5 0.0 3.5 
R – IV : Autocratic 4.9 3.2 8.1 
R – V : Democratic 1.7 0.7 2.4 
R – VI : Autocratic 3.9 1.6 5.5 
R – VII : Democratic 4.0 1.9 5.9 
Total: Democratic 13.1 4.4 17.6 
Total: Autocratic 28.3 7.5 35.8 
Grand Total 41.5 11.9 53.4 
Note: Figures are inflation-adjusted and presented in 2011 constant US$.  
Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants – Obligations and Loan Authorizations 
(Greenbook) (http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/) (assessed on 2013/11/17) 
 
 
Table 1.2: Details of Regime Change to and from Democratic 
Transition Who Whom When Why 
Democratic to 
Autocratic 
President 
(Iskandar Mirza) 
Prime Minister 
(Malik Feroz Khan 
Noon) 
October 07, 1958 
Power tussle, 
political instability, 
food crisis etc 
Autocratic to 
Democratic 
Politician 
(Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) 
President 
(General Yahya 
Khan) 
December 20, 1971 
Handover charge due 
to political and civil 
pressure 
Democratic to 
Autocratic 
Military Chief 
(General Zia-ul-Haq) 
Prime Minister 
(Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) July 07, 1977 
Political instability 
and deteriorated law 
and order condition 
Autocratic to 
Democratic 
Acting President 
(Ghulam Ishaq Khan) 
President 
(General Zia-ul-Haq) August 17, 1988 
Zia’s Death in plane 
crash 
Democratic to 
Autocratic 
Military Chief 
(General Pervez 
Musharraf) 
Prime Minister 
(Mian Nawaz Sharif) October 12, 1999 
Confrontation with 
military on Kargil 
Issue 
Autocratic to 
Democratic 
Acting President 
(Mohammadmian 
Soomro) 
President 
(General (Rtd.) 
Pervez Musharraf) 
August 18, 2008 
Handover charge due 
to completion of 
tenure 
Source: Author’s compilation based on information obtained from Pakistan’s National Assembly 
website (http://na.gov.pk/en/presidents.php) (assessed on August 13, 2014) 
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Table 1.3: Sector wise Economic Growth during 1957 – 58 
(% age) 
Economic Sector 1957 1958 Δ 
GDP Growth 3 2.5 -0.5 
Agriculture 2.3 1.9 -0.4 
Major Crop 3.6 1.2 -2.4 
Industrial 5.9 5.6 -0.3 
Service 2.8 2.1 -0.7 
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan (2010)  
 
Table 1.4: Essential Crop Production during 1957 – 1958 
(‘000’ Tones) 
Crops 1957 1958 % Δ 
Wheat 3639 3564 -2.1 
Rice 844 875 3.7 
Maize 469 447 -4.7 
Gram 692 664 -4.0 
Bajra (Pearl Millet) 314 329 4.8 
Jowar (Sorghum) 259 186 -28.2 
Barley 116 127 9.5 
Moong (Mung Bean) 26 22 -15.4 
Mash (White Lentil) 13 12 -7.7 
Masoor (Red Lentil) 34 31 -8.8 
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan (2010)  
 
 
Table 1.5: Inflation and External Sector Performance during 1957 – 1958 
 1957 1958 % Δ 
Consumer Price Index (1959 – 60 = 100)    
Overall 91.31 98.47 7.8 
Food and Beverage 85.23 94.35 10.7 
    
External Sector    
    
Export (Million US$) 337.7 298.7 -11.5 
Manufacturing (1954–55 =100) 4795.98 1397.87 -70.9 
Foreign Exchange Reserves (Million US$) 252 185 -26.6 
  Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan (2010)  
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Table 1.6: GDP per capita in East and West Pakistan 
(in Rupees) 
Year East Pakistan 
West 
Pakistan 
Disparity 
Ratio 
1949 – 50 293 342 1.17 
1954 – 55 290 354 1.22 
1959 – 60 269 355 1.32 
1964 – 65 293 426 1.45 
1969 – 70 314 504 1.61 
Data Source: Figures from 1949 to 1965 are Stern (1968) 
Table 1(a). Figure for 1969 – 70 is from Zaidi (2005) 
Table 6.11.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1.7: Distribution of Population 
(Million) 
Year East Pakistan West Pakistan East Pakistan Share (%) 
1950 42.25 35.31 54.5 
1955 47.7 39.87 54.5 
1960 53.58 45.03 54.3 
1965 61.3 51.1 54.5 
Data Source: Figures from 1949 to 1965 are Stern (1968) Table 1(a). 
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Table 1.8: Relative Position of Trade Balance in East and West Pakistan (1950 – 1965) 
(Rs. In Million) 
Year 
East Pakistan West Pakistan 
Export Import Surplus/ 
Deficit 
Ratio of 
Import/ 
Export 
Export Import Surplus/ 
Deficit 
Ratio of 
Import/ 
Export 
1950 628 391 237 62.3 565 930 -365 164.6 
1951 1211 515 696 42.5 1342 1184 158 88.2 
1952 1087 856 231 78.7 922 1504 -582 163.1 
1953 642 407 235 63.4 867 1065 -198 122.8 
1954 654 311 343 47.6 641 845 -204 131.8 
1955 732 332 400 45.4 491 801 -310 163.1 
1956 1041 376 665 36.1 743 982 -239 132.2 
1957 909 841 68 92.5 698 1525 -827 218.5 
1958 988 748 240 75.7 434 1320 -886 304.1 
1959 881 579 302 65.7 444 1036 -592 233.3 
1960 1080 682 398 63.1 763 1807 -1044 236.8 
1961 1259 1039 220 82.5 540 2181 -1641 403.9 
1962 1301 899 402 69.1 543 2243 -1700 413.1 
1963 1249 1059 190 84.8 998 2086 -1088 209.0 
1964 1224 1499 -275 122.5 1075 2985 -1910 277.7 
1965 1268 1726 -458 136.1 1151 3674 -2523 319.2 
Data Source: Figures are from Stern (1968) Table 2(a) & (b). 
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Table 1.9: Pattern of Regime Change 
Regime Change/Reasoning Political Economic Social Institutional 
     
Democracy to Autocracy Yes Yes No Yes 
Autocracy to Democracy Yes No Yes No 
Democracy to Autocracy Yes Yes Yes No 
Autocracy to Democracy Smooth Transition due to Death of President Zia 
Democracy to Autocracy Yes Yes No Yes 
Autocracy to Democracy Yes No Yes No 
Source: Author’s Compilation 
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Figure 1.1: Brief Time Line for Pakistan’s Major Political Events 
 
1947 Independence from British Colony 
1948 War with India on Kashmir Issue 
1956 Promulgation of First Constitution of Pakistan  
1958 Regime Change - Military Takeover by General Ayub Khan 
1962 Introduction of New Constitution by General Ayub  
1965 War with India on Kashmir Issue 
1969 General Ayub Handover Charge to General Yahya Khan 
1971 War with India on Kashmir Issue and Regime Change – Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Became President 
1973 Introduction of New Constitution by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
1977 Regime Change – Military Takeover by General Zial – ul – Haq 
1988 General Zia’s Death and Fresh Election 
1990 President Ghulam Ishaq Khan Dissolve Assemblies – Mian Nawaz Sharif  Became Prime Minister 
1993 President Ghulam Ishaq Khan Dissolve Assemblies – Benazir Bhutto Became Prime Minister 
1996 President Sardar Farooq Ahmed Lagari Dissolve Assemblies – Mian Nawaz Sharif Became Prime Minister 
1999 Regime Change – Military Takeover by General Pervez Musharraf 
2002 Fresh Election Held – Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali Became Prime Minister 
2008 Fresh Election Held – Syed Yousaf Raza Gailani Became Prime Minister 
2013 Fresh Election Held – Mian Nawaz Sharif Became Prime Minister 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Figure 1.2: Trend of US Assistance to Pakistan 
 
Note: Figures are inflation-adjusted and presented in 2011 constant US$.  
Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants – Obligations and Loan Authorizations 
(Greenbook) (http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/) (assessed on 2013/11/17)   
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Figure 1.3: Factors Influencing the 1st Regime Transition – Democratic to Autocratic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s work 
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Figure 1.4: Factors influencing the 2nd Regime Transition – Autocratic to Democratic 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Work 
 
Figure 1.5: Share of Manufacturing Output in total GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Data Source: Figures from 1949 to 1965 are Stern (1968) Table 1(b). 
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Figure 1.6: Factors influencing the 3rd Regime Transition – Democratic to Autocratic 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Work 
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Figure 1.7:  Relative Share of Public Sector Investment in Large – Scale Manufacturing Sector 
Data Source: Zaidi (2005) Table 6.16 
 
Figure 1.8: Factors influencing the 5th Regime Transition – Democratic to Autocratic 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Work 
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Figure 1.9: Factors influencing the 6th Regime Change – Autocratic to Democratic 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Work 
 
  
Pressure Group  
Confrontation 
with Judiciary 
Liberalized Media 
Regime Change 
to 
Democratic 
Autocratic Regim
e 
  
63 
 
Appendix 1-A:  Military’s Corporate Interest – Details of Businesses 
  
Part I: Pakistan Army 
Fauji Foundation Army Welfare Trust 
Commercial Business Public Listed Company: 
1) Fully Owned Projects: Askari General Insurance Company 
Limited 
a) Fauji Cereals   
b) Foundation Gas   
c) Overseas Employment Services  
d) Fauji Foundation Experimental and 
Seed Multiplication Farm  
Public Unlisted Companies: 
1) Associated Companies a) MAL Pakistan Ltd 
a) Fauji Fertilizer Company Limited b) Askari Securities Ltd 
b) Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim Limited  
c) Fauji Cement Company Limited  
d) Fauji Oil Terminal and Distribution 
Company Limited 
Private Limited Companies: 
e) Fauji Kabirwala Power Company 
Limited 
a) Askari Aviation Pvt Ltd 
f) Fauji Akbar Portia Marine Terminal 
(Pvt.) Limited 
b) Askari Guards Pvt Ltd 
g) Fauji Security (Pvt.) Limited c) Askari Enterprises Pvt Ltd 
h) Foundation Power Company Daharki 
Limited  
d) Fauji Security Services Pvt Ltd 
i) Mari Petroleum Company Limited Other Business Units: 
j) Pakistan Maroc Phosphate S.A. 
Morocco  
 
k) Askari Bank Limited a) Askari Real Estate  
i) Askari Cement Company b) Askari Woolen Mills 
2) Under Implementation c) Askari Shoe Project 
a) Foundation Wind Energy – I d) Askari CNG 
b) Foundation Wind Energy – II  e) Askari Farms and Seeds 
Health Care f) Army Welfare Sugar Mills 
1) Urban Hospitals g) Blue Lagoon & Army Welfare Mess 
a) Fauji Foundation Hospital, Rawalpindi  
b) Fauji Foundation Hospital, Peshawar  
c) Fauji Foundation Hospital, Lahore  
d) Shaukat Omar Memorial Hospital, 
Karachi 
 
2) Semi – Urban Hospitals  
a) Fauji Foundation Hospital, Jhelum  
b) Fauji Foundation Hospital, Kallar 
Kahar 
 
c) Fauji Foundation Hospital, Sialkot  
d) Fauji Foundation Hospital, Khanewal  
e) Fauji Foundation Hospital, Faisalabad  
3) Rural Hospitals  
a) Fauji Foundation Hospital, Lachi 
(Kohat) 
 
b) Fauji Foundation Hospital, Mansehra  
4) Other Health Care Units  
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a) Fauji Foundation Medical Centers   
b) Dispensaries  
c) Mobile Dispensaries   
d) Artificial Limb Center  
e) Nursing School  
f) Medical College  
Education and Training Centers  
1) Vocational Training Centers  
2) Technical Training Centers   
3) Model Schools  
4) Secondary High Schools  
5) Foundation University  
6) Institutes  
a) Institute of Engineering and 
Management Science 
 
b) Foundation University Medical College  
c) Foundation University College of Arts 
and Science 
 
Source: Fauji Foundation (http://www.fauji.org.pk) and Army Welfare Trust (http://www.awt.com.pk) 
(Accessed on October 10, 2014)  
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Part II: Pakistan Air Force and Pakistan Navy 
Shaheen Foundation Bahria Foundation 
Aviation Trade and Services 
a) Shaheen Airport Services a) Falah Trading Agency 
b) SAPS Aviation College b) Bahria Logistic Cell 
c) SAPS International Trip Planning 
Services 
c) Maritime Services 
d) Air Eagle Aviation Academy d) Bahria Container Terminal 
e) Air Eagle e) Bahria Security System and Services 
 f) Bahria Travels 
Real Estate g) Bahria Recruiting Agency 
 h) Bahria Filling Station 
a) Shaheen Complex Lahore i) Bahria Pharmacy 
b) Shaheen Complex Karachi  
c) Shaheen Housing Scheme Projects Industrial Units 
d) Educational Services  
e) Fazia Education System Schools Bahria Paints 
  
Information Technology Engineering Services 
  
a) Ensign Communiqué Boat Building and Engineering 
Services  
b) Infospan Inc.  
 Real Estate 
Trades and Services  
 a) Bahria Complex – I 
a) Shaheen Aero Traders b) Bahria Complex – II  
b) Shaheen Insurance c) Bahria Complex – III  
c) Shaheen Knitwear d) Bahria Developers and Constructions 
d) Shaheen Medical Services e) Bahria Enterprise System and 
Technologies 
e) Shaheen Fuel Filling Stations  
 Agriculture 
 Cattle Farming 
  
  
Source: Shaheen Foundation (http://www.shaheenfoundation.com);  
Bahria Foundation (http://www.bahriafoundation.com) (Accessed October 18, 2014) 
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Chapter 2  
Long-Run Sources of Economic Growth:  
A Regime-wise Analysis for Pakistan Economy 
2.1. Introduction 
What determines long-run economic growth – factor accumulation or productivity? 
This is one of the fundamental questions investigated since Solow’s (1957) classic 
work on technical change. The growth literature shows divergent views. A large 
number of researchers believe that factor accumulation is a key driver for economic 
growth (see Mankiw et al, 1992; World Bank, 1993; Barro et al, 1995; Mankiw, 1995; 
World Bank, 1995; Young, 1995; World Bank, 2000).  Young (1995), for instance, 
argues that the fundamental source of growth behind the extraordinary Asian Tiger40 
performance was accumulation of factors, not productivity. In contrast, a substantial 
amount of research shows that factor accumulation is not the main driver for 
economic growth (see Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; King and Levine, 
1994; Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Easterly, 1999; 
Collier et al, 2000; Easterly and Levine, 2001). Hall and Jones (1999) show that the 
difference in per worker output among countries is partly explained by difference in 
factor inputs. He argues that a large chunk of difference in per worker output between 
countries is explained by differences in productivity. Giving this debate, we intend to 
determine long-run sources of growth for Pakistan economy. 
Pakistan is an interesting case study because of three main reasons. First, Pakistan’s 
economic growth41 remained modest during the period under study. Average output 
per capita growth fluctuated around the mean of 2.2 percent. However, the patterns of 
                                                          
40 Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea 
41 As determined by log difference of real GDP per capita. 
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growth differ in various political regimes. For example, growth under the autocratic 
regime, on average, is higher than under a democratic regime (see Figure 2.1).  
Second, in early 1960s, Pakistan economy was growing at an average per capita 
growth of 4 percent. It was growing with other East Asian economies and considered 
as a miracle economy (Husain, 2009). However, over the time we have observed that 
Pakistan economy remained underdeveloped and majority of East Asian economies 
have changed their economic status. Finally, Pakistan economy experienced frequent 
change in its political regimes. In its total life of 67 years, Pakistan spent 32 years in 
autocratic regimes.  The growing debate over fundamental sources of growth and 
uneven growth pattern for Pakistan motivate us to analyze what determine growth 
pattern under different regimes. More specifically, using the Pakistan case, we aim to: 
(i) determine the main driver(s) for economic growth; (ii) examine the effect of 
change in political regime on patterns of economic growth; and (iii) estimate the 
determinants of total factor productivity.  
We determine the source of growth by regime. Here the term ‘regime’ refers to a 
political regime which may either be democratic or autocratic. We consider a regime 
is democratic if the chief executive assumes power through election and open 
competition. If the chief executive takes the position by forcefully seizure of political 
power then it is considered an autocratic regime. An autocratic regime may take 
different forms, but for the analysis of this study, we refer it to an autocratic regime as 
a military42 regime which assumes political power in a coup d’état.         
Following Solow (1957), Griliches & Jorgenson (1967), Barro (1999) and Bosworth 
& Collins (2008), we use a growth accounting framework in decomposing Pakistan’s 
                                                          
42 The term ‘military’ is general which includes army, navy and air force but for us the term ‘military’ 
means Pakistan Army only. 
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economic growth into its components by regime. We also develop an econometric 
model and estimate the determinants of productivity level and its growth. 
Understanding the right source of growth is important for two major reasons. First, if 
the main driver of growth is factor accumulation, then it is well established that the 
economy cannot grow forever (Solow, 1957, Lucas, 1988); but if the prime source of 
growth is productivity, then a country can sustain and improve its growth. Second, 
policy implication varies from one source to another. For instance, if the fundamental 
source of growth appears to be a factor accumulation, then the key policy implication 
may be generation of additional funds for investment in productivity enhancing 
goods43 to sustain growth. 
Similarly, analysis of source of growth by regime is important because policy 
conditions for growth may differ by regime. For example, provisions of basic public 
goods such as national defense services, health facilities, schooling, utilities, road 
networks etc. to the electorate are the prime concerns of a democratic regime. Private 
property rights are more secure under a democratic regime. Secure property rights 
induce investment in physical capital as well as technology and research and 
development (R&D). An autocratic regime is generally unaccountable to the citizenry, 
which may motivate an autocrat to divert scarce resources for personal gain. Similarly, 
the higher risk of expropriation under an autocratic regime reduces incentives to 
invest in physical capital, technology and R&D.        
Our main contributions to the literature are threefold: first, while a lot of studies have 
been done on the democracy-growth nexus (see Sirowy and Inkeles, 1991; Alesina 
and Rodrik, 1994; Alesina et al, 1996; Rodrik, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2006; and 
                                                          
43 Such as investment in R&D, technology, human capital etc  
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Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu, 2008), to the best of our knowledge, there has been no 
study which develops an explicit linkages between regime, productivity and growth. 
Using the Pakistan case, we attempt to establish explicit linkages between regime and 
economic growth through productivity. Thus, our research sheds light on how regime 
policy changes the composition of growth.  
Our second contribution is decomposition of Pakistan’s economic growth by 
incorporating human capital as an additional input. Data constraints forced previous 
studies to decompose growth by considering only capital and labor inputs (see Burney, 
1986; Khan, 2006; Hussain, 2009). Following Hall and Jones (1999), we develop an 
index of human capital on the basis of average years of schooling. Development of 
human capital series is our third contribution towards Pakistan’s growth literature.  
Using growth accounting framework, we found that in case of Pakistan, the long-run 
sources of economic growth are mixed. In early years, the main source of output 
growth per worker was productivity. However, in recent years, the main driver of 
growth is human capital. One of the reasons why Pakistan fails to change its 
economic status is that Pakistan ignored investment in physical and human capital 
accumulations in early years. Econometric analysis showed that the main 
determinants of total factor productivity are investment in health facility, increase in 
life expectancy, government spending on development projects and other government 
general spending, foreign assistance and export of goods and services. Our main 
conclusion is that in the short-run, political regime matters in determining the level 
and growth of total factor productivity. However, in the long-run, there is no 
systematic difference in determining total factor productivity under various political 
regimes.   
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The paper progresses as follows: the next Section analyzes very briefly Pakistan’s 
political structure. Section 2.3 establishes linkages between a regime and components 
of growth. The theoretical framework is explained in Section 2.4, followed by 
variable formulation and data sources in Section 2.5.  Using a growth accounting 
framework, regime-wise productivity analysis is shown in Section 2.6. Econometric 
methodology and empirical results are respectively explained in Section 2.7 and 2.8. 
The final Section concludes the discussion. 
2.2. Political Structure of Pakistan 
Pakistan became an independent country on August 14, 1947. At that time, Pakistan 
comprised two Wings: the East Wing (present Bangladesh) and the West Wing (the 
present Pakistan). Pakistan lost its East Wing in December 1971 mainly because of 
policy negligence.  
In the early years of independence, Pakistan was politically unstable because of a lack 
of political leadership,44 migrant influx, political and economic mismanagement and 
lower literacy and educational levels, coupled with a strong bureaucracy and military. 
A power struggle between political parties and the bureaucracy supported by the 
military led to the first military coup d’état in October 1958. This opened the way for 
a subsequent coup d’état. Consequently, Pakistan has experienced two more military 
coups d’état, one in July 1977 and another in October 1999. In its 67 years, Pakistan 
has spent 32 years under military control (see Table 2.1).  
On the democratic front, Pakistan has also experienced frequent changes in political 
government. The 1990s were the longest democratic period; but in this time, the 
                                                          
44 Pakistan’s founder passed away in September 1948; the first Prime Minister of Pakistan was 
assassinated in 1951. 
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regime changed four times, mainly because of economic mismanagement and 
corruption.   
2.3. Conceptual Framework 
 We argue that regime matters for determination of economic growth. In this section, 
we explain the possible channels by which regime can affect productivity and 
subsequent economic growth. Figure 2.2 shows potential linkages between political 
regime and economic growth. The inner rectangles represent positive association 
between political regimes and economic growth whereas the outer circles show 
negative relation between them.  
 The first channel that may affect productivity is a democratic regime’s commitments. 
In a democratic regime, the government is accountable to the electorate. The regime 
generally makes commitments for the betterment of society. ‘Credible’ commitments 
such as securing private property rights reduce uncertainty and encourage investment. 
Profit-maximizing individuals and firms have an incentive to allocate some portion of 
their investment in training employees, R&D, and developing or importing new 
technology. These additional investments in technology and R&D can improve 
productivity and economic growth (see inner rectangles of Figure 2.2).     
Legitimacy of the regime is another channel which may increase productivity. An 
autocratic regime does not generally have the support of the masses, so it needs to 
legitimize itself. One option that an autocrat may use is provision of a conducive 
investment environment. The regime may secure property rights or invest in public 
goods. Securing property rights or provision of basic public goods may directly 
influence productivity and economic growth.  
  
72 
 
In some circumstances a regime may harm productivity. For instance, in a multi-party 
political system, a government may be formed in coalition, in which case it is highly 
likely that a substantial amount of scarce resources may be diverted to satisfy multiple 
demands of coalition partners. Hence, resource divergence may boost current 
government expenditure and reduce resources for investment in public goods (see 
outer circles of Figure 2.2). Consequently, the reduction in investment may reduce 
productivity and economic growth.  
Another channel by which a regime may affect productivity involves people’s rights. 
In a democratic regime, people are free to stand up for their rights. This encourages 
the formation of unions, particularly labor unions which fight for higher wages and 
conditions. Acceding to union demands increases production costs and reduces profit. 
Lower profits may induce firms to cut investment in employees training or R&D, in 
turn reducing productivity and economic growth.  
An autocratic regime may lower incentives for productivity-enhancing investment for 
at least two reasons. First, in an autocratic regime there are increased risks of 
expropriation that may lower the incentive for investment in accumulating physical 
and human capital. Lower investment in technology-embodied capital or training may 
reduce output-generating capacity and hence productivity.  
The second reason may be related to regime style. Autocrats are not generally 
accountable; they may devote a nation’s scarce resources for personal gain. Higher 
personal gains may foster current consumption relative to future consumption, which 
may lower the nation’s future productive capacity. Lower productivity and economic 
growth may be the result.  
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2.4. Methodology 
The growth-accounting framework essentially decomposes output growth into factor 
inputs and productivity. Solow’s (1957) seminal paper and Griliches and Jorgenson’s 
(1967) theoretical and empirical work are useful guidelines for decomposing growth 
into its components. We use a growth-accounting framework to decompose Pakistan’s 
economic growth. In this section, we explain the theoretical framework for 
decomposing growth of output into its components.  
2.4.1. Theoretical Framework 
Broadly speaking, the literature shows two alternative approaches in analysis of 
productivity growth: (i) a growth-accounting framework and (ii) a direct econometric 
approach. The first is based on assumptions of constant returns to scale and 
competitive markets. These assumptions help to identify production parameters in 
estimating relative contributions of factor inputs and productivity to total output. 
Capital share and labor compensation in total output are used as weights in 
determining relative contributions. In the second approach, we do not need 
assumptions about the market, but we explore alternative functional forms for a given 
country’s production function. We use both approaches for determination and analysis 
of Pakistan’s productivity and growth. Details of each approach are explained below. 
2.4.1.1. Growth Accounting Framework – A Case of General Production Function 
Suppose aggregate output Y can be produced by using two inputs – capital K and 
skilled labor H.  The basic aggregate production function over time can be represented: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑡,𝐻𝑡) 
If H ≡  AhL then, 
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𝑌𝑡 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑡, (𝐴ℎ𝐿)𝑡) 
Here A is labor-augmenting technology or simply Total Factor Productivity (TFP), h 
is average level of human capital associated with labor force, L is employed labor 
force and t is time index. Let y represent output per worker and k represent capital per 
worker; the above aggregate production function can be represented per worker as 
follows: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐹(𝑘𝑡, (𝐴ℎ)𝑡)                               (1) 
Differentiating Equation (1) with respect to time and simplifying, we get 
?̇?
𝑦
=  ?̇?
𝐴
+ 𝐴𝑓𝑘𝑘
𝑦
𝑘
𝑘
̇ + 𝐴𝑓ℎℎ
𝑦
ℎ
ℎ
̇
 
Here,  𝐴𝑓𝑘  and 𝐴𝑓ℎ represent marginal products of physical and human capital 
respectively. If a market is competitive, which we assume, these marginal products 
are rental rate and wage rate respectively. The terms �𝐴𝑓𝑘𝐾
𝑌
� and �𝐴𝑓ℎ𝐻
𝑌
� represent 
compensation share of physical capital (φ) and human capital (ω) in total output. 
Under constant returns to scale assumption, the compensation share of human capital 
is one minus the compensation share of physical capital (i. e.   ω =  1 −  φ). Thus the 
growth rate of output per worker  �ẏ
y
�  can be decomposed into growth rate of 
productivity �?̇̇?
𝐴
� and factor inputs growth �?̇?
𝑘
 and ℎ
ℎ
 ̇ � as follows: 
?̇?
𝑦
=  ?̇?
𝐴
+ 𝜑 𝑘
𝑘
̇ + (1 − 𝜑) ℎ
ℎ
̇
 
g𝑦 =  𝑔𝐴 + 𝜑 𝑔𝑘 + (1 − 𝜑) 𝑔ℎ                                        (2) 
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Here, g𝑦  is growth rate of output per worker, g𝑘 and gℎ are growth rates of physical 
and human capital respectively. Equation (2) implies that growth of output per worker 
is nothing but a sum of productivity growth and weighted sum of factor inputs growth. 
Under constant returns to scale assumption, these weights are share of capital and 
labor compensation in total output. From Equation (2) we can also determine 
productivity growth, which is simply the difference between growth of output per 
worker and growth of inputs per worker:  
g𝐴 = g𝑦 − [𝜑g𝑘 + (1 − 𝜑)gℎ]          (3) 
Equation (3) implies that the total factor productivity growth is the residual of output 
per worker growth and weighted sum of factor inputs growth. The prime advantage of 
this growth decomposition exercise is that we do not need to assume any explicit form 
for production function. It is valid for any form of production function. However, for 
empirical simplicity, researchers 45  generally assume Cobb-Douglas Production 
Function. The following discussion explains how output per worker growth can be 
decomposed into its components under the Cobb-Douglas Production Function.  
2.4.1.2. Growth Accounting Framework – A Case of Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
Assuming constant-return-to-scale and Cobb-Douglas production function, the 
aggregate production function can explicitly be written as: 
Y𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡𝜑(𝐴ℎ𝐿)𝑡1−𝜑              (4) 
Where A is labor-augmenting technology, h is the average level of human capital 
associated with a labor force, 𝜑  and 1 − 𝜑  are output elasticities with respect to 
physical capital and skilled labor inputs respectively. The alternative interpretations of 
                                                          
45 For example: Hall and Jones (1999), Easterly and Levine (2001), Bosworth and Collin (2008) etc. 
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𝜑  and 1 − 𝜑  are the share of capital and labor compensation in total output 
respectively. Per worker, the Equation (4) becomes: 
y𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡𝜑(𝐴ℎ)𝑡1−𝜑 
y𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝑘𝑡𝜑ℎ𝑡1−𝜑         (5) 
Here, y and k represent output per worker and capital per worker respectively, and A 
is equal to 𝐴𝑡
1−𝜑.  Differentiating Equation (5) with respect to time and simplifying, 
we get: 
?̇?
𝑦
= ?̇?
𝐴
+ 𝜑 ?̇?
𝑘
+ (1 − 𝜑) ℎ̇
ℎ
 
or g𝑦 = g𝐴 + 𝜑g𝑘 + (1 − 𝜑)gℎ 
The total factor productivity growth is the residual of growth of output per worker and 
growth of factor inputs:  
g𝐴 = g𝑦 − [𝜑g𝑘 + (1 − 𝜑)gℎ]     (6) 
Comparing Equation (6) with Equation (3) we get the same result. Thus, we can 
safely say that assuming Cobb-Douglas production function for empirical simplicity 
will not harm our analysis.  
2.5. Variable Formulation and Data Sources 
We use over six decades of data, from 1950 to 2010. Our main data sources are 
Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2013) and the State Bank of Pakistan (2010).  The next 
section explains details of variable construction and trend.  
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2.5.1. Output Per Worker 
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is used as a measure for output. The data for this 
variable is obtained from Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2013). It is measured at 
constant 2005 national prices and denoted in US dollars. Data on output per worker is 
then derived by dividing the real GDP over the employed labor force (see Section 
2.5.3 for further detail on this variable). 
Table 2.2 reports Pakistan’s real GDP growth trends compared to other countries in 
the region.  Panel A contains data of real GDP growth for Pakistan-bordering 
countries; Panel B has the same data for various regions of the world. Over more than 
six decades Pakistan has had average output growth of about 5%; while this growth 
was volatile, it remained above 4% in the 1960s, 1980s and 2000s. Pakistan’s growth 
performance was better than its neighboring countries in the 1960s to 1980s, but it 
lost its comparative ranking in the next two decades. Regionally, in the 1960s, 
Pakistan’s real output grew 3% more than South Asia as a whole; during 1960–1990 it 
also performed better than other regions of the world except the Middle East and 
North Africa. In the 1980s, Pakistan’s economic performance was more or less at par 
with East Asian economies but it became only half theirs in the 2000s.  
Table 2.3 explains output trends per worker. Pakistan’s output per worker has 
fluctuated around the mean growth of 2.2% over the last six decades. The 1960s seem 
better and 1990s worse in terms of growth of output per worker. Pakistan’s growth 
was quite low compared to neighboring countries in the first and last two decades. 
Iran’s growth was tremendous in the first two decades but it totally lost its momentum 
thereafter. Bangladesh, India and China have been growing continuously since 1980.  
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2.5.2. Capital Stock 
The main challenge in growth accounting is the estimation of capital stock series, 
because this series is generally unavailable. Fortunately, Feenstra, Inklaar and 
Timmer’s (2013) estimation of this series include Pakistan. We use their capital stock 
series to estimate Pakistan’s TFP.  
In measuring capital stock, Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer’s FIT approach used two 
fundamental differences as compared to the standard approach46 in the literature. In 
the standard approach, investment is treated as single homogenous asset using a single 
rate of depreciation; under the FIT approach, asset-wise investment is considered and 
depreciation rates vary accordingly over asset and over time. The FIT approach 
divides total investment into six asset categories: structures (residential/non-
residential), transport equipment, computers, communications equipment, software 
and other machinery/assets.  
The second major difference concerns assumptions in estimating the initial level of 
capital stock. With a steady-state assumption, the standard approach estimates the 
initial level of capital stock by the following formula: 
K0 = 𝐼0𝑔𝐼 + 𝛿 
Here, K0 and 𝐼0 are initial levels of capital stock and investment respectively; 𝑔𝐼 is the 
(steady-state) growth rate of investment, and δ is the depreciation rate. This requires a 
very strong assumption about the first year for which investment data is available. It 
assumed that for the first available year, a country is at a steady-state level, and the 
steady-state growth rate of investment can be easily identified. For computation of 
                                                          
46 In the literature, Caselli (2005) is considered the standard approach.  
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steady-state growth rate of investment, different years are used in the literature. For 
instance, Harberger (1978) uses the first three available years’ average, and Caselli 
(2005) uses the first ten to twenty years to estimate the steady-state investment growth 
rate. Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) explain various alternative methods for estimating 
the initial level of capital stock.  
The FIT approach estimates the initial level of capital stock on the basis of starting 
capital/output ratio. The following relationship is used under the FIT approach for 
estimating the initial level of capital stock: 
K0 = 𝑌0 ×  𝑘 
Here, K0 and 𝑌0 are respectively the initial levels of capital stock and GDP; k is the 
assumed capital/output ratio. On the basis of cross–country regression analysis, the 
FIT approach concludes that the initial capital output ratio for non-ICT (information 
and communication technology) assets is 2.7 (the median value for the sample 
countries); for structures (2.2); for transport equipment (0.1); and for other machinery 
and assets (0.3) is sufficient. However, for ICT assets, the initial capital output ratio is 
assumed to be zero (for further detail, see Inklaar and Timmer 2013, 7 – 11).  
Given the initial capital stock for asset i and time period t, the FIT approach estimates 
the series of capital stock for asset i for a given country by using perpetual inventory 
method, as follows: 
K𝑖𝑡 = I𝑖𝑡 + (1 − δ𝑖𝑡) K𝑖𝑡−1 
Where δ𝑖𝑡 is the depreciation rate for assets i at time t. To estimate the current value 
of capital stock, the FIT approach multiplies the capital stock for asset i with its 
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relevant asset price (𝑃𝑖𝑡 ). For aggregate capital stock at constant price, the FIT 
approach uses following formula: 
∆logRK𝑡 = ∑ ?̅?𝑖𝑡𝑖 ∆𝑙𝑙𝑔𝐾𝑖𝑡              (7) 
Here, 
?̅?𝑖𝑡 = 12 (𝜃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡−1)  and  𝜃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑖𝑡 ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑖𝑡𝑖⁄  
Equation (7) estimates the growth rate of aggregate capital stock at time t and the 
level is defined as the total capital stock at 2005 prices. By this process, the FIT 
approach estimates the series of real capital stock for Pakistan from 1950 to 2010.  
As Equation (2) above explains, change in output mainly involves two factors: factor 
input change or productivity change. The former comprises labor and capital inputs. 
The change in capital input is generally considered as change in quantity not quality, 
because quality change is included in productivity. 
Capital output ratios for Pakistan and its neighboring countries are given in Table 2.4, 
where it is evident that capital to output ratio for Pakistan fell over the first three 
decades, remained stagnant during the 1980s and 1990s, and start increasing in the 
2000s. For India, this ratio remained stagnant at around 1.5 in the first three decades, 
then increased to 2.2. For China and Bangladesh, the ratio showed an increasing trend. 
Bangladesh started its journey with a relatively low ratio of 1.2 in the 1960s but 
showed the relatively high ratio of 2.9 in the 2000s. Similarly, China started from a 
ratio of 1.8 and showed a ratio of 3.3 in the 2000s. Iran showed an inverted u-shaped 
trend, increasing from 2.9 in the 1960s to a peak of 10.3 in the 1980s, then declining 
to 3.2 in the 2000s. 
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2.5.3. Labor Input 
Labor input data is obtained from Heston, Summers and Aten (2012); actually, data 
on this variable is not directly available, but is computed from the series of real GDP 
per worker. Once we have data on output and output per worker, it is easy to obtain 
labor input series by simply manipulating the following definitional equation: 
Output per worker ≡ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂
𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐸𝐸 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝐿 𝐹𝑙𝐿𝐹𝐸 
This implies that 
Employed Labor Force = 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑂𝐸𝐿 𝑤𝑙𝐿𝑘𝐸𝐿 
Ideally, the unit of employed labor force would be hours per worker. Unfortunately, 
we do not have this data, so we use number of workers employed instead of hours per 
worker as labor input.  
As stated above, output change has mainly occurred because of either factor inputs 
change or productivity change. Factor inputs comprise labor input and capital input. 
Changes in labor input can be observed in quantity (change in number of labor 
working hours or change in number of labor employed) or quality (change in 
education, skills, sex or age composition). Because of limited availability of relevant 
data, our productivity estimates account only for changes in number of labor 
employed and changes in education. These imply that our estimate for productivity is 
upwardly biased. 
Table 2.5 reports growth of employed labor force. Pakistan’s employed labor force 
grew on average 2.5% over the more than six decades. In the 1950s, average 
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employment growth was just 1%, which may reflect lower industrial and agricultural 
bases in the early years of independence. From 1980 onwards, it grew more than 3%. 
Regionally, Pakistan’s average employment growth is higher than in neighboring 
countries except for Iran.  
India’s labor employment showed an inverted u-shape growth, with the average of 
around 2% per annum: from 1.3% in the 1950s, it reached a maximum of 2.2% in the 
1980s and then declined. In the 2000s, it grew at an average of 1.8% per annum. 
Bangladesh’s labor force fluctuates around a mean growth of 2.3%, almost equal to 
Pakistan’s average. China recorded the lowest average growth of employed labor 
force in the region. It grew on average at 1.7% a year in 1951-2010. Surprisingly, in 
recent decades, China’s average growth has been under 0.5%.  
Table 2.6 compares Pakistan’s labor force participation rate to that of neighboring 
countries. Over the last three decades, Pakistan’s labor force participation rate has 
dropped by 5%, from 51% in 1981 to 46% in 2011. The same decline has been 
observed in India (6%) and Iran (3%). Bangladesh and China showed an increasing 
trend, substantial for Bangladesh at around 11%, while for China a marginal rate of 
around 2%. Interestingly, the female participation rate rose dramatically in Pakistan 
and Bangladesh. Pakistan’s female participation rate increased from 7% to 22%, and 
for Bangladesh it was even more, from 5% to 29%.  
Table 2.7 explains Pakistan’s distribution of employed labor force by industry. In 
1965, around 60% of the labor force was employed in the agriculture sector, declining 
to 42% in 2002. The manufacturing employment share remained at under 15% 
through the period under consideration. A higher employment share in the agriculture 
sector vs a low share in the modern sector (manufacturing) implies that people 
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continued to receive low wages. The services sector employment share showed an 
increasing trend, from 23% in 1965 to 38% in 2002.  The distribution of employment 
seemed to reverse in 2009. The employment share of the service and manufacturing 
sectors fell 4%, and the change was absorbed by the agriculture and construction 
sectors.  
2.5.4. Human Capital 
Data on human capital for Pakistan economy is not readily available. Following Hall 
and Jones (1999) we compute data on human capital on a basis of average years of 
schooling for the 15-64 years age group. It is assumed that labor L is homogenous 
across Pakistan and each unit of labor has s years of schooling. The total human 
capital H𝑡 is then estimated as follows: 
H𝑡 = 𝐸∅(𝑠𝑡)𝐿𝑡 
or in per worker terms: 
h𝑡 = 𝐸∅(𝑠𝑡) 
Where h𝑡 is human capital per worker and ∅(𝑠𝑡) is the return to schooling schedule 
that can be estimated by a Mincerian wage regression. Hall and Jones (1999), 
following Psacharopoulos (1994), assumed a piecewise linear schedule for ∅(𝑠𝑡) such 
that for the first four years of schooling the return is 13.4%; for the next four years, it 
is 10.1%; and return to schooling for beyond 8 years of schooling is estimated as 
6.8%. Data on average years of schooling is obtained from Barro and Lee (2013), 
available for 1950-2010 over the 5 years of interval. For a complete time series, data 
is interpolated within the interval.  
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It is worth mentioning that the series of human capital estimated from ‘average years 
of schooling’ only is understated and does not reflect the true human capital for 
several reasons. First, it accounts only for skills acquired in formal schooling and 
totally ignores skills acquired through other sources like informal education or private 
tutoring. Second, it does not account for skills acquired through experience or on-the-
job training. Third, the procedure does not take into account the quality of education. 
Finally, it fails to account for the difference of schooling systems across region and 
over time. For instance, Pakistan has three educational systems: the British system, a 
conventional system (divided into English medium and Urdu medium) and the 
Maddarasa (religious school). Nonetheless, the literature shows that an average year 
of schooling is a good proxy for human capital.  
Table 2.8 shows accumulation of human capital by Pakistan and neighboring 
countries. Panel A reports average years of schooling; Panel B reports growth trends 
for human capital. In 1950 the average schooling in Pakistan was about one year. Up 
to 1990, the average working population had no primary schooling. In 2010, Pakistan 
by-passed the threshold of primary schooling and the average schooling became 5.5 
years, about the same as Bangladesh and India, better than Afghanistan but poor 
compared to Iran and China. Iran’s average schooling was quite low in 1950, 
improved in 1990 and become good in 2010.  
In growth of human capital, Pakistan’s speed of accumulation was under 1% in the 
earlier three decades, and accelerated in the 1990s to 1.7% in the 2000s (see Table 
2.9). Compared to neighboring countries, in the 1950s Pakistan’s human capital 
growth was similar to neighboring countries (except China), and in the 2000s, was 
better than that of its neighbors.   
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2.5.5. Production Parameters 
The exercise for decomposition of growth of output into factor inputs and productivity 
is sensitive to output elasticity with respect to physical capital 𝜑 and labor inputs 1 − 𝜑 . This elasticity also represents the relative share of capital and labor 
compensation in total output. Equation (3) uses these shares as a weight in 
determining the relative contribution of factor inputs in generating outputs. It is a very 
useful exercise to determine the relative share of labor and capital in the Pakistan 
economy; however, the unavailability of relevant data restrained us in such an 
exercise for Pakistan. Bernanke and Gürkaynak (2002), with a sample of 53 countries, 
show that the average share of capital is equal to one-third. A standard approach in the 
growth literature is to assume the value of 𝜑  as one-third; Feenstra, Inklaar and 
Timmer (2013) do so for India. As the Indian economy is close to Pakistan’s it is not 
invalid to assume Pakistan’s capital share as one-third; this study therefore uses one-
third as a value of capital share 𝜑. 
2.6. Measuring Productivity – A Regime-wise Analysis 
The estimation of regime-wise output growth and output per worker growth is given 
in Table 2.10. Average output growth fluctuated around 5% per annum, which is 
remarkable. Since 1951, Pakistan has maintained an output growth of around 3% 
under all regimes; growth under autocratic regimes was higher than under other 
regimes. However, the contribution of labor growth in generating output growth is 
50%, which made output per worker grow at 2.2% from 1951 to 2010.  
Under the first democratic regime (1951-1957), output grew around 3% (see Table 
2.10). These were the years when Pakistan started to build its economic and political 
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bases. Then, Pakistan’s was predominantly an agrarian economy with a very small 
industrial base, a small service sector and almost no infrastructure. The Korean War 
enabled Pakistan’s mercantilist group to invest in industry under close bureaucratic 
supervision. Import substitution was the main strategy for this regime, and Pakistan’s 
average growth rate was 3%. The employed labor force grew at 1% and output per 
worker grew at around 2%.  
In Pakistan’s economic history, the first autocratic regime (1958-1971) is considered 
as the Golden Era of Economic Development. Output grew at an average 5.6% per 
annum. This phenomenal growth was backed by a green revolution, industrialization, 
trade liberalization and foreign aid. Not surprisingly, the higher output growth also 
boosted employment, which grew at 2% a year. Around 40% growth in output comes 
from labor growth.  
The average output growth under the second democratic regime (1972-1977) fell 2%, 
from about 6% to 4%. This may be attributed to the change in the economic 
environment and policies adopted by this democratic regime. The major change 
during this regime was separation of the East Wing (now Bangladesh). Before this, 
half of the output was marketed to East Pakistan and around one-fifth of all goods 
came from there. The separation involved the loss of a major market, which had to be 
compensated with the introduction of new markets.  
Other unfortunate factors beyond the control of this regime were the 1973 oil price 
shock, a world recession, failure of cotton crops and a flood which was the worst in 
recorded history. The new democratic government also made dramatic policy changes 
which had positive as well as negative effects on output growth. The major policy 
changes were nationalization of basic industries and financial institutions, land and 
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labor market reforms, public investment in heavy industry, devaluation of the 
Pakistani rupee, rises in agricultural goods’ prices and the abolishment of the Export 
Bonus Scheme which was key to the 1960s output growth.47 The second democratic 
government was more labor-oriented, and employment growth was higher under this 
regime than under the two earlier regimes.  
Output growth under the second autocratic regime (1978-1988) was remarkable. The 
6.5% annual growth was Pakistan’s highest ever. The main reason for this 
extraordinary growth was the favorable external environment, despite some 
considerable policy changes. The favorable external factors were twofold: (i) 
increased foreign aid, mainly due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and (ii) 
remittances from abroad due to the previous democratic government’s good overseas 
employment policies. Major policy changes included corporatization of state-owned-
enterprises and deregulation of business activities, reviving private sector confidence; 
introduction of an Islamic banking system; trade liberalization; and increased public 
investment in social and economic infrastructure. Employment grew by around 3% 
per annum and output per worker grew at 3.6%.  
The third democratic regime (1989-1999) was politically unstable, experiencing four 
changes of government in the Era of Structural Adjustment. Average output growth 
was 4%. Major policy options under this regime were privatization; liberalization; 
deregulation; openness; private sector development; and improved fiscal balance. 
These policies were growth-oriented but also had some negative impacts. For instance, 
the trade liberalization policy had a negative impact on the industrialization process. 
Tariff reductions increased the demand for imports which were previously 
                                                          
47 The main reason for abolishing the Export Bonus Scheme was that it benefited a few rather than 
the masses. 
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domestically produced. Rather than increasing productivity or competition, this forced 
some industries to close down. Similarly, to improve fiscal balance, the government 
had two policy options: either increase taxation or decrease expenditure. The 
governments actually opted for both; instead of increasing the tax base, the 
governments increased direct and indirect taxes. Coupled with other reasons, 48  
inflation increased sharply; the average inflation rate over this period was 10%. Under 
the second policy option, the pressure was on reducing development expenditure 
rather than less lavish expenditure. The share of development expenditure relative to 
GDP reduced from 7% in 1988 to 3.3% in 1999. The regime generated more 
employment, but most was unproductive and political rather than economic. As a 
result, under this regime employment generation growth was 2.8% and worker output 
grew at 1% only; 70% of output growth was accounted for by growth of labor.  
 Output growth under the third autocratic regime (2000-2007) was remarkable; good 
luck was again in favor of this non-elected government, which enjoyed windfall gains 
in huge foreign aid and increased foreign remittances, mainly because of the 9/11 
event and Pakistan’s becoming a front-line ally in the US-led War On Terror. Policies 
adopted by this regime were similar to those of the previous one, but the emphasis 
was more on private sector development; deregulation of business activity; fewer 
subsidies; promotion of the financial sector; and accumulation of human capital. 
Output grew at 5% per annum. Another striking feature was the increased female 
participation rate, from 15% in 1999 to over 21% in 2007. There was a rise in 
employment of around 4%, and output per worker grew at 1.2% per annum.  
                                                          
48 Such as increase in utility prices, continuous depreciation of Pakistani rupee etc. 
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The last democratic government (2008-2010) enjoyed about 3% growth in output, 
similar to the first democratic regime. Because of some poor policy decisions of the 
previous autocratic regime, this government faced a severe law-and-order situation 
and acute electricity and gas shortages, with a resultant reduction in investor 
confidence. Other challenges included a global recession and natural disaster (flood), 
which may have been responsible for lower output growth. Employment grew at 
almost at the same pace as output; output per worker grew at just 0.5% per annum. 
Table 2.11 decomposes the growth of output per worker into three components: (i) 
growth from physical capital accumulation; (ii) growth from human capital 
accumulation; and (iii) growth from productivity. It shows that in the last over six 
decades, Pakistan’s output per worker grew at an average 2.2% per annum, more than 
Afghanistan (0.1%) and Bangladesh (1.2%) but less than India (3.1%) and China 
(5.7%). 49  Growth per worker under the first and second autocratic regimes was 
substantially faster than the other regimes, at 3.6% per annum. The lowest per worker 
growth was in the most recent democratic period, at slightly above 0.5%, which may 
be attributed to excessive unproductive employment generation.  
It is also evident from Table 2.11 that there is no substantial role played by physical 
capital accumulation in generating per worker output, fluctuating around the mean of 
under 0.5%. In its early development years, Pakistan adopted import substitution 
policy as the main vehicle to achieve its goals. Unsurprisingly, under the first 
democratic regime, the contribution of physical capital accumulation was negative. 
Successive political regimes tried gradual liberalization of trade, particularly imports. 
The impact of a liberalized import policy is shown by the positive contribution of 
                                                          
49 See Table 2.3 for data on Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India and China 
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physical capital accumulation in generating per worker output. The first autocratic 
regime fully recognized the importance of physical capital accumulation and adopted 
policies which increased investment in physical capital. Under this regime, physical 
capital contributed 0.84% to per worker output growth of 3.5%. Successive regimes 
paid attention to accumulation of physical capital but there seems to have been a 
decline in relative importance.  
Surprisingly, under the third autocratic regime (2000-2007), the contribution of per 
worker physical capital again turned negative. The first five years of this regime show 
negative per worker physical capital growth (see Table 2.12); whereas in the final 
three years it showed positive growth. The negative contribution may be attributed to 
a relative change in physical stock and employed labor. Growth of the employed labor 
force was higher than growth in physical stocks, which made the net effect negative. 
One possible reason for the higher employment effect was increased female 
participation. In 1999, the female participation rate was 15.3%, which increased by 
2007 to 21.3%. The slower growth of physical capital stock may be attributed to the 
prevailing environment, when the military took over from the democratic government. 
After two years, 9/11 happened and US started its War On Terror, with Pakistan as 
one of the front line countries. All this increased uncertainty, which may have some 
effect on investor confidence.  
The contribution of human capital to per worker output showed an increasing trend, 
on average contributing 0.6% while generating 2.2% per worker output. Each 
successive regime recognized the importance of human capital. The reasons for the 
increasing trend are shown in Table 2.13 where it is evident that in six decades, the 
average years of schooling rose 4.5 years, from 1 year in 1951 to 5.5 years in 2010. It 
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can be seen that under the first democratic regime the change in average years of 
schooling was less than one month, which is very low, reflecting the government’s 
total negligence of the education sector. Public spending on health relative to GDP 
was just 0.1%. However, from 1978, these sectors became more important. The third 
democratic regime spent around 2.6% of GDP on education and 0.8% percent on 
health. The highest change in average years of schooling was observed in this regime, 
and the major source of long-term growth under the third autocratic regime was 
human capital.  
As for construction, the growth of TFP is residual: whatever is unexplained by factor 
accumulation is captured by TFP. Table 2.14 shows the relative contribution of factor 
input and productivity in generating per worker output. It is clear from the Table 2.14 
that in the last six decades, 50% of per worker output was the result of factor 
accumulation, and the other 50% was from productivity. However, the relative share 
of productivity changed from regime to regime and from time to time. Under the first 
democratic regime, there was a negative relative share of input, implying that all 
growth was generated by productivity growth. The possible reason for the very low 
share of factor input is a scarcity of physical and trained human capital in the early 
years of independence. Successive governments adopted different policy options and 
accumulated factor inputs. So, under the first autocratic and second democratic 
regimes, the share of factor inputs increased to 30% and 60% respectively, which 
lowered the share of TFP from full to 40%. Interestingly, the TFP share in generating 
per worker output rose 70% under the second autocratic regime, and declined, 
becoming negative under the fourth democratic regime.   
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2.7. Determinants of Productivity – An Econometric Analysis 
The literature identifies variables that potentially affect productivity (see Isaksson, 
2007, for a comprehensive review). In this section we will briefly explain the details 
of variables and then made an econometric model to estimate the coefficients.  
2.7.1. Variables Description 
This section briefly explains the causality between our variables of interest and 
productivity. Table 2.15 explains descriptive statistics of our sample.  
2.7.1.1. Investment in Human Capital and Productivity  
Productivity literature recognizes human capital as an important determinant of total 
factor productivity (see Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Mayer, 2001). It enhances skills, 
knowledge and absorption capacity, pre-requisites for creating or adopting technology 
(Acha et al, 2004). Generally, human capital refers to education, health, training and 
development. The most notable indicator of human capital is average years of 
education. In estimating productivity, we have already taken this variable into account 
(see Section 2.5.4). Our focus here is the health of the workforce. The ideal indicator 
for this variable is investment in employee health, by both government and private 
sector. However, because of the limited data, we focus only on government 
investment in health.  
Another indicator that has been used in the literature is life expectancy (Cole and 
Neumayer, 2003). We use government health expenditures and life expectancy at 
birth as indicators of human capital. 
Figure 2.3 plots a scatter relationship between human capital and total factor 
productivity, showing a positive relationship and re-emphasizing the importance of 
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human capital in enhancing productivity. However, in Pakistan, government spending 
on health has been very low. During the period under study, the average health 
spending was around 0.5% of GDP. There was a growth trend up to 1988, but health 
was somehow ignored in the 1990s and 2000s. Life expectancy at birth is also low 
(2010: 66 years) compared to neighboring countries of Bangladesh (2010: 69.5 years) 
and China (2010: 74.9 years).   
2.7.1.2. Investment in infrastructure and Productivity 
Undoubtedly, investment in infrastructure has a positive impact on productivity, 
facilitating the production process and increasing factor input efficiency. For instance, 
building roads connects markets, reducing transaction costs and increasing efficiency. 
Provision of electricity, gas, communications, water and sewerage systems raise labor 
and capital productivity (see Munnell, 1992; Dessus and Herrera, 2000). 
 We use government spending on development projects net of health projects as a 
proxy for investment in infrastructure. Figure 2.4 shows the potential relationship 
between total factor productivity and public spending on development projects. 
During the period under consideration, Pakistan’s average spending on development 
projects was about 9%.    
2.7.1.3. Net General Government Spending and Productivity 
General government spending, as measured by share of government expenditure in 
GDP, may have two contrasting effects on productivity levels. On the one hand, 
government spending on provision of basic necessities, adequate compensation for 
government employees, investment in technology embodied in physical capital and 
maintaining law and order may improve productivity levels. On the other hand, higher 
government spending may crowd out the private sector, which may lower productivity.  
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The share of government final consumption expenditure relative to GDP can be used 
as an independent explanatory variable in determining impact on productivity. Since 
we use government spending on health facilities and infrastructure as a separate 
productivity determinant, it is advisable to take these variables into account in 
measuring government size. We subtract out the government spending on health 
facility and development projects from government final consumption expenditure. 
Therefore, we use net share of government spending relative to GDP as our preferred 
measure.  
In Pakistan, the major heads of total government spending include defense (23.4% of 
total spending), debt servicing (28.5%), general administration (4%), economic, social 
and community services (4.2%) and law and order (1.4%). The sample average net 
government spending was 22% of GDP. The scatter plot between TFP and net 
government spending is in Figure 2.5, which shows a positive relationship between 
them.  
2.7.1.4. Development of Financial Sector and Productivity 
Financial sector development is critical in enhancing productive capacity. It mobilizes 
savings, opens new investment opportunities, helps reduce transaction costs and 
increases allocative efficiency, all important aspects in boosting productive capacity. 
A better and well-integrated financial system promotes the domestic business culture, 
attracts foreign investment and helps access funding for innovative projects and R&D.  
Following King and Levine (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Levine et al 
(2000), we use domestic credit to private sector relative to GDP as an indicator to 
measure depth of financial development. Figure 2.6 supports the hypothesis that 
financial development helps promote productivity.  
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2.7.1.5. Trade and Productivity 
Trade is also an important determinant of productivity (see Frankel and Romer, 1999; 
Irwin and Tervio, 2002; Alcalá and Ciccone, 2004). Trade helps diffuse knowledge, 
technology and innovative ideas, all essential elements for enhancing productivity. 
When firms are integrated through trade, they are able and encouraged to learn from 
their counter partners. Trade also helps transmit technologies and technical 
knowledge.  
Pakistan’s total exports as a percentage of GDP fluctuate around an average of 12%. 
Major export items include cotton, cotton yarn, ready-made garments, leather and 
leather products, surgical items and sports goods. Pakistan’s import share moves 
around an average of 17.6%. Food items, petroleum and petroleum products, 
machinery, textiles and raw metal materials are major imports. Pakistan’s trade is 
highly concentrated on Asia (1952: 48%; 2013: 64%) and Western Europe (1952: 
41%; 2013: 18%). 
We use share of export and import relative to GDP to gauge the impact of trade on 
productivity.  
2.7.1.6. Foreign Direct Investment, Foreign Assistance and Productivity 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is considered a technology carrier (Isaksson, 2007). 
Countries with higher FDI are more likely to have relatively advanced technology. It 
helps improve backward and forward linkages, domestically and internationally, 
attracting new technology and innovative production processes, and boosts demands 
for skilled and non-skilled labor. However, FDI may crowd out domestic production, 
enjoy preferential government treatment and bring about shutdown of domestic 
companies, which in turn reduces domestic investment and increases unemployment.  
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We use net flow of FDI relative to GDP as an indicator in estimating FDI impact on 
productivity. The sample data shows that the average FDI value was only 0.6% of 
GDP, which seems very low. Figure 2.7 plots total factor productivity against FDI; 
the scatter plot shows a positive link between the two variables of interest.   
Foreign assistance is another channel raising productivity; it generally substitutes 
domestic finance, which may be used for other productive purposes. It bridges the gap 
between domestic financial need and supply. Foreign assistance includes technical 
assistance, which enhances the technical know-how of domestic producers.  
We use share of foreign assistance (projects) in total foreign assistance to gauge its 
impact on productivity. Our sample shows that the average share of foreign assistance 
in projects comprises 52% of total foreign assistance.  
2.7.2. Empirical Methodology 
We use the following simple econometric model to investigate the possible 
determinants of Total Factor Productivity for Pakistan economy: 
ln(𝑇𝐹𝑃)𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1ln (𝐻𝐸𝐿𝑙𝑂ℎ)𝑡 + 𝜑2 ln(𝐿𝐿𝑓𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑂)𝑡 + 𝜑3 ln(𝑆𝐹ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑔)𝑡+ 𝜑4 ln(𝐷𝐸𝐷.𝐸𝐸𝑂. )𝑡 + 𝜑5 ln(𝐺𝑙𝐷.  𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑜𝐸𝐿𝑜𝑔)𝑡 + 𝜑6 ln(𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐷𝑦)𝑡+ 𝜑7 ln(𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑙𝐿𝑂)𝑡 + 𝜑8 ln(𝐼𝐸𝑂𝑙𝐿𝑂)𝑡 + 𝜑9 ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼)𝑡+ 𝜑10 ln(𝐹𝐴 𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐸)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                    (8) 
Here 𝑇𝐹𝑃  refers to total factor productivity, 𝐻𝐸𝐿𝑙𝑂ℎ  is the share of government 
spending on health in GDP; 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑂 is life expectancy at birth; 𝑆𝐹ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑔 is the 
average years of schooling; 𝐷𝐸𝐷.𝐸𝐸𝑂. is the share of public spending on development 
projects net of health spending in GDP; 𝐺𝑙𝐷.  𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑜𝐸𝐿𝑜𝑔  is the share of general 
government spending net of health and development spending in GDP; 𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐷𝑦  is 
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domestic credit to the private sector relative to GDP; 𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑙𝐿𝑂  and 𝐼𝐸𝑂𝑙𝐿𝑂  are 
respectively the share of export and import in GDP; 𝐹𝐷𝐼 is foreign direct investment 
relative to GDP; and 𝐹𝐴 𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐸 refers to foreign assistance share of projects in total 
foreign assistance. The parameter 𝜑𝑖 estimates the causal effect of the above variables 
on productivity. The subscript 𝑂 denotes the time index, from 1951 to 2010, and 𝜀 is 
the error term that contains all other factors which have not been incorporated in our 
model, with the assumption that 𝐸(𝜀𝑡) = 0 for all 𝑂. 
Whether productivity differs in autocratic and democratic regimes, we use 
𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦 as an additional explanatory variable in Equation (8) and estimate its 
impact on productivity using the following econometric model: 
ln(𝑇𝐹𝑃)𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1ln (𝐻𝐸𝐿𝑙𝑂ℎ)𝑡 + 𝜑2 ln(𝐿𝐿𝑓𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑂)𝑡 + 𝜑3 ln(𝑆𝐹ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑔)𝑡+  𝜑4 ln(𝐷𝐸𝐷.𝐸𝐸𝑂. )𝑡 + 𝜑5 ln(𝐺𝑙𝐷.  𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑜𝐸𝐿𝑜𝑔)𝑡 + 𝜑6 ln(𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐷𝑦)𝑡+ 𝜑7 ln(𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑙𝐿𝑂)𝑡 + 𝜑8 ln(𝐼𝐸𝑂𝑙𝐿𝑂)𝑡 + 𝜑9 ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼)𝑡 + 𝜑10 ln(𝐹𝐴 𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐸)𝑡+ 𝛿 (𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦)𝑡 +  𝜇𝑡                                                                      (9) 
 In Equation (9), our interested parameter is 𝛿.  If 𝛿 appears to be positive and 
significant, it implies that the degree of democracy has positive and significant impact 
on productivity.  
Besides the level, we also estimate determinants of total factor productivity growth. In 
this case, we maintain the consistency and use the same specification of equation (9) 
but take the log difference of the equation.      
We use an annual time series to estimate determinants of total factor productivity and 
its growth. In time series analysis, it is more often the case that a disturbance term 
correlates with its past values. The presence of serial correlation invalidates inferences 
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drawn upon the estimation obtained from simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
method. One possible solution to overcome this issue is that the interested parameters 
may be estimated through the Generalize Least Square (GLS) or Feasible Generalized 
Least Square method (FGLS).50 We use the Durbin Watson H-test to validate our 
assumption of ‘no serial correlation’ before we finalize the estimation of our 
parameters of interest. If we fail to reject the null of ‘no serial correlation,’ we use 
OLS; otherwise FGLS.  
The relationship between our explanatory variables and total factor productivity may 
be endogenous. For instance, we assert that to improve productivity, trade may help in 
diffusion of knowledge, technology and innovative ideas. However, to increase trade, 
it is necessary that firms be competitive, with comparative advantage. A firm may 
obtain a competitive edge for its products by increasing productivity. Thus, trade may 
be endogenous. The presence of endogeneity in the variable invalidates the estimation 
by simple OLS. One solution to this issue is that we may use an IV for endogenous 
variable. However, in a time series, it is hard to find a good IV with data on a longer 
time horizon. Another possible solution to handle the endogeneity issue is to take 
advantage of the time series by using past realization as an instrument of current 
realization. The basic intuition behind this strategy is that the past may affect the 
future but the future seldom or scarcely affects the past. Therefore, following Muller 
and Seligson (1994), Oneal and Russett (1997 & 1999) and Li Reuveny (2003), we 
use the first lag of all independent variables as regressors in estimating causal effect 
on total factor productivity.  
                                                          
50 For detail discussion, see Gujarati and Porter (2009), p. 442-448 
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Using time series, it is highly likely that we may meet the issue of ‘spurious 
regression.’ Gujarati and Porter (2009) point out that in a spurious regression, the 𝑂 
statistics and 𝑅2  are misleading and cannot be used for hypothesis testing. One 
possible remedy for this issue is to de-trend the data. We have, therefore, de-trended 
the data of our variable of interest before use in estimating causal relationship.  
2.8. Empirical Results 
We begin our analysis by using estimating Equation (8); the estimated results are 
shown in Table 2.16 and Table 2.17. The former reports determinants of total factor 
productivity at level and the later reports the estimated determinants for growth. In 
both tables, the robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Column (1~4) of 
Table 2.16  and Table 2.17 report estimates for our explanatory variables at level, 
whereas column (5~8) addresses the issue of endogeneity and estimates causal 
relationship between our variable of interest and productivity at first lag. We found 
that on average, the coefficients are over-estimated when we estimate them at level51. 
For instance, we are able to correct 33 percent bias from the coefficient of 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝐸 by 
estimating at first lag.  The bottom panels of the tables report the strength of our 
analysis. The Durbin–Watson value measures the possibility of first order serial 
correlation. If the value is around 2, we are not expecting a serial correlation problem 
in our models (Gujarati and Portal, 2009, p. 436). 𝑅2  represents 𝐿𝐸𝑎𝑂𝑠𝑂𝐸𝐸 𝑅2  and 
measures explanatory power of the model. We prefer estimates of column (08) over 
all other models on the grounds that it estimates the casual impact of all explanatory 
variables on the level of productivity at once and addresses the issue of endogeneity. 
                                                          
51 Here we compare the estimates at column (8) with column (4) 
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2.8.1. Determinants of Total Factor Productivity at Level 
The first two rows of columns (1~8) of Table 2.16 estimates the impact of human 
capital on productivity. As expected, public spending on health facilities positively 
and significantly increases productivity. Our estimate suggests that a 10% increase in 
public spending on health increases next year productivity by 1.2%. One possible 
reason for a small coefficient is the lower relative share of government spending on 
health; the average relative share of GDP spend on health is 0.5%. Similarly, life 
expectancy has positive and significant impacts on productivity. Our estimate 
suggests that an additional year of life expectancy increases productivity on average 
by 2.7%.   
Columns (2~4 & 6~8) of Table 2.16 estimate the government role in enhancing total 
factor productivity. We add two variables: 𝐷𝐸𝐷.𝐸𝐸𝑂.  and 𝐺𝑙𝐷.  𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑜𝐸𝐿𝑜𝑔.  As 
expected, public spending on development projects appears an important determinant 
of total factor productivity. We found positive but mostly significant coefficients. Our 
estimate suggests that higher development spending leads to higher productivity. 
However the estimated impact is small. A 10% rise in public development spending 
increases productivity by 0.6%. The possible reason for having relatively small 
impact may be attributed to continuously declining trend of development expenditure 
relative to GDP. While average development spending relative to GDP is reasonable 
(10%), however, it is continuously declined from a peak of 21% in 1967 to 4% in 
2010.  
The impact of net government spending on factor productivity is reported in columns 
(2~4 & 6~8) of Table 2.16. We found positive and mostly significant coefficients. 
The positive significant sign implies that general government spending on security, 
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law and order and better employee compensation is beneficial in improving 
productivity. 
The fifth row of Table 2.16 shows estimated impact of financial development on 
productivity. We found mostly insignificant coefficients. However, the sign of 
coefficients depend on model specification. When we run the model at levels, we 
observe negative but insignificant coefficients.  The sign changes from negative to 
positive when we run the model at first lag of explanatory variables. The positive 
coefficient implies the importance of the financial sector in improving productivity. 
The composition of domestic credit for the private sector may explain insignificance 
of coefficients. About 54% of domestic credit is allocated to the consumption sector,52 
textiles and petroleum and allied refinery sectors. Only around 3% of credits are for 
machinery and equipment, electrical machinery and electronics. The remaining 
portion of credit is allocated to service and other sector of the economy. This 
highlights the fact that most part of the credit is being allocated to non-productive 
sectors.  
Columns (3~4 & 7~8) of Table 2.16 investigate the influence of the external sector on 
domestic productivity. Here we add four external variables: 
𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑙𝐿𝑂;  𝐼𝐸𝑂𝑙𝐿𝑂;  𝐹𝐷𝐼; and 𝐹𝐴 𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐸. We got a significant and positive impact of 
exports on productivity, but mostly negative and insignificant coefficients for imports. 
Our estimates show that exports are a good determinant of productivity, whereas 
imports are not. The negative sign associated with imports implies that imports reduce 
productivity. As explained above, Pakistan’s major imports are food, petroleum and 
petroleum products, machinery, textiles and raw materials. Pakistan’s imports of 
                                                          
52 Includes food, tobacco and beverage, cement and other non-metals  
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machinery, fertilizers, pesticides and transport equipment make up 32% of all imports; 
around 2/3 of all imports comprise non-productive items. We separately check the 
productivity impact of machinery imports, and find positive but insignificant 
coefficients (results are not shown); this may imply that imported machinery is either 
outdated or too advanced, requiring sufficient absorption capacity. Our findings are 
consistent with Khan (2006). 
We fail to find any significant impact of 𝐹𝐷𝐼 on productivity when we run the model 
at first lag of explanatory variables. The positive sign associated with this variable 
implies that FDI is on the potential determinants of total factor productivity; however, 
in Pakistan case, it is not. The reasons for the insignificant FDI impact may be two-
fold. First, in terms of size, the average FDI value relative to GDP is 0.6%, which 
may explain why we fail to get positive but insignificant coefficients. Second, as to 
FDI direction53, we observed that between 2002 and 2010, about 60% of FDI was in 
the service sector 54 . Although it may improve productivity in sectors like 
communications and power but it has come to these sectors very recently55 and it 
takes time to realize benefits.  
The impact of 𝐹𝐴 𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐸 on the level of total factor productivity is appeared to be 
positive and mostly significant. Positive and significant sign of this variable highlights 
the fact that foreign assistance in development projects can supplement the need of 
domestic financing for enhancing productivity. However, the impact is relatively 
small. It shows that a 10% increase in share of foreign assistance can improve the 
level of total factor productivity by 0.4%.    
                                                          
53 We do not have sector-wise composition of FDI prior to 2002. 
54 It includes communications, power, trade, tourism, storage facilities, financial business and other 
social and personal services. 
55 The major chunk comes in 2007 and 2008 and our sample period ends in 2010. 
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Using Equation (9), we estimate the regime effect on the level of productivity; 
estimated coefficients are reported in columns (4 & 8) of Table 2.16. For both models 
we got positive but insignificant coefficients of the𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦. The positive but 
insignificant sign implies that the degree of democracy has no systematic impact on 
the level of total factor productivity. This finding is consistent with our descriptive 
analysis (see Table 2.16). Except for the last three years56, the average contribution of 
total factor productivity in generating per worker output under democratic and 
autocratic regimes is the same. This is an interesting finding. It implies that in the 
short-run, regime matters in determining productivity. However, in the long-run, the 
impact of democratic and autocratic regimes on productivity equalizes. 
2.8.2. Determinants of Total Factor Productivity Growth     
Column (1 & 5) of Table 2.17 estimates the growth effect of human capital on total 
factor productivity growth. The estimated results show that growth of life expectancy 
has positive and significant impact on the growth rate of productivity while growth of 
health spending has insignificant impact. As explained before, the reason for not 
getting significant impact of health spending on productivity growth may be related to 
its sheer size. During the last sixty years, the average growth of public health 
spending relative to GDP was around 4%. However, its growth remained volatile and 
showed a continuous declining trend.  
The growth of public spending on development projects appeared to be significant 
positive impact on productivity growth (see column 8 of Table 2.17). Our estimate 
suggests that a one percent increase in development spending leads to one year ahead 
                                                          
56 We ignore last three years because these years cannot be considered as normal years. These are 
the years when there was a global economic recession, in these years, Pakistan economy experienced 
a massive flood and had a sever energy crisis. 
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growth of productivity by 5.2%. This is a substantial impact and highlights the 
importance of development spending on productivity enhancing projects.  
Growth of exports is another determinant of productivity growth. We found positive 
and significant coefficients in all models. Our estimate predicts that one percent 
increase in export earnings leads to 9% increase in next year productivity growth, 
ceteris paribus.   
We fail to find any systematic impact of growth of general net government spending, 
financial development, foreign direct investment, import of goods and services, 
foreign assistance and regime effect on the growth of productivity.      
2.9. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
What determines the long-run sources of Pakistan’s economic growth? A regime-wise 
analysis is conducted over the sample period of 1951 to 2011. Pakistan’s output per 
capita growth fluctuates around a mean of 2.2%. However, patterns of growth under 
autocratic and democratic regimes differ. The analysis shows that economic 
performance under an autocratic regime is better than under a democratic regime. 
When we decompose output growth into factor inputs and productivity, it is observed 
that half the growth is from labor growth. In growth of output per worker, the 
contributions of factor inputs and productivity are fifty-fifty. Analysis of per worker 
growth under each regime reveals that productivity was the main driver in the first 
two autocratic regimes; under the last autocratic regime, human capital appeared to be 
the main source of output per worker growth. It is observed that the share of human 
capital in generating per worker output is larger than the share of physical inputs. 
However, the share of productivity declined continuously from 1989, and became 
negative under the last democratic regime. Overall, it is observed that growth sources 
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have changed dramatically. In the early regimes, productivity was the main source; in 
later regimes, human capital was the main driver of economic growth.   
What drives productivity in Pakistan? We conduct an econometric analysis for 
estimating the determinants of level and growth of productivity. We found that 
government spending on health, development, national security, law and order and 
employee compensation and export of goods and services may increase level of 
productivity. Life expectancy at birth is a robust determinant of productivity level. 
Imports of goods and services appear to have a negative but insignificant impact on 
productivity level. We do not find any significant impact of imports of goods and 
services, FDI and foreign assistance on productivity level. We also fail to find any 
significant difference in productivity under a democratic or an autocratic regime.  
Under econometrical growth analysis of productivity, we found life expectancy at 
birth, government spending on development projects and export of goods and service 
have significant positive impact on the growth rate of productivity.    
In sum, the sources of long-run economic growth are mixed; earlier regimes, 
productivity was the main source, but it has now become human capital. This drastic 
change made recent productivity growth negative, which may have serious 
implications for long-run growth. Ignorance of capital accumulation also to some 
extent explains growth volatility. In the short-run, a political regime matters in 
determining productivity and subsequent economic growth. However, our analysis 
shows that, in the long-run, the average impact of an autocratic or democratic regime 
is the same in determining productivity. Good economic policies under an autocratic 
regime may off-set negative consequences of the autocratic regime on productivity 
and economic growth.   
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Our analysis offers several policy implications. First, we cannot deny the importance 
of physical capital accumulation. Without sufficient amount of physical capital, no 
country can grow. Our analysis suggests that the negative growth of physical capital 
partly explain why Pakistan economy fails to change its economic status. Second, 
though Pakistan economy recently recognized the importance of investing in human 
capital but there is still a room for further investment in education and health facilities. 
Third, negative growth of productivity highlights policy makers’ ignorance of this 
area. Our econometric analysis suggest that productivity can be enhanced by 
increasing investment in health and development projects, providing secure 
environment and higher government spending on employees’ compensation and 
trainings. Fourth, our analysis re-emphasizes the importance of development of 
financial sector for enhancing productivity. However, while allocating credits to 
private sector, there is a need to give a priority to the sectors57 which has higher 
potential for enhancing productivity. Five, liberalizing the import of technology 
embodied machinery and equipments can increase productivity. Finally, our analysis 
reveals that the type of regime does not matter. What matters the policies that pursued 
under a political regime. If policies are good enough, then whatever type of regime is, 
it has long-lasting impact on productivity and economic growth.  
 
Reference 
Abramovits, M. "Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind." Journal of Economic 
History XLVI, no. 2 (1986): 385-406. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared. "Income and 
Democracy." The American Economic Review 98, no. 3 (June 2008): 808-842. 
Acha, Virginia L., Orietta Marsili, and Rishard R. Nelson. "What Do We Know About 
Innovation?" Research Policy 33, no. 9 (2004): 1253-1258. 
                                                          
57 Such as education, health, communication, import of machinery and equipment, R&D etc 
  
107 
 
Aghion, P., and P. Howitt. Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998. 
Alcalá, F., and A. Ciccone. Trade and Productivity. CEPR Dicussion Paper No. 3095, 
London: CEPR, 2001. 
Alesina, Alberto, and Dani Rodrik. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth." Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 109 (1994): 465-490. 
Alesina, Alberto, Sule Ozler, Nouriel Roubini, and Paul Swagel. "Political Instability and 
Economic Growth." Journal of Economic Growth 1, no. 2 (1996): 189-211. 
Barro, Robert J. "Notes on Growth Accounting." Journal of Economic Growth 4, no. 2 (June 
1999): 119-137. 
Barro, Robert J., N. Gregory Mankiw, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. "Capital Mobility in 
Neoclassical Models of Growth." American Ecnomic Review 85 (1995): 103-115. 
Barro, Robert, and Jong-Wha Lee. "A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 
1950 - 2010." Journal of Development Economics CIV (2013): 184-98. 
Benhabib, J., and M. M. Spiegel. "The Role of Human Capital in Economic Development: 
Evidence from Aggregate Cross-Country Data." Journal of Monetary Ecnomics 34, 
no. 2 (1994): 143-174. 
Bernanke, Ben S., and Refet S. Gürkaynak. "Is Growth Exogenous? Taking Mankiw, Romer, 
and Weil Seriously." In NBER Macroeconomics Annual, by Ben S. Bernanke and 
Kenneth Rogoff. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. 
Bosworth, Barry, and Susan M. Collin. "Accounting for Growth: Comparing China and 
India." Journal of Economic Perspective XXII, no. 1 (Winter, 2008): 45-66. 
Burney, Nadeem A. "Sources of Pakistan's Economic Growth." The Pakistan Development 
Review 25, no. 4 (1986): 573-589. 
Caselli, Francesco. "Accounting for Cross - Country Income Differences." In Handbook of 
Economic Growth, by Phillipe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, 679-741. Elsevier, 
2005. 
Cole, M. A., and E. Neumayer. The Impact of Poor Health on Total Factor Productivity: An 
Empirical Investigation. mimeo, Birmingham: University of Brimingham, 2003. 
Collier, Paul, David Dollar, and Nicholas Stern. "Fifty Years of Development." World Bank, 
mimeo, 2000. 
Dessus, S., and R. Herrera. "Public Capital and Growth Revisitted: A Panel Data 
Assessment." Economic Development and Cultural Change 48, no. 2 (2000): 407-418. 
Doucouliagos, Hristos, and Mehmet Ali Ulubaşoğlu. "Democracy and Economic Growth: A 
Meta - Analysis." American journal of Political Science 52, no. 1 (January 2008): 61-
83. 
Easterly, W., and R. Levine. "It's Not Factor Accumulation: Stylized Facts and Growth 
Models." World Bank Economic Review XV, no. 2 (2001): 177-219. 
  
108 
 
Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. Timmer. The Next Generation of the Penn 
World Table. 2013. http://www.ggdc.net/pwt (accessed February 14, 2014). 
Frankel, Jeffrey A., and David Romer. "Does Trade Cause Growth?" American Economic 
Review 89 (1999): 379-399. 
Griliches, Zvi and Dale W. Jorgenson. "The Explanation of Productivity Change." Review of 
Economic Studies XXXIV (July 1967): 249-80. 
Grossman, G., and E. Helpman. "Quality Ladders in the Theory of Economic Growth." 
Review of Economic Studies 58 (1991): 43-61. 
Gujarati, Damodar N., and Dawn C. Porter. Basic Econometrics. 5th Edition. Singapore: 
McGraw Hill, 2009. 
Hall, Robert E., and Charles I. Jones. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More 
Output Per Worker Than Others?" The Quarterly Journal of Economics CXIV, no. 1 
(February, 1999): 83-116. 
Harberger, Arnold. "Perspectives on Capital and Technology in Less Developed Countries." 
In Contemporary Economic Analysis, by Michael J. Artis and Avelino R. Nobay. 
London: Croom Helm, 1978. 
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten. Penn World Table Version 7.1. Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania. November 2012. 
Husain, Ishrat. "The Role of Politics in Pakistan's Economy." Journal of International Affairs 
63, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2009): 1-18. 
Inklaar, Robert, and Marcel P. Timmer. Capital, Labor and TFP in PWT8.0. 2013. 
http://www.ggdc.net/pwt (accessed March 19, 2014). 
Irwin, A. Douglas, and Marko Tervio. "Does Trade Raise Income? Evidence from the 
Twentieth Century." Journal of International Economics 58 (2002): 1-18. 
Isaksson, Anders. "Determinants of Total Factor Productivity: A Literature Review." United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization, Staff Working Paper No. 02/2007, 
July 2007. 
Khan, Safdar Ullah. "Macro Determinants of Total Factor Productivity in Pakistan." SBP 
Research Bulletin 2, no. 2 (2006): 383-401. 
King, Robert G., and Ross Levine. "Capital Fundamentalism, Economic Development and 
Economic Growth." Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 40 
(1994): 259-292. 
King, Robert G., and Ross Levine. "Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right." The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, no. 3 (1993): 717-737. 
Klenow, Petter, and Andres Rodriguez-Clare. "Economic Growth. A Review Essay." Journal 
of Monetary Economics 40 (1997): 597-617. 
  
109 
 
Levine, Ross, Norman Loayza, and Thorsten, Beck Beck. "Financial Intermediation and 
Growth: Causality and Causes." Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000): 31-77. 
Li, Quan, and Rafael Reuveny. "Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical 
Analysis." British Journal of Political Science 33, no. 1 (January 2003): 29-54. 
Lucas, Robert E. Jr. "On the Mechanics of Economic Development." Journal of Monetary 
Economics 22 (1988): 3-42. 
Mankiw, N. Gregory. "The Growth of Nations." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 
(1995): 275-326. 
Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, and David N. Weil. "Contribution to the Empirics of 
Ecnomics Growth." Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (1992): 407-437. 
Mayer, J. Technology Diffusion, Human Capital and Economic Growth in Developing 
Countries. Disussion Papers No. 154, Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, 2001. 
Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Qeustion 
of Casual Relationships." The American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 
(September 1994): 635-652. 
Munnell, A. H. "Policy Watch: Infrastructure Investment and Economic Growth." Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 6 (1992): 189-198. 
Nehru, Vikramand, and Ashok Dhareshwar. "A New Database on Physical Capital Stock: 
Sources, Methodology and Results." Revista de Analisis Economico VIII, no. 1 
(1993): 37-59. 
Oneal, John R., and Bruce M. Russet. "The Classical Liberals were Right: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985." International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 
(June 1997): 267-294. 
Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. "Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifiation: 
Trade Still Reduces Conflict." Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (July 1999): 423-
442. 
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. 50 Years of Pakistan in Statistics. Vol. I. IV vols. Karachi, 
Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan: The 
Managers of Publications, 1998. 
—. Pakistan Statistical Year Book 2007. Karachi, Federal Bureaue of Statistics, Statistical 
Division, Government of Pakistan: The Managers of Publication, 2008. 
—. Pakistan Statistical Year Book 2010. Karachi, Federal Bureau of Satistics, Statistical 
Division, Government of Pakistan: The Managers of Publication, 2011. 
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. "Democracy and Development:The Devil in the 
Details." NBER Working Paper No. 11993, 2006. 
  
110 
 
Psacharopoulos, George. "Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update." World 
Development XXII (1994): 1325-43. 
Rajan, R. G., and L. Zingales. "Financial Dependence and Growth." American Economic 
Review 88, no. 3 (1998): 559-586. 
Ray, Debraj. Development Economics. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1998. 
Rodrik, Dani. "Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire 
Them." Studies in International Comparative Development 35, no. 3 (2000): 3-31. 
Romer, Paul. "Endogenous Technological Change." Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990): 
S71-S102. 
Sirowy, L., and A. Inkeles. "The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality: 
A Review." Studies in Comparative International Development 25 (1991): 126-157. 
Solow, Robert M. "Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function." The Reveiw of 
Economics and Statistics XXXIX, no. 3 (August, 1957): 312-20. 
State Bank of Pakistan. Handbook of Statistics on Pakistan Economy. 2010. 
http://sbp.org.pk/departments/stats/PakEconomy_HandBook/index.htm (accessed 
February 10, 2014). 
Todaro, Michael P. Economic Development. 7th. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 2000. 
World Bank. Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 2000. 
—. Latin America After Mexico: Quickening the Pace. Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 1995. 
—. The East Asian Miracle. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1993. 
—. World Development Indicators. 2014. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx 
(accessed February 10, 2014). 
Young, Alwyn. "The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of the East 
Asian Growth Experience." The Quarterly Journal of Economics CX, no. 3 (August, 
1995): 641-80. 
 
 
  
  
111 
 
Table 0.1: Pakistan’s Political History 
Type of Regime Duration (Period) Duration (Years) 
Democratic 1947 – 1958 11 
Autocratic 1958 – 1971 13 
Democratic 1971 – 1977 06 
Autocratic 1977 – 1988 11 
Democratic 1988 – 1999 11 
Autocratic 1999 – 2007 08 
Democratic 2007 – 2014 08 
Source: Relevant information is extracted from Pakistan’s 
National Assemble’s website (www.na.gov.pk)   
 
 
Table 0.2: Trend of Real GDP Growth 
(Percent) 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Average 
Pakistan  2.3 7.1 4.3 6.2 3.9 4.5 4.7 
Panel A: Neighboring Countries:  
Bangladesh 4.4 0.7 1.8 3.6 3.4 5.8 3.3 
India 3.8 4.3 3.5 5.3 4.8 7.5 4.9 
China 6.8 3.2 6.3 8.7 9.9 9.8 7.5 
Iran 14.1 10.2 1.4 1.8 4.0 3.7 5.9 
Afghanistan - - 2.9 -1.6 -4.5 11.8 2.2 
Panel B: Regions:        
South Asia - 4.3 3.1 5.5 5.3 7.0 5.0 
East Asia & Pacific - 4.5 6.6 7.5 8.4 9.1 7.2 
Middle East & North Africa - 7.8 5.3 2.9 3.9 4.3 4.8 
North America - 4.6 3.3 3.3 3.4 1.7 3.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa - 5.0 3.7 1.5 2.2 5.3 3.5 
World - 5.3 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.6 3.5 
Note: East Asia & Pacific and Middle East & North Africa regions include only developing 
countries; whereas, Sub-Saharan Africa include all income levels. Data Source:  for 
Pakistan and Panel A countries: Heston, Summers and Aten (2012); for Panel B regions: 
World Bank (2014).  
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Table 0.3: Trends of Output per Worker 
  
(Percent) 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Panel A: 
PAKISTAN 
      
Change  $1782 
to 
$2034 
$2034 
to 
$3310 
$3310 
to 
$4066 
$4066 
to 
$5473 
$5473 
to 
$5976 
$5976 
to 
$6681 
Growth 1.3 4.9 2.1 3.0 0.9 1.1 
Panel B: Neighboring Countries (Growth) 
Bangladesh 3.5 -0.7 -0.8 0.5 1.6 3.2 
India 2.6 2.5 1.5 3.1 2.7 6.0 
China 5.2 1.1 3.8 6.2 8.8 8.9 
Iran 12.0 7.9 -1.5 -2.3 0.8 0.6 
Afghanistan - - 1.1 -0.2 -8.8 8.5 
Note: Change in output per worker is measured on PPP at 2005 constant 
prices.  
Data Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2012.) 
 
Table 0.4: Capital – Output Ratio 
Country 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Pakistan 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.7 
India 1.6 1.5 1.6 2.2 2.1 2.1 
Bangladesh - 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.7 2.9 
China 1.2 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.4 3.3 
Iran 2.9 3.7 4.3 10.3 5.9 3.2 
Data Source: Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2013) 
 
Table 0.5: Growth of Employed Labor Force 
 (Percent) 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Average 
Pakistan 1.0 2.3 2.2 3.3 3.0 3.4 2.5 
India 1.3 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.9 
China 1.3 2.1 2.5 2.1 1.8 0.4 1.7 
Bangladesh - 1.4 2.6 3.1 1.8 2.7 2.3 
Iran - 2.4 2.9 4.1 3.2 3.1 3.1 
Afghanistan - - 1.7 -1.4 4.5 3.3 2.0 
Data Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2012). 
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Table 0.6: Labor Force Participation Rate 
Country Period Δ Participation Rate 
Δ Female 
Participation 
Rate 
Pakistan 1981 to 2011 0.51 to 0.46 0.07 to 0.22 
Bangladesh 1981 to 2005 0.48 to 0.59 0.05 to 0.29 
India 1981 to 2010 0.61 to 0.55 0.33 to 0.29 
Iran 1982 to 2008 0.45 to 0.42 0.12 to 0.15 
China 1982 to 2011 0.68 to 0.70 - 
Data Source: World Bank (2014) 
 
Table 0.7: Distribution of Employed Person by Industry 
 (Percent) 
Sector 1965 1981 1995 2002 2009 
Agriculture 58.7 52.7 46.7 42.1 45.1 
Manufacturing 14.5 9.2 10.4 13.8 13.0 
Service 23.1 31.5 35.4 38.0 35.1 
Others 3.8 6.7 7.5 6.1 6.8 
Note: Agriculture sector includes agriculture, forestry, hunting and 
fishing. Service sector includes services, financing, insurance, 
transport and communication, commerce, electricity, gas, water and 
sanitary services. Other includes mining and quarrying, 
construction and others. Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan (2010) 
 
Table 0.8: Average Years of Schooling – Selected Years 
(Years) 
 Pakistan Bangladesh India Afghanistan China Iran 
1950 0.98 0.91 1.00 0.26 1.57 0.53 
1970 1.57 1.38 1.57 0.69 3.43 2.00 
1990 2.91 3.15 3.44 1.87 5.62 4.84 
2010 5.53 5.91 5.20 3.74 8.11 8.64 
Data Source: Barro and Lee (2013) 
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Table 0.9: Growth of Human Capital 
     (Percent) 
 Pakistan Bangladesh India Afghanistan China Iran 
1950s 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.5 
1960s 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 1.5 1.5 
1970s 0.8 1.2 1.0 0.7 1.5 1.8 
1980s 1.0 1.2 1.5 0.9 0.9 1.7 
1990s 1.3 1.6 1.0 1.3 1.5 2.3 
2000s 1.7 1.5 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.3 
Data Source: Barro and Lee (2013) 
 
 
Table 0.10: Output, Labor and Output per Worker Growth 
   (Percent) 
Regime Period Output  Growth 
Labor 
Growth 
Output 
per 
worker 
Growth 
Labor’s 
Contribution 
Full Sample (1951 - 2011) 4.7 2.5 2.2 0.5 
Democratic - I (1951 - 1957) 2.94 0.99 1.95 0.3 
Autocratic - I (1958 - 1971) 5.61 2.04 3.57 0.4 
Democratic- II (1972 - 1977) 4.06 2.28 1.78 0.6 
Autocratic - II (1978 - 1988) 6.50 2.91 3.60 0.4 
Democratic - III (1989 - 1999) 3.97 2.87 1.10 0.7 
Autocratic - III (2000 - 2007) 5.01 3.73 1.28 0.7 
Democratic - IV (2008 - 2011) 2.88 2.31 0.57 0.8 
Note: If the chief executive assumes power through election and open competition, it is 
considered as democratic regime otherwise autocratic regime. Labor’s contribution is 
estimated by ratio of labor growth to output growth. Data Source: Feenstra, Inklaar and 
Timmer (2013). 
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Table 0.11: Regime – Wise Productivity Growth 
 (Percent) 
Regime Period g_y g_k g_h g_tfp 
Full Sample (1951 - 2011) 2.2 0.4 0.6 1.2 
Democratic - I (1951 - 1957) 1.95 -0.39 0.12 2.22 
Autocratic - I (1958 - 1971) 3.57 0.84 0.38 2.35 
Democratic- II (1972 - 1977) 1.78 0.61 0.55 0.63 
Autocratic - II (1978 - 1988) 3.60 0.52 0.65 2.42 
Democratic - III (1989 - 1999) 1.10 0.36 0.87 -0.13 
Autocratic - III (2000 - 2007) 1.28 -0.12 1.30 0.10 
Democratic - IV (2008 - 2011) 0.57 0.34 0.64 -0.42 
Note: If the chief executive assumes power through election and open competition, it is 
considered as democratic regime otherwise autocratic regime. g_y: growth of output per 
worker; g_k: growth of capital input with weight (α=0.3); g_h: growth of human capital 
with weight (1-α=0.7); and g_tfp: growth of total factor productivity. Data Source: 
Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2013). 
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Table 0.12: Regime – Wise Productivity Growth – Further Details 
(Percent) 
    g_Y g_n g_y g_k g_h g_tfp 
Democratic – I (1951 - 1957) 
Full Period  2.94 0.99 1.95 -0.39 0.12 2.22 
Autocratic – I (1958 - 1971) 
1st  5 years 
(1958 - 
1962) 
3.89 1.53 2.36 0.58 0.34 1.44 
2nd  5 years 
(1963 - 
1967) 
6.82 2.28 4.54 1.34 0.40 2.80 
Last 4 
years 
(1968 -
1971) 
6.24 2.36 3.88 0.52 0.42 2.94 
Democratic – II (1972 - 1977) 
Full Period  4.06 2.28 1.78 0.61 0.55 0.63 
Autocratic – II (1978 - 1988) 
1st  5 years 
(1978 - 
1982) 
6.75 3.28 3.48 0.37 0.58 2.53 
Last 6 
years 
(1983 -
1988) 
6.30 2.60 3.70 0.65 0.71 2.34 
Democratic – III (1989 - 1999) 
1st  5-years 
(1989 - 
1993) 
4.66 2.41 2.25 0.66 0.81 0.78 
Last 6 
years 
(1994 - 
1999) 
3.39 3.26 0.14 0.10 0.92 -0.89 
Autocratic – III (2000 - 2007) 
1st  5 years 
(2000 - 
2004) 
4.23 3.69 0.54 -0.27 1.43 -0.63 
Last 3 
years 
(2005 - 
2007) 
6.30 3.79 2.51 0.14 1.06 1.31 
Democratic – IV (2008 - 2011) 
Full Period  2.88 2.31 0.57 0.34 0.64 -0.42 
Note If the chief executive assumes power through election and open competition, it is 
considered as democratic regime otherwise autocratic regime. g_Y: growth of output; g_n: 
growth of employed labor force; g_y: growth of output per worker; g_k: growth of capital input 
with weight (α=0.3); g_h: growth of human capital with weight (1-α=0.7); and g_tfp: growth of 
total factor productivity. Data Source: Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2013). 
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Table 0.13: Change in Human Capital 
Regime Period 
Δ Average 
Years of 
Schooling 
(Years) 
Average 
Educational 
Expenditure  
(% of GDP) 
Average 
Health 
Expenditure  
(% of GDP) 
Full Sample (1951 - 
2010) 
4.50  -  
Democratic - I (1951 - 
1957) 
0.06  - 0.11 
Autocratic - I (1958 - 
1971) 
0.54  - 0.41 
Democratic- II (1972 - 
1977) 
0.30  1.9 0.58 
Autocratic - II (1978 - 
1988) 
0.71  2.3 0.82 
Democratic - III (1989 - 
1999) 
0.94  2.6 0.83 
Autocratic - III (2000 - 
2007) 
1.30  2.1 0.57 
Democratic - IV (2008 - 
2010) 
0.61  2.5 0.56 
Note: If the chief executive assumes power through election and open competition, it is 
considered as democratic regime otherwise autocratic regime. Data Source: Average 
years of Schooling – Baro and Lee (2013); Educational Expenditure – World Bank (2014); 
Health Expenditure – State Bank of Pakistan (2010) 
 
Table 0.14: Contribution to per Worker Output Growth 
Regime Period Physical Capital 
Human 
Capital TFP 
Full Sample (1951 - 2011) 0.2 0.3 0.5 
Democratic - I (1951 - 1957) -0.2 0.1 1.1 
Autocratic - I (1958 - 1971) 0.2 0.1 0.7 
Democratic- II (1972 - 1977) 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Autocratic - II (1978 - 1988) 0.1 0.2 0.7 
Democratic - III (1989 - 1999) 0.3 0.8 -0.1 
Autocratic - III (2000 - 2007) -0.1 1.0 0.1 
Democratic - IV (2008 - 2011) 0.6 1.1 -0.7 
Note: If the chief executive assumes power through election and open 
competition, it is considered as democratic regime otherwise autocratic 
regime. Relative contribution shares are computed by ratio of input 
growth to per worker output growth. Data Source: Feenstra, Inklaar and 
Timmer (2013). 
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Table 0.15: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A:  At Level      
TFP 61 182.7084 42.2621 107.8408 237.1476 
Health 61 0.0057 0.0027 0.0005 0.0119 
Life Exp. 51 58.6695 5.5204 46.4337 66.1263 
Dev. Exp. 61 0.0919 0.0448 0.0242 0.2060 
Gov. Exp. 61 0.2210 0.0519 0.1394 0.3438 
Privy 51 0.2406 0.0388 0.1115 0.2984 
Export 61 0.0530 0.0104 0.0380 0.0764 
Import 61 0.0801 0.0167 0.0529 0.1263 
FDI 61 0.6043 0.7957 0.0100 3.7800 
FA Share 50 0.5251 0.1594 0.1946 0.7836 
Democracy 57 3.5438 3.3704 0 8 
Panel B: At Growth      
TFP  60 0.012 0.028 -0.037 0.115 
Health 60 0.040 0.166 -0.423 0.528 
Life 50 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.020 
Dev. Exp 60 -0.002 0.233 -0.793 0.510 
Gov. Exp 60 0.002 0.127 -0.302 0.338 
Privy 50 0.013 0.097 -0.254 0.228 
Export 60 0.001 0.137 -0.323 0.412 
Import 60 -0.003 0.148 -0.410 0.423 
FDI 60 0.058 1.099 -3.497 3.555 
FA Share 49 -0.016 0.293 -0.892 0.714 
Democracy 55 -0.009 0.648 -2.197 2.197 
Note: See Appendix 2-A for variable details. Source: Author’s Compilation 
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Table 0.16: Determinants of Total Factor Productivity 
      1st Lag of Explanatory Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Health 0.064a 0.058b 0.107a 0.100a  -0.009 -0.014 0.097a 0.120a 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021)  (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.023) 
Life 2.233a 2.292a 1.507a 1.484a  2.018b 1.306 1.135a 0.994a 
 (0.518) (0.530) (0.433) (0.398)  (0.925) (0.971) (0.404) (0.299) 
Dev. Exp.  0.029c 0.035 0.045b   0.023 0.056b 0.056b 
  (0.016) (0.021) (0.019)   (0.017) (0.024) (0.024) 
Gov. Exp.  0.042 0.107a 0.113a   0.032 0.104a 0.147a 
  (0.035) (0.031) (0.031)   (0.026) (0.035) (0.037) 
Privy  -0.027 -0.008 -0.016   0.068b 0.046 0.022 
  (0.041) (0.036) (0.040)   (0.031) (0.047) (0.039) 
Export   0.121a 0.104b    0.046 0.130a 
   (0.041) (0.040)    (0.038) (0.038) 
Import   -0.044 -0.054c    -0.081a 0.006 
   (0.030) (0.028)    (0.028) (0.039) 
FDI   0.008c 0.013b    0.008 0.008 
   (0.005) (0.005)    (0.005) (0.006) 
FA Share   0.023 0.026    0.033b 0.037b 
   (0.016) (0.016)    (0.014) (0.017) 
Democracy    0.005     0.003 
    (0.005)     (0.005) 
Constant 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.004  -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.010c 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.006) (0.008)  (0.064) (0.068) (0.005) (0.006) 
Diagnostic          
D-Watson 2.25 2.21 1.98 1.81  2.38 2.44 1.97 1.83 
R2 0.34 0.43 0.84 0.90  0.12 0.19 0.88 0.93 
N 51 51 50 46  50 50 49 45 
Note: Dependent variable is total factor productivity. All variables are in natural logarithm. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. In 
order to correct first order autocorrelation, estimations are based on Prais – Winsten and Cochrance – Orcutt FGLS estimators and 
contains annual time series for the period from 1951 - 2010. D – Watson refers to Durbin Watson test for serial correlation. See Appendix 
2-A for variable details.  a (p<0.01); b  (p<0.05); c (p<0.1) 
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Table 0.17: Determinants of Total Factor Productivity Growth 
      1st Lag of Explanatory Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Δ Health 0.033 0.021 0.037c 0.027  -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.011 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.020) (0.021)  (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) 
Δ Life 2.168a 2.070a 1.868b 2.095b  2.323a 1.599b 2.084b 1.860b 
 (0.660) (0.765) (0.727) (0.879)  (0.737) (0.754) (0.825) (0.725) 
Δ Dev. Exp.  0.028c 0.006 -0.002   0.024 0.035 0.052b 
  (0.016) (0.018) (0.026)   (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) 
Δ Gov. Exp.  0.033 0.042 0.035   0.050 0.028 0.023 
  (0.043) (0.033) (0.038)   (0.030) (0.022) (0.020) 
Δ Privy  -0.003 0.011 0.002   0.067b 0.046 0.037 
  (0.034) (0.029) (0.037)   (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) 
Δ Export   0.100b 0.070c    0.085b 0.090c 
   (0.039) (0.041)    (0.033) (0.044) 
Δ Import   0.023 0.024    -0.020 -0.015 
   (0.027) (0.028)    (0.028) (0.028) 
Δ FDI   0.007 0.007    0.007 0.004 
   (0.004) (0.005)    (0.006) (0.005) 
Δ FA Share   0.012 0.005    0.029b 0.019 
   (0.016) (0.015)    (0.012) (0.012) 
Δ Democracy    0.002     0.001 
    (0.005)     (0.004) 
Constant -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005  -0.006 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Diagnostic          
D-Watson 2.00 1.97 1.87 1.83  1.96 2.01 2.01 1.94 
R2 0.20 0.25 0.42 0.34  0.18 0.30 0.47 0.49 
N 50 50 49 44  49 49 48 43 
Note: Dependent variable is total factor productivity growth. All variables are in natural logarithm. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. In order to correct first order autocorrelation, estimations are based on Prais – Winsten and Cochrance – Orcutt FGLS 
estimators and contains annual time series for the period from 1951 - 2010. D – Watson refers to Durbin Watson test for serial correlation. 
See Appendix 2-A for variable details.  a (p<0.01); b  (p<0.05); c (p<0.1)  
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Figure 2.1: Regime Wise Trend of Per Capita Economic Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: If the chief executive assumes power through election and open competition, 
it is considered as democratic regime otherwise autocratic regime. Data Source: 
Heston, Summers and Aten (2012)  
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Figure 2.2: Potential Linkages between Political Regime and Economic Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The inner rectangles show positive linkages whereas the outer circles show 
negative linkages between political regime and productivity. Source: Author’s work. 
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Figure 2.3: Human Capital and Total Factor Productivity 
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan (2010)            Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan (2010) 
 
Figure 2.4: Investment in Infrastructure and Productivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (1998), Updated from 
Pakistan Statistical Year Book (2008 and 2011) 
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Figure 2.5: Net General Government Spending and Productivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (1998), Updated from 
Pakistan Statistical Year Book (2008 and 2011) 
Figure 2.6: Financial Development and Productivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: World Bank (2014) 
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Figure 2.7: Foreign Direct Investment and Productivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan (2010) 
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Appendix 2-A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Justification Data Source 
TFP 
Total Factor Productivity 
Index 
Dependent Variable 
Author’s 
estimation 
Health Health Expenditure (% of GDP) 
Raise human capital for adoption 
of technology 
SBP (2010) 
Life 
Total Life Expectancy at Birth 
(Years) 
WDI (2014) 
Dev. Exp. 
Development Expenditure, net of 
Health Exp. 
  (% of GDP) 
Increases productive capacity 
PBS (1998), 
PBS(2008) and 
PBS(2011) 
Gov. Exp. 
General Government Final 
Consumption, net of Health and 
Dev. Exp. 
(% of GDP) 
May raises productivity through 
provision of technology 
embodied public goods 
Export 
Export of Goods and Services (% of 
GDP) 
Raise productivity by diffusion 
of knowledge and innovative 
ideas  
SBP(2010) Import 
Import of Good and Services (% of 
GDP) 
Help in introducing relative 
advance technology in domestic 
economy 
FA Share 
Foreign Assistance in Projects  
(% of Total FA) 
Substitute domestic finance and 
bridge gap between domestic 
finance demand and supply 
Privy 
Domestic credit to private sector (% 
of GDP) 
Help in financing transferring of 
technology 
WDI (2014) 
FDI 
Foreign Direct Investment 
 (% of GDP) 
Transferring technology and 
Create knowledge spillovers 
Democracy 
Institutionalized Democracy 
(from 0 to 10 Scale) 
 (higher value means more democracy) 
Captures Regime effect on 
productivity 
Marshal et al 
(2012) 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
  
127 
 
 
Chapter 3  
Political Regime and Economic Growth:  
An Empirical Investigation for Pakistan 
3.1. Introduction 
The literature recognizes the role of institutions in economic growth.58 Researchers 
have looked into how to determine the relationship between institutional development 
and economic growth. For instance, theoretical and empirical case studies by 
Acemoglu et al (2005) show that a fundamental cause of difference in economic 
development is difference in institutional performance. The argument is that 
economic institutions provide incentives to economic agents and shape economic 
outcomes, whereas political institutions set the stage. Rodrik et al (2004) establish the 
importance of institutions over geography and integration and find positive impacts 
on income. Their results indicate that the quality of institutions trumps everything else.  
Flachaire et al (2013) examine the role played by institutions in the growth process 
and confirm the Hierarchy of Institution hypothesis proposed by Acemoglu et al 
(2005).  Persson and Tabellini (2006) analyze the role of political institutions and 
argue that it is too difficult to identify the impact of political regimes from within the 
cross-section variation, as the concept of democracy is too broad.  
The term ‘democracy’ here refers to a form of government where recruitment of the 
chief executive is more open and competitive, with substantial constraints on the 
successful candidate.59 It is a type of government where the executive is recruited 
through a competitive election process, with executive recruitment regulated by either 
                                                          
58 For discussion and empirical purposes, this refers to growth of real GDP per capita.  
59 As defined by Marshal et al (2012). 
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a constitution or a set of rules and regulations, or both, and there is an accountability 
group whose power is equal to the executive; this means there is a good check-and-
balance mechanism in the political system.  
Democracy is widely considered a ‘good’ government system mainly because it 
protects the interests of electors; decisions are generally made by consultation and 
consensus; rulers or policy makers are more accountable to their electorate; people 
have freedom to express their opinions; and an inherent check-and-balance system 
requires that policies are more efficient and competitive. Freedom and protection of 
individual interests, in particular property rights, under a democratic system may 
foster a positive environment for long-term economic prosperity. However, there are 
some less positive features of this system. The system generally protects the interests 
of influential groups rather than ordinary people; fixed terms of government 
incentivize policy makers to focus on short-term policy gains rather than long-term 
policy outcomes; and it is difficult to build consensus between political leaders, which 
may result in political instability.  
We systematically analyze whether the duration of a democratic regime matters for 
economic growth. The term ‘duration’ refers to the number of years a government 
lasts. A longer-duration government may put a country on a development trajectory, 
mostly because it has more time to pursue long-term goals. Leaders may choose 
appropriate policy options to achieve long-term objectives. A longer duration enables 
a government to achieve such goals by a persistent and consistent pursuit of policies. 
It also helps reduce uncertainty. Grilli et al (1991) argue that a short-term government 
is more likely to perform myopically and never take hard decisions. To improve the 
economy, a government must pursue medium- to long-term policies persistently and 
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take hard decisions. A government’s longer duration makes this more possible. If 
government is short-lived or changes frequently, it will not attempt long-term 
development projects. Prevailing uncertainty engendered by short-lived governments 
may reduce the exploitation of investment opportunities and discourage the start of 
new business ventures. All these factors may put hurdles in the path of development.  
Whether democracy is better for economic growth is a hot topic in the literature. The 
consequences of democratic system for economic prosperity are still debatable on 
theoretical grounds. Empirical evidence is also inconclusive. Sirowy and Inkeles 
(1991) provide three alternative perspectives for linking democracy with development: 
conflictual, compatible and skeptical.  
Followers of the conflictual perspective60 offer a development first hypothesis. They 
claim that democracy puts hurdles in the way of development and they argue that an 
authoritative government is needed in the initial stages to suppress political and civil 
rights and to foster the growth process. Once the economy has achieved a sufficient 
amount of development, democracy can be revived.  
Followers of the compatible perspective61 claim exactly the opposite, claiming a need 
for democracy first. They argue that basic civil and political rights are necessary to 
express public opinions and demands for action. These freedoms provide an incentive 
for saving and investment that are key drivers for growth.  
The third group is very skeptical about a systematic link between democracy and 
development (see Pye, 1966). They suggest that additional factors such as 
industrialization (capital vs. intensive labor), the political party system (multi- vs. 
                                                          
60 See De Schweinitz (1964) and Rao (1985) for instance 
61 See King (1981) and Kohli (1986) for instance 
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two-party system) and how the state intervenes in the market, should also be 
considered, while claiming a direct link between economic development and 
democracy.  
There are researchers who offer empirical evidence in favor of a democracy-led 
growth hypothesis, while others fail to find such evidence. For instance, Barro (1991), 
Scully (1988 & 1992) and Roll and Talbott (2003) describe positive impacts of 
democracy on economic growth, while Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Sirowy and 
Inkeles (1991), Keech (1995) and Persson and Tabellini (2006) claim negative 
impacts of democracy on economic growth. Interestingly, Przeworski and Limongi 
(1993), Acemoglu (2008) and some others fail to find any causal relationship between 
income and democracy.  
Very few studies have been done for the Pakistan context. Zakaria and Fida (2009) 
found a weak negative relationship between per capita economic growth and 
democracy. Mahmood et al (2010), found a significant positive impact relationship 
between democracy and economic growth. Amir-ud-Din et al (2008) failed to find 
any relationship between democracy and income inequity. Iqbal et al (2008) analyzed 
macro-economic performance and various political regimes of Pakistan in a 
descriptive manner. They conclude that Pakistan’s macro-economic performance has 
been better under an autocratic regime.  
Pakistan’s strategic geo-political position has been important for the international 
community in general and for the US in particular. Bordering resource-rich countries 
like Afghanistan and Iran, Pakistan is considered a gateway to Central Asia, and its 
economic and political situation matter in the maintenance of regional peace. If 
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Pakistan becomes economically and politically weak, it will be a threat for regional 
and US security, because a weakened state and poor economic situation may promote 
extremism and terrorism. A proper understanding of Pakistan’s political and 
economic conditions is important for an understanding of the prospects for future 
development. We make an effort in this regard. Further, as regards competing 
theoretical arguments, inconclusive empirical results on a regime-growth nexus and 
the lack of studies on Pakistan motivate us to systematically examine empirically 
Pakistan’s political arena and its impact on economic growth and income inequality.  
Our main contributions are three folds: first, in terms of scope, our analysis has a 
much wider scope: we analyze the regime effect on economic growth, productivity 
growth and growth of income inequality. We also utilize a longer time series covering 
the sample period of 1950 to 2010. Second, we analyze regime-wise duration effect 
on output growth, productivity growth and income distribution. Third, we develop an 
instrument for addressing the endogeneity of regime and its duration.     
This study progresses as follows: the next section briefly examines Pakistan’s 
political economy in the context of its political and macro-economic situation and the 
strategies adopted by each regime; Section 3.3 reviews evidence related to the 
democracy-growth nexus; the empirical methodology and data descriptions are 
explained in Section 3.4, followed by an interpretation of estimated results and 
discussion in Section 3.5 and 3.6 respectively; and the final section sums up the 
discussion.  
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3.2. Pakistan’s Political Economy 
Since Pakistan became an independent state, it has experienced frequent switches in 
political regime. In its total life span of 67 years, Pakistan has experienced three 
military coups d’état62 and twenty-eight changes of prime minister. Table 3.1 shows 
the type of regime63 and its duration. It is evident from Table 3.1 that the duration of 
each autocratic regime has been longer than that of each democratic regime, ranging 
from eight (R–VI) to thirteen years (R–II).  
The political history shows that during the country’s first democratic regime (R–I), 
Pakistan faced many challenges. At the time of separation from India, Pakistan had 
insufficient economic and political bases. Leaders tried hard to settle the newborn 
country down politically and economically, without significant success, which may be 
attributed to a shortage of trained human, physical and financial resources. During this 
period, Pakistan experienced war over the Kashmir region; Pakistan’s founding father 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah passed away; and the first prime minister, Liquat Ali Khan, 
was assassinated while on a political campaign. These factors and others made 
Pakistan politically unstable. Weak and unstable democratic forces and the 
strengthening of the military in the initial period sowed the seeds for autocracy. In 
October 1958 there was a military coup and General Ayub Khan took charge of the 
country (see Chapter 3 for full details).  
The second regime (R–II) is considered a golden age in Pakistan’s economic history, 
when the economic situation improved and industrialization began. During this period 
                                                          
62 First in October 1958, second in July 1977 and third in October 1999 
63 For this study, we refer to a democratic or autocratic regime on the basis of the head of the state. If 
the head of the state was military, we class it as autocratic; otherwise, democratic. 
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Pakistan enjoyed an average 6% GDP growth, the lowest-ever inflation rate (3.5%), 
and the highest-ever investment rate of 22.5% (see Table 3.2).  
The third regime (R–III) was also important in Pakistan’s political history, when the 
country experienced a period of democracy. Although that period lasted only five and 
a half years, it included major policy shifts.64 The Constitution was promulgated in 
1973, the economy moved toward socialism, all major industries were nationalized 
and labor was given substantial power as trade unions were established. On the 
economic front, Pakistan’s average GDP growth was 3.5% with agricultural growth of 
1.4% and manufacturing growth of 4.1%. As well as reasonable economic growth, the 
economy experienced its highest-ever inflation rate of 14.6% and the average 
investment share declined from 22.5% to 19.3%.   
Internal political conflicts and strong opposition to socialism set the stage for another 
military coup. The second period of martial law began in July 1977 (R–IV), when 
General Zia-ul-Haq took charge and introduced new economic and political policies. 
His major policies included Islamization of the economy, reversal of socialism, 
denationalization of some industries, promotion of corporate structures and 
involvement in the Afghan war. The economic situation remained stable during this 
period; the economy enjoyed 6% average growth, coupled with agricultural growth of 
3.9% and manufacturing growth of 8.4%. The inflation rate remained modest and the 
average investment share in GDP improved slightly.  
After the death of General Zia-ul-Haq in a mysterious plane crash, Pakistan again 
turned to democracy (R–V). Note that this democratic regime lasted considerably 
                                                          
64 It is debatable whether the policy shift was good or bad for the economy. 
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longer than the previous democratic period (11 vs. 6 years), but Pakistan remained 
politically unstable. In its eleven years, the government changed hands four times 
because of either corruption or economic mismanagement. This is remembered as 
the lost decade because during this period Pakistan’s economic performance remained 
poor.  
In October 1999, Pakistan experienced a third military coup; General Pervaiz 
Musharaf overthrew the government of Mian Nawaz Sharif to become Chief 
Executive. He decentralized political power from the provincial to the local level but 
strengthened the federal government. The nation’s economic performance was good. 
In 2005, Pakistan was named the second fastest-growing Asian economy (after China) 
and the stock market was higher than in the last two decades. After the US calamity of 
9/11, Pakistan received tremendous remittances from abroad and foreign aid from the 
US. Foreign exchange reserves, which stood at US$7 billion in 1999, climbed to 
US$13 billion in 2006. During this time Pakistan experienced a massive earthquake in 
the northern area which inflicted massive infrastructure damage. The average GDP 
growth was 4.7% and the inflation rate was 5.3%.  
The last democratic regime (R–VII) faced considerable challenges, ranging from 
terrorist attacks, energy crises and street crime to natural disasters such as massive 
flooding. Inflation rose to over 25% and average growth fell to 3.7% (manufacturing 
2.7%, agriculture 2.2%). The energy crisis was at a peak, substantially hurting 
Pakistan’s economy. The global recession also played a negative role in the process of 
development. The government continued to receive a substantial amount of US aid to 
play an active role in US-led War against Terror. 
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3.2.1. Political Regimes and Economic Strategies 
It is generally recognized the democratic regime may outperform than non-democratic 
regime mainly because the policy adopted by democratic regime are more pro-market. 
In this section, we review the policies adopted by Pakistan’s democratic and 
autocratic regimes. Table 3.3 categorizes regime’s policies by its type.  
Between 1940 and 1960 the global strategy for development was Import Substitution. 
The democratic regime followed the trend and adopted Import Substitution (IS) as its 
strategy for development. The main policy tools adopted by that regime in 
implementing an IS strategy were licensing, quantitative restrictions and exchange 
controls (Lewis, 1969). With its licensing system, the regime managed to control 
import volume, composition and sources (Naqvi, 1964), and this was the most 
effective policy tool adopted by that regime (Ahmad and Amjad, 1984). The volume 
of total imports substantially declined from $593 million in 1952 to $208 million in 
1956. In terms of composition, the import of manufactured goods decline by 78%, 
food and beverage by 84% and raw materials by 52.4% during the said period. While 
the rationale behind the IS strategy was to initiate and build industrialization, the main 
emphasis was on the establishment and protection of the consumption goods sector 
rather than of capital goods (see Figure 3.1). Zaidi (2005) argues that the reasons for 
this protection of consumption goods were twofold: that the demand for consumption 
goods in the 1950s was higher than for investment goods; and that protection was 
provided mostly to those industries where demand had been previously met by 
imports from India. 
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The main economic strategies of the first military regime were a Green Revolution, 
Land Reforms and Export Promotion. Under the Green Revolution, enhancement of 
irrigation facilities, cheap credit for modernization and access to new agriculture 
technologies were ensured. It was implemented in two phases: the first (1960-1965) 
provided improved and enriched irrigation facilities and the second (1965-1970) 
delivered new agriculture technology 65  (Zaidi, 2005). The military regime used 
subsidized agriculture credit as a major policy tool for implementation of the strategy.  
Under Land Reform a ceiling was placed on landholdings, tenants became owners and 
legal protection to tenants was granted. However, in practice, we observe a partial 
improvement in landholdings. For instance, under the 1959 Land Reform regulations, 
only 15% of total declarants were affected by the ceilings on individual holdings. 
Within the 15% affected declarants, the regime was able to resume 35% of the area of 
affected declarants. The reason for not getting full benefits of land reform may be 
attributed to implementation delay and loopholes in the land reform regulations. For 
example, the land reform regulations allowed landholders to transfer a part of land to 
dependents and other members of their families and it exempted numerous categories.        
The third main policy tool of Export Promotion strategy as adopted by the military 
regime was the launch of a Bonus Voucher Scheme (BVS) and introduction of Free 
List. Papanek (1967) argued that these policy tools can be marked as “an important 
shift from direct to more flexible and market-orientated indirect controls”. Lewis 
(1969) pointed out that liberalized import policy allowed market forces to determine 
the commodity composition of import.  Under the BVS, exporters earned bonus 
                                                          
65 Includes provision of high-yield seed varieties, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, tractors and other 
agriculture machinery  
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vouchers in addition to rupee-converted amounts. These bonus vouchers could be 
used as license to import certain goods or could be sold on an official market. The 
BVS minimized government intervention in determining the amount and composition 
of import. It provides flexibility in the system.  
Socialism was the core strategy of the second democratic regime. The regimes main 
policy tools were nationalization, devaluation, abolition of the bonus voucher scheme 
and labor and land reform. The regime nationalized major units of the industrial, 
banking, insurance and education sectors, believing that this would protect small and 
medium entrepreneurs from giant industrialists and transfer economic power from a 
few hands to the masses. However, the statistics showed that the regime failed to 
achieve its intended objectives. During the period 1971 to 1979, the household 
income distribution deteriorated as evident from Table 3.4 that household Gini co-
efficient increased from 0.33 to 0.37. Similarly, the ratio of top 20% to lowest 20% 
also escalates from 4.9 to 6.2. Another repercussion of nationalization policy was 
decline of private sectors confidence – private sector investment in the large scale 
manufacturing sector declined by 45 percent during the democratic regime tenure.     
Under land reform, a relatively low ceiling on landholding was imposed and land was 
re-distributed to tenants without charge. However, the success rate for this regime 
land reform was substantially lower than the previous military regime. The regime 
successfully resumed 0.481 million hectares area as compared to 1.022 million 
hectares of 1959 which constitutes only 47%. In terms of total farm area of the 
country, the regime resumed only 0.001%. Only 1% of the landless tenants and small 
owners got benefits by these policy measures.   
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The democratic regime liberalized trade by abandoning the bonus voucher scheme 
and import restriction for over 300 commodity items. The regime lowered tariff rates 
on intermediate and capital goods. However, it seems that due to its nationalization 
policy, the regime could not encourage private sectors for investing in long-term 
projects as the share of import of capital goods declined from 33.7% in 1971 to 21.4% 
in 1975.  The regime also devalued the currency by 131%. 
The focal strategies of the second military regime were Revival of the Private Sector 
and Trade Liberalization. The military regime rejected the legacy of the previous 
regime and decided to revive the private sector. It initiated numerous policy steps for 
involvement of the private sector in the production process, for example de-
nationalizing some agro-based industries and small engineering units. It also opened 
some basic and heavy chemical and cement industries to the private sector, issued tax 
holidays and rebates on export earnings, and reduced the interest rates for investment 
in agriculture and industry. As a consequences of these policy measures, the share of 
public sector in total industrial investment declined from 72.74% in 1979 to 18% in 
1988 (see Table 3.5).   
The military regime initiated a corporatization program to promote the corporate 
culture and introduced legislation to regulate the activities of the corporate sector. 
Perhaps the most prominent strategy of this regime was that of Islamization, 66  
introducing business avenues based on Islamic principles.67 Various policy steps were 
taken to liberalize trade, the major ones being introduction of a flexible exchange rate, 
                                                          
66 Islamization is a process where economic activities are based on Islamic rules.  
67 Islam prohibits the taking of interest and interest-based activities; he introduced the concept of 
financing purely on a profit and loss basis.  
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removal of most non-tariff barriers and a reduction in the number of import-banned 
goods. 
Structural Adjustment was the prominent strategy of the third democratic regime, 
which took advice from the IMF and World Bank and launched a structural 
adjustment program with major policy steps to further enhance the role of the private 
sector. These policy steps included abolishing the import licensing scheme; 
empowering the private sector to choose the level and location of investment; opening 
up new business avenues which were previously in the public sector, such as 
provision of utilities, power generation, transport, communications and banking; 
providing incentives such as tax holidays, exemption from indirect taxes like custom 
duties, import surcharges and sales tax; and easing regulations on foreign loan 
procedures and hiring of foreigner employees (World Bank, 1993).  
Beside this structural program, the democratic regime also initiated a privatization 
program and financial sector reform. The government adopted two types of 
privatization strategy: i) fully privatizing state-owned enterprises68 and ii) reducing 
government ownership of large industrial units and banks.69 Financial sector reform 
included institutional strengthening of financial intermediaries; measures to manage 
and recover non-performing loans; debt management reform; monetary management 
measures; and exchange and payment reform.   
The third military regime adopted a Market Oriented strategy whereby it reduced the 
government role and increased private sector participation. Key policy tools included 
privatization, deregulation, globalization and higher education reform. The regime 
                                                          
68 Such as National Motors; Pak Suzuki Company; Zeal Pak Cement; D.G. Khan Cement 
69 Such as Mari Gas (20%); Kot Addu Power Company (36%); PTCL (12%); Allied Bank Ltd (51%); 
Muslim Commercial Bank (75%); Banker Equity (51%). 
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undertook massive privatization of state-owned enterprises. The major focus was on 
the financial sector, but privatization in sectors such as energy, fertilizers, 
telecommunications, cement and chemicals also took place. Deregulation of economic 
and business activities70 was another policy tool adopted by this regime. On the eve of 
worldwide globalization, the regime further liberalized trade by removing subsidies 
and non-tariff barriers, reducing tariffs, increasing market access, upgrading 
technology and skills and eliminating tariff walls for various commodities. The 
regime initiated various reforms, 71  the most prominent of which were in higher 
education, when universities were given free internet access and more funds to 
increase R&D (research and development) and to produce more scholars and 
researchers.  
3.3. Political Institutions and Economic Growth: Evidence from the Past 
This section reviews past evidence about the relationship between political institutions 
and economic growth. It falls into two parts: the first reviews linkages between 
institutions and economic growth in general, while the second reviews specific forms 
of political institutions and their relationship with economic growth.     
3.3.1. Political Institutions and Economic Growth 
There is growing concern over the notion that institutions are important determinants 
of economic growth. Whether institutions are really deep causes for economic growth 
has been widely debated in the literature. There are two distinct and opposing groups: 
those who consider institutions as a root cause of economic growth (see Keefer and 
                                                          
70 This includes deregulation of imports and pricing of petroleum products, agricultural prices, 
allowing the private sector to import DAP and fertilizers and to export wheat and wheat products. 
71 This includes reforms in the judiciary, police, civil service and procurement.  
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Knack, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al, 2001; Rodrik et al, 2004) and 
those who refuse to accept institutions as a deep cause (see Glaeser et al, 2004).  
The main argument for the institutional role is that political institutions or political 
agents determine the path of the economy by pursuing appropriate policies. If political 
institutions are strong enough to protect property rights, incentivize savings and 
investment, and distribute resources in an effective and efficient manner, there is no 
reason to believe that economy will remain poor. The following literature reviews 
briefly shed light on the growing debate.  
 Rodrik et al (2004) establish the importance of institutions over geography and 
integration and find a positive impact on income. Their results indicate that 
institutional quality trumps everything else. Flachaire et al (2013) discuss the role 
played by the institution in promoting economic growth and argue that political and 
economic institutions have played very different roles in the growth process, saying 
that political institutions are deep causes of economic growth, whereas economic 
institutions are not. They observe that political institutions have played a key role in 
determining to which regime a country belongs, whereas economic institutions have 
played an important role in determining the growth rate within the regime.  
 Marsiliani and Renstrom (2007) analyze the theoretical impact of political 
institutions on economic growth by using an overlapping generation model. They 
examine two structures of decision-making institutions: the first, that all decisions are 
made by parliament; the second, that ministers are authorized to set spending policies 
independently (called power separation). They highlight the importance of predicted 
population growth in the decision-making process and show that economic growth is 
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lower under power separation mainly because of production inefficiency. Eicher and 
Leukert (2009) examine parameter heterogeneity in noted approaches for linking 
institutions with economic performance. They found that parameter heterogeneity is 
strong enough to require a new set of instruments for control. Further, they confirm a 
Hierarchy of Institutions hypothesis and show that economic institutions have a 
significant role in output levels when political institutions are used as instruments for 
economic institutions. 
Pereira and Teles (2010) looks empirically at how political institutions cause 
economic growth at different stages of democracy and development. Their results 
suggest that political institutions can be considered as substitute for democracy to 
accelerate economic growth. Further, they highlight the importance of political 
institutions in economic performance during transitory periods of democracy and in 
countries where ethnical fractionalization is very high.  
In contrast to the above, some do not recognize institutions as deep causes for 
economic growth. Glaeser et al (2004) re-examine the role played by political 
institutions in the growth process and deny the proposition that institutions cause 
economic growth. They examine various proxies used in literature for political 
institutions, and claim that these are not good proxies to measure the inherent 
characteristics of polity. Institutional proxies must capture two features: (1) 
constraints on government; and (2) durable features of political settings. However, 
proxies used in growth literature mostly do not possess these two features. They argue 
that institutional proxies commonly used in literature measure outcomes rather than 
government constraints. They further challenge methodologies used to establish a 
causal relationship between incomes and institutions, and argue that some IV 
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techniques are imperfect. They demonstrate that under a simple OLS technique, 
human capital appears a good predictor of economic growth, whereas institutions are 
not. They suggest that most countries may get rid of poverty and escape the 
underdevelopment trap simply by applying a dictator’s policies and may subsequently 
improve institutional quality. 
3.3.2. Democracy-Growth Nexus 
The literature shows growing concern about the causal relationship between 
democracy and economic growth. Proponents of democracy-led growth argue that 
democratic governance performs better because of its accountability and check-and-
balance mechanisms. Democratic government opts for those policies which promote 
development because they are accountable to the electorate. These proponents argue 
that under a democratic system, government also faces tremendous opposition if their 
policies are not up to the mark. They believe that these characteristics constrain 
democratic government not to abuse executive powers, and the recurring election 
process makes them more accountable and responsible for their actions. 
Empirically, the results are inconclusive. Some studies support a democracy-led 
growth approach, others not. Interestingly, some studies fail to find any systematic 
correlation between regime type and income growth. The following discussion briefly 
reviews some empirical work in the literature.  
Work by Kormendi and Meguire (1985) is considered pioneering in developing non-
economic determinants for growth. They use civil liberty as a proxy for political 
freedom and find a growth-enhancing effect of political freedom via investment. 
Scully (1988) analyzes the institutional framework of a political system and its impact 
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on efficiency and growth. He finds a significantly positive effect of politically open 
economies, claiming that they show a growth three times as fast, and two-and-a-half 
times as efficient, as economies with curtailed freedoms. Mbaku and Kimenyi (1997) 
re-examine the Kormendi and Meguire (1985) data and find more support for a 
positive correlation between political freedom and economic growth. Feng (1997) 
examines how democracy and political stability interact with economic growth; he 
observes an indirect positive impact of democracy on economic growth. Leblang 
(1997) finds a robustly significant positive impact of democracy on growth. Jalles 
(2010) examines the democracy-growth relationship and finds a significant positive 
impact. He concludes that electoral democracy itself fosters per capita growth, and he 
failed to find any evidence for the fostering of growth under autocracy. Knutsen (2011) 
empirically investigates how democracy promotes the protection of property rights; he 
finds a positive impact of democracy on property rights. 
Persson and Tabellini (2006) empirically analyze the role of political institutions on 
the development process. He argues that it is too difficult to identify the impact of 
political regimes from within the cross-section variation, as the concept of democracy 
is too broad. Kurzman et al (2002) fail to find evidence for a direct effect of 
democracy on growth, but do find a positive indirect effect via investment and 
government expenditure. Plumper and Martin (2003) provide some explanations for 
the prevailing hypothesis of an inverted u-shape relationship between the level of 
democracy and economic development. They argue that any given political regime 
uses government spending as an instrument to get political support. They use 
theoretical and empirical evidence to show that autocratic regimes overspend on rent-
seeking action, whereas democratic regimes overspend on public goods for political 
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support. Thus, neither type of regime achieves an appropriate rate of economic growth 
like countries whose level of democracy is at an intermediate level. They further 
argue that causation runs from political participation to government spending to 
economic development.  
Landau (1986) examines the growth effect of various types of government 
expenditure. He uses models to capture political situations before and after a country 
becomes independent. He finds a negative impact of democracy on growth. His 
results support the prevailing idea that “democracy is an expensive luxury for poor 
countries.” Barro (1996) investigates a potential democracy and growth relationship. 
After controlling for growth effects by initial level of GDP per capita, human capital, 
rule of law, government consumption and the free market, he observes a weak 
negative relationship between democracy and economic growth. He further 
investigates the existence of a non-linear relationship between a democracy and 
economic growth, and suggests that a low level of political freedom promotes 
economic growth, but a moderate level of political freedom seems to slow down 
income growth.  
Dick (1974) fails to note any clear-cut growth-enhancing effect of either an 
authoritarian or a non-authoritarian regime. He concludes that regime choice varies 
between countries and also depends on the prevailing national circumstances. Marsh 
(1988) fails to find any systematic relationship between democracy and economic 
growth. Acemoglu et al (2008) deny the prevailing belief of a causal relationship 
between per capita income and democracy, and argue that per capita income is not an 
important determinant of democracy. They argue that in the presence of a 
simultaneous bias between interest variables, most cross-sectional studies show a 
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strong association between them. However, this association seems to disappear once 
such bias is controlled for. The use savings rates and trade-weighted world income as 
instruments and fail to find any strong evidence for causality running from income to 
democracy. From a theoretical and conceptual framework, they show that both 
income and democracy evolve jointly. 
3.4. Data and Methodology 
We employ the following econometric model for determining the impact of a political 
regime and its duration on economic growth and productivity growth: 
∆ 𝑙𝑜(𝑌)𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜 (𝐷𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑜)𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜(𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦)𝑡 + 𝛽3ln (𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦)𝑡 ∗ln (𝐷𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑜)𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡−1 +  𝛽5𝛥𝑙𝑜(𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑙)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡……… (1) 
Here, Y is either economic growth measured by log difference of real GDP per capita 
or productivity growth measured by log difference of total factor productivity, 
𝐷𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑜  represents the durability of a given political regime, 𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦  is a 
measure of political regime. Controls are the lag level of per capita GDP(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡−1); 
human capital measured by school enrollment rate at middle level (𝑆𝐹ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙); health 
expenditure relative to GDP (𝐻𝐸𝐿𝑙𝑂ℎ) ; general government consumption share 
relative to GDP (𝐺𝑙𝐷); government spending on development projects (𝐷𝐸𝐷.𝐸𝐸𝑂. ); 
domestic credit to private sector relative to GDP (𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐷𝑦); openness (𝑂𝑂𝐸𝑜); share to 
foreign assistance in development projects (𝐹𝐴 𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐸) and foreign direct investment 
relative to GDP (𝐹𝐷𝐼); 𝑂 is the time index and 𝜀  is the error term, which is assumed 
to be white noise. Note that all model variables are in natural logarithm. 72  The 
                                                          
72 Some observations in democracy variable are zero. To make logarithm possible, we took log of (1 + 
Democracy). 
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controls specified at equation (1) are our core specifications and will always be used 
in estimations; however, we also use other controls to validate our estimated results.  
The parameter 𝛽1  estimates the average impact of duration on economic growth; 
however it does not distinguish whether duration of democratic or autocratic regime 
matters for economic growth. One way to estimate duration impact for a given regime 
is to add an interaction term between democracy and duration along-with two 
components in the model. If duration of a given regime matters for economic growth, 
then the coefficient associated with interaction term (i.e. 𝛽3) will be significant and 
positive. To reduce the multicollinearity, the two component variables are generally 
centered by their respective means before calculating the interaction term.  This does 
not change the coefficient estimates, its standard errors or covariance estimates of the 
model (Aiken and West, 1991; Gasiorowski, 1995). 
We use an annual time series for the last six decades (1950-2010). One common 
problem associated with a time-series regression is that a disturbance term may be 
correlated with past values. In this case, estimated coefficients are still unbiased but 
their standard errors are not efficient. Consequently, inferences drawn from these 
standard errors are invalid. One possible remedy is to re-estimate coefficients by the 
Generalized Least Square (GLS) or the Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) 
method. 73  We verify the validity of serial correlation assumption by the Durbin 
Watson H – test before finalizing the estimation of a model. If test statistics are 
significant, the models are re-estimated by FGLS.  
                                                          
73 For further detail see Gujarati and Porter (2009), p. 442-448 
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One empirical difficulty is the measurement of a political regime as dichotomous 
(Gasiorowski, 1995; Barro, 1996; Perroti, 1996; Brown, 2000; Reiter and Stam, 2003; 
Rodrik and Wacziang, 2005; and Persson and Tabellini, 2006) or as continuous 
variable (Brunetti and Weder, 1995; Ades and Tella, 1999; Acemoglue et al, 2005 & 
2008; Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Ashraf and Galor, 2013; Gassebner et al, 2013). 
The main disadvantage of considering political institutions as being of a dichotomous 
nature is that it only distinguishes a regime as democratic or non-democratic. It does 
not categorize a regime under varying degrees of democracy. By contrast, a 
continuous measure of political regime is generally based on an ordinal scale, 
enabling measurement of degree of political institution. On a continuous ordinal scale, 
it is easy to say that Sweden has more democracy than Mexico, and Mexico is more 
democratic than Chile (Bollen 1990). This study considers political regimes as 
continuous variables and measures on a continuous scale.  
Our 𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦 variable is a composite weighted average index derived from three 
major components: (i) executive constraints; (ii) competitiveness and openness of 
executive recruitment; and (iii) competitiveness of political participation. First 
component measures the extent to which the head of the state consider preferences of 
others while making a decision. Second component captures the ways by which the 
chief executives occupy position. In other words, it measures regulation on chief 
executive recruitment process, the degree of competition among the potential 
candidates and the extent of opportunity available to politically active population. 
Last component measure the extent to which the political system enables non-elites to 
influence political elites in regular way. Thus, our 𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦  variable measures 
constraints and regulations on chief executive. Higher constraints and regulations may 
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make chief executives accountable to their electorates. This may reduce inefficiency 
in the system which in turns may promote economic growth. Similarly, these 
constraints and regulations may also bind chief executive to provide goods and 
services according to the preferences of their constituents. Appendix 3-A  compares 
these three components between democracy and autocracy.  
We measure 𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦  on 11-point scale from 0 (no democracy) to 10 (full 
democracy). We obtained data on Democracy from the Polity IV project (Marshall et 
al, 2012).  
The variable 𝐷𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑜 captures regime durability and measures “the number of years 
since last regime change.”74 The single greatest advantage of using the Polity IV 
project database is availability of data for a longer time, from 1800 to 2012. For 
country-specific time series analysis such as this study, that is a better choice. Another 
advantage is that the Polity IV measure of democracy incorporates institutional 
characteristics75 of a given regime. Details of variables definitions, rationales and data 
sources are given in Appendix 3-B 
3.4.1. Instrumental Variable 
It is generally argued that democratic regime is more prone to economic growth 
because the rights of individuals, firms and investors are protected. In contrast, 
continuous economic recession may put pressure on a regime to transit from 
democratic to non-democratic. Thus, the political regime is endogenous. In case of 
endogeneity, least square estimator becomes biased and coefficients of interest cannot 
be estimated precisely. One possible way to get precise estimate is using instrument 
                                                          
74 As defined on p. 17 of the Polity IV Project Data User’s Manual. 
75 Such as ‘openness and competitiveness of processes for selecting chief executives’ (Knack, 2004) 
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variable technique. The condition for having a good instrument is that the proposed 
instrument should not have direct relation with the dependent variable (i.e. economic 
growth) but it will affect the dependent variable through the endogenous variable (i.e. 
democracy). We use two instruments to correct the possible bias of reverse causation: 
the first is amendments to the Constitution, as we developed for this study; and the 
second IV is past values of institutional variables.  
Countries may amend their Constitutions to strengthen their institutions, particularly 
their political institutions. Khan (2004) recognizes government action to amend the 
Constitution as a democratic parliamentary function. Since independence, Pakistan 
has experienced three types of political system: Presidential, Semi–Presidential and 
Parliamentary. Figure 3.2  shows the type of political system along-with it timing.  
Pakistan’s first Constitution was promulgated in 1956 to introduce a parliamentary 
form of government. The first military ruler abolished this system in 1962 and 
introduced a Presidential form of government, giving the president more power. In 
1973 a democratically-elected government re-introduced the Parliamentary system, 
delegating power to a prime minster. The second military ruler amended the 1973 
Constitution and changed the political structure from a Parliamentary to a Semi-
Presidential system by empowering the presidential office. This continued till 1997, 
when the democratic government re-introduced the Parliamentary form of 
government by amending the Constitution. In 2003 a third military government re-
empowered the president and re-introduced the Semi-Presidential form of government 
by amending the Constitution. In 2010 a democratic government revived the 
Parliamentary form of government by again amending the Constitution.  
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This back-and-forth changing of the political system shows how political power 
struggles encourage an incumbent government to amend the Constitution and retain 
political power.   
The main argument here is that the autocratic regimes used constitutional 
amendments as a tool for legitimize their tenure. It can be used as instrument for 
political institutions. Since these amendments directly affect the political institutions 
but have nothing to do with economic growth. We developed a dummy with value 
one for the years when the political system was changed through constitutional 
amendment and zero for other times. Besides the amendment dummy, we take 
advantage of time series analysis and use one year past score of democracy as 
additional instrument. The basic intuition behind using past realizations as an 
instrument for the present is that the past may affect the future but the future seldom 
or scarcely affects the past.   
Similarly, duration of a regime may also be endogenous. We argue that longer 
duration is needed for pursuing policies consistently and presently. The consistent in 
policies may reduce uncertainty and encourage investment. It is more likely that 
higher investment increases the economic growth. On the other hand, higher 
economic growth may support a regime and regime may survive longer. In other 
words, higher economic growth may longer the duration of democratic regime. Thus, 
duration is endogenous.  
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To address this endogeneity issue, we estimate the likelihood of democratic regime by 
using the following probit model76: 
𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦𝑡 =  𝜓0 + 𝜓1𝑆𝐹ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡 + 𝜓2𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑡 + 𝜓3𝐷𝐸𝑓𝐸𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑡 + 𝜓4𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑡 + 𝜓5𝐿&𝑂𝑡+ 𝜓6𝑂𝑂𝐸𝑜𝑡 + 𝜓6𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
Here 𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦 is a dummy variable whose value is equal to 1 if regime at time 𝑂 is 
democratic and zero otherwise. 𝑆𝐹ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙 denotes average number of years of schooling; 
𝑇𝐿𝐸 is tax revenue relative to GDP; 𝐷𝐸𝑓𝐸𝑜𝑠𝐸 is government spending on military 
relative to GDP; 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑂  is total public debt relative to GDP; 𝐿&𝑂  is government 
spending on a law and order situation relative to GDP; 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑂 denotes the openness of 
the economy; 𝐴𝐼𝐷 refers to US total foreign assistance to Pakistan; the subscript 𝑂 
denotes a year ranging from 1950 and 2010, and 𝜀 is the error term that captures all 
other factors which have not been incorporated in our model, with the assumption that 
𝐸(𝜀𝑡) = 0 for all 𝑂.   
Once estimation is done, we predict the likelihood of democratic regime survival. On 
the basis of this likelihood we formulate a duration series by adding the cumulative 
probability. Let ?̂?𝑡 represents the likelihood of democratic regime at time ‘𝑂’ and ?̂?𝑡 is 
the predicted duration of a democratic regime at time ‘𝑂’. We assign a value zero for 
the years when change of regime occurred (i.e. ?̂?0 = 0). The estimated duration for 
the subsequent years will be as follows: 
?̂?1 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1, 
?̂?2 = ?̂?1 + ?̂?2 
                                                          
76 We also estimate the coefficients by logit model and found that there is no systematic difference 
between these two alternative estimation techniques. 
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?̂?3 = ?̂?2 + ?̂?3 
⋮ 
⋮ 
We continue adding up the likelihood of democratic regime till the regime change. By 
definition the likelihood for autocratic regime survival is nothing but one minus the 
likelihood of democratic regime i.e.  1 − ?̂?𝑡 . We follow the same process for 
estimating the duration of autocratic regime. We use the predicted value of duration as 
an instrument for our endogenous variable 𝐷𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑜.  
3.4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of our sample are given in Table 3.6, with number of 
observations, mean, standard deviation and range for each variable. Between 1951 
and 2010, Pakistan’s average per capita income was US$1,258 (on purchasing power 
parity basis), with an annual average growth of 2.2%.  
The average scores for democracy and autocracy on a 0-10 scale were 3.54 and 2.73 
respectively. In terms of degree of political institution as measured by the average 
scores of democracy and autocracy, it seems that Pakistan’s democratic institutions 
are relatively stronger than their non-democratic institutions. However, when we 
analyze the total duration of each regime, Pakistan spent more time under an 
autocratic regime (32 vs. 28 years). The average duration of a democratic regime was 
1.8 years; the average duration for an autocratic regime was 10.6 years. The lesser 
amount of time under a democratic regime implies that, on average, no democratic 
regime completed its full tenure of 5 years but was dismissed in under 2 years. The 
substantially lower duration of democratic regimes also implies that Pakistan was 
politically unstable during the period under review. One possible reason for the non-
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functioning of democratic regimes could be low average years of schooling (2.5 
years). 
3.5. Empirical Results 
We begin our analysis by estimating equation (1) for the period 1951-2010. Table 3.7 
shows the estimated impact of a democratic regime and its duration on economic 
growth. Columns (1 & 2) in Table 3.7 show the potential impact of democracy on 
economic growth; while columns (3 & 4) show the estimated impact of democracy on 
productivity growth. We fail to find any evidence of serial correlation in our models. 
Therefore, we estimate coefficients of column (1 & 3) by simple OLS. The 
coefficients of column (2 & 4) are estimated by instrumented variable two stage least 
square method (2SLS). The robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The 
bottom panel of the Table 3.7 shows diagnostic analysis of our estimated models. We 
prefer OLS estimates over 2SLS because the endogeneity test fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that ‘variable are exogenous’. If variables are exogenous, OLS is efficient 
than 2SLS.       
3.5.1. Economic Growth 
Significance of the 𝐷𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑜 term in all models of Table 3.7 shows that duration 
matters for economic growth; it is positive and highly significant. The positive sign at 
column (1) implies that an additional year in one regime improves economic growth 
by around half percent. This supports our hypothesis that longer duration is beneficial 
for economic growth because if duration is longer, the regime can implement its 
policy consistently. The longer duration also reduces uncertainty and encourages 
investment.  
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In case of democracy, we get negative but significant sign.  When we address the 
endogeneity problem and obtain the coefficient by two stages least square, the size of 
coefficient slightly improves. However, we fail to find any statistical difference 
between these two coefficients which may be interpreted as, in case of Pakistan, the 
political regime variable is not endogenous.  The negative sign associated with the 
democracy variable imply that a higher degree of democracy reduces economic 
growth. Our results are consistent with Barro (1994), Persson and Tabellini (2006) 
and Zakaria and Fida (2009). The sample average score of democracy is 3.3 which 
imply that the quality of Pakistan’s democratic institutions is well below the average 
score of democracy. Przeworski et al (1996) argued that the democratization process 
is less likely to be strong in countries whose per capita income is less than $2000. 
Pakistan’s average per capita income is around $1250(in PPP bases).   
One of the main arguments in favor of democratic regime is that democracy promotes 
economic growth because under democratic regime the rights of individuals and firms 
are more protected. The secure property rights encourage the investment behavior 
which promotes growth. However, in case of Pakistan we see a little evidence in favor 
of secure property rights. For instance, the adoption of nationalization program under 
the second democratic regime minimizes the investor confidence (see Section 1.4.3.1 
for further details). Figure 3.3 plots a scatter between investment share and level of 
democracy.  We can see that higher level of democracy fail to increase share of total 
investment as well as private sector investment. We also found that democratic 
regime not only shaken the domestic investors’ confidence but also fail to improve 
foreign investors (see Figure 3.4). 
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The economy grows slower in democratic regime than autocratic regime may be due 
to loss of ‘state autonomy’.  Here we define the ‘state autonomy’ as the capacity of 
the regime in pursuing development policies in isolation of lobbying group pressure. 
In case of Pakistan, military is one of lobbying group. We have observed substantial 
influence of military in controlling the democratic affairs. For instance, in 1990s the 
frequent change of democratic regimes was mainly due to influence of military (see 
Section 1.4.5.1 for further details). One way to minimize military influence is to 
increase its share in total output. Figure 3.5 support our hypothesis. It shows that 
higher degree of democracy increases the government spending on military.         
To test the hypothesis that duration of democratic regime matters for determining per 
capita income growth, the 𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦  variable is interacted with 𝐷𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑜 . In 
column (1) of Table 3.7, we get a highly significant negative coefficient of interaction 
term.  A negative sign associated with the interaction term suggest that at an average 
level of 𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦, another year in democracy reduces the per capita growth by half 
percent. Significantly positive individual term of 𝐷𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑜  and its significantly 
negative interaction with 𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦 shows that the effect of 𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦 variable 
dominates. The robust negative coefficient implies that, at least for Pakistan, longer-
lasting democracy is harmful for economic growth. This result is not surprising; as 
discussed above, Pakistan’s democratic regimes fail to provide an environment which 
is favorable for enhancing economic growth. When we estimate equation (1) by using 
instrument variable technique, we get almost similar coefficient but marginally lower 
significance. It is not surprising because if our suspected variables are in fact 
exogenous, then the 2SLS estimator is less efficient then the simple OLS. The 
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endogeneity test given at the bottom of the Table 3.7 shows that our suspected 
variables are in fact, exogenous.     
The negative sign associated with a lag of GDP per capita confirms the convergence 
hypothesis and shows that the initial lower GDP per capita increases the future 
economic growth. Not surprisingly, higher school enrollment rates, and more 
government spending on development projects, all have a significant and positive 
impact on economic growth. The positive sign associated with these variables re-
confirms importance of human capital and development of infrastructure in promoting 
economic growth.  
Government expenditure growth has appeared to play a significant but negative role 
in the growth process. The coefficient is robust in both models. The negative sign 
supports the market economy hypothesis. One possible interpretation of the negative 
sign is that size of government matters. A large government may put hurdles in the 
way of an efficiently functioning market. Our empirical results suggest that a limited 
government is better for per capita income growth. 
In Pakistan’s case, we fail to find any significant role of FDI, financial development 
and trade openness in growth. One possible reason for this may be size. The average 
FDI value relative to GDP over the period in question is 0.6 percent. As to trade, over 
two-thirds of the Pakistan economy is closed. Around 60% of total exports comprise 
textile and textile-related goods; the other 40% comprise sports goods, surgical items, 
carpets and similar low-value items. Around 38% of import goods comprise food 
items, petroleum products and textile inputs. These figures explain partially the non-
contribution of trade to economic growth.  
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We found significantly negative effect of growth share of foreign assistance in 
development project on economic growth. Since, it is a foreign assistance which can 
be supplement the domestic financial needs. Carefully examination of sample data 
shows that around 53 percent of total foreign assistance come on development 
projects and the supply of funds are very fragile. The share ranges from 20 percent to 
around 80 percent of total FA. In terms of growth, we observe a negative average 
growth over sample period. This uneven supply of funds and average negative growth 
may explain why we have robustly negative effect on economic growth. 
Diagnostic tests confirm that the error term is not serially correlated and the model 
has sufficient explanatory power.  
3.5.2. Productivity Growth 
Column (3 & 4) of the Table 3.7 reports impact of democracy on productivity growth. 
We fail to find any significant impact of level of democracy on productivity growth. 
The negative sign imply that democratic regime in not effective in promoting the 
growth of productivity. As explained above, it seems that the democratic regime fails 
to provide an environment which is more conducive for productivity growth. In case 
of duration, we found positive but weak significant impact. The positive sign support 
our claim that longer duration is needed for pursuing policies consistently.  
When we interact the 𝐷𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑜  with 𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦 , we got negative sign. The 
coefficient is significant at 10 percent level. The significance level improves when we 
estimate the model by instrumental variable technique. However, the size of the 
coefficient remained the same. The endogeneity test fails to reject the null and 
confirms that in case of Pakistan, the institutional variables are not endogenous. The 
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interaction term imply that at an average level of democracy, additional year of 
democratic regime reduces the productivity growth by 0.2%. The marginal impact of 
duration is low. The result also shows that democracy effect dominates over duration 
effect.     
We fail to find any significant impact of growth of health spending on productivity 
growth. The reason for getting insignificant growth impact may be related to its sheer 
size. During the last sixty years, the average growth of public health spending relative 
to GDP was around 4%. However, its growth remained volatile and showed a 
continuous declining trend.  
The impact of general government spending on productivity growth is significant but 
negative. The negative sign indicates that a further increase in government spending 
reduces the productivity substantially. The significant negative sign support our 
earlier interpretation that government size matter. A larger size of government reduces 
the productivity. We do not see any significant difference between OLS and 2SLS 
estimates.     
We found significant positive impact of growth of domestic credit to private sector on 
productivity growth. Positive sign re-emphasize the importance of financial sector in 
improving technology and innovation. Our estimate predicts that a 10 percent increase 
in domestic credit leads to around 8 percent productivity growth. This is a substantial 
impact. Significant positive impact on productivity growth but insignificant impact on 
economic growth shows the indirect channel of financial development. It implies that 
financial development foster economic growth through increase in productivity.  
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The growth of public spending on development projects appeared to be significant 
positive impact on productivity growth. Our estimate suggests that a one percent 
increase in development spending leads to one year ahead growth of productivity by 
4%. This is a substantial impact and highlights the importance of development 
spending on productivity enhancing projects. We found significant reduction in the 
standard errors when we estimate the model by 2SLS. The improvement in the size of 
the coefficient shows that about 45 percent bias is corrected when we take into 
account the endogeneity issue.   
We fail to find any systematic impact of growth of openness, foreign direct 
investment, share of foreign assistance on the growth of productivity. Diagnostic test 
shows that we do not have serial correlation problem, our instruments are valid and 
our explanatory variables reasonably explain variation in the productivity growth.   
3.5.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
For sensitivity analysis we have added more controls, re-measured the political 
regime in dichotomous and used different indicators for economic growth. The 
estimated results are reported at Table 3.8.  
Columns (1) of Table 3.8 incorporate growth of market capitalization, utilization of 
agriculture land, inflation rate and average rainfall as additional controls. Inclusion of 
additional controls increases the explanatory power of model from 0.56 to 0.74. 
Interestingly, the presence of additional controls does not alter our conclusions, as 
neither sign nor magnitudes of coefficients associated with our variables of interest 
changed. However, the significance of 𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦 improves. It becomes significant 
at 5 percent level. The significant positive sign of 𝐷𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑜 shows the robustness of 
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our result and supports our hypothesis that duration matter for determination of 
economic growth. The interaction term remained highly significant but negative. It 
implies that higher duration under democratic regime reduces the economic growth.    
In column (2) of Table 3.8 we consider democratic regime as a dichotomous in nature. 
We measure democracy as a dummy with a value of 1 when the chief executive 
assumes power through open competition and elections and of zero otherwise. We re-
estimate democratic regime, duration and interaction effect on economic growth. We 
continue to get significant positive effect of duration and significant negative effect of 
interaction term on economic growth. However, re-defining democracy as 
dichotomous changes its sign. Our new estimate suggests that democracy foster 
economic growth. We reconcile this discrepancy as follows.  
The dichotomous nature of regime shows whether a regime is democratic at a given 
point in time. This definition fails to capture the degree of democracy. For instance, in 
terms of dichotomous definition of democracy, in 2007, Pakistan and the US are both 
counted as democratic countries. However, when we compare the degree of 
democracy, we found a huge difference. In 2007, Pakistan has democracy score of 2 
whereas the US has full democracy score of 10. Thus, the dichotomous definition of 
democracy fails to capture true effect of democracy on economic growth. 
 We also investigate whether our estimated results are sensitive to definition of 
economic growth. As a robustness check, we re-define economic growth in terms of 
real GDP per worker and real GDP, and report the results in columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 3.8. Estimated coefficients of the interaction term maintain its sign but 
marginally lower the magnitude and significance levels.  
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3.5.4. Democracy and Income Inequality 
 It is commonly argued that democratic governments are more egalitarian than 
autocratic ones. The rationale offered is that a prevailing inequity may encourage 
politicians to launch a political campaign. Democratic government is accountable to 
the electorate, so politicians generally make and try to honor promises. They adopt 
income-enhancing policies to improve income distribution. It is also argued that a 
democratic government enhances growth opportunities for their positive impact on 
income distribution. Income inequity is predicted to reduce under a democracy mainly 
because labor unions are permitted and individual rights are protected. Consequently, 
labor is more likely to get better wages and other benefits.  
Recent theories predict a Kuznets-type non-linear relationship between democracy 
and inequality. It is argued that in a democracy, inequity first increases until it reaches 
a threshold, and thereafter starts to decline. Among the principal supporters of this 
theory are Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Bourguignon and Verdier (2000). 
Acemgolu and Robinson (2000) argue that at the pre-industrialization stage, an elite 
group accumulates wealth, which increases inequality. At a later stage, when the elite 
group has accumulated sufficient wealth, the process of transfer of wealth to a lower 
group begins, which reduces inequity.  
Empirically, various studies support the egalitarian view of democracy. Chong and 
Calderon (2000) systematically investigate the linkage between institutional quality 
and income distribution, finding a significant and robust quadratic relationship 
between interest variables. Their results imply that for poor countries, the relationship 
between institutional quality and inequity is positive, whereas for rich countries it is 
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negative. Chong (2001) surveys empirical literature and establishes an empirical link 
between existing theories for democracy and inequality. He finds a non-monotonic 
relationship between democracy and inequity. By theoretical and empirical 
investigation, Chong and Gradstein (2007) establish a bi-directional causality between 
income inequity and institutional quality. They argue that weak institutional quality 
does not properly provide judicial protection to the poor, which reduces rent-seeking 
opportunities, as compared to rich elites which enjoy such opportunities. As a result, 
the rich-poor gap widens. Large income inequity may empower the rich to influence 
political institutions, which may further deteriorate their quality. 
We use the following econometric model to analyze regime and duration effect on 
income distribution: 
𝛥ln (𝐺𝐿𝑜𝐿)𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑙𝑜 (𝐷𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑜)𝑡 + 𝛾2 𝑙𝑜(𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦)𝑡 + 𝛾3 ln(𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦)𝑡
∗ ln (𝐷𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑜)𝑡 +  𝛾4ln (𝐼𝑜𝐹𝑙𝐸𝐸)𝑡 + 𝛾5 ln(𝐼𝑜𝐹𝑙𝐸𝐸)𝑡2+ 𝛾6𝑙𝑜(𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑙)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                              (2) 
Here, 𝐺𝐿𝑜𝐿 is the growth of Gini coefficient, 𝐷𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑜 and 𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦 are the same 
as we defined in equation (1), 𝐼𝑜𝐹𝑙𝐸𝐸 refers to real GDP, 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑠 include average 
years of schooling, foreign direct investment relative to GDP, age dependency ratio 
and annual inflation rate, 𝑂 refers to time and 𝜀 is disturbance term which is assumed 
to be white noise. 
We estimate the equation (2) and report the results at Table 3.9. We found that regime 
duration also matters for income distribution. A longer duration of a regime reduces 
the growth of income inequality. Our estimate suggests that another year of a regime 
reduces the growth of Gini coefficient by 5.3 percent. We also found weak negative 
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effect of democracy on growth of Gini. However, when we interact the 𝐷𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑙𝑜 
with 𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑙𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑦, we found significant positive effect. Our estimate on interaction 
term implies that at least in the case of Pakistan, this contradicts the hypothesis that a 
democratic regime is more egalitarian. It may imply that Pakistan’s democratic 
governments use their duration to strengthen the elite group so as to secure their 
political support.  
Empirical results also support Kuznets’ hypothesis of an inverted u-shape for income 
inequity, at least in a weak form. A positive sign associated with income and negative 
with its square show that income is non-linearly related with inequity. It increases 
initially with a rise in income but later starts to decline.  
3.6. Discussion  
Empirical results show that democratic regimes fail to play an effective role in 
economic process. This leads naturally to the question, why does this happen in 
Pakistan? Why is a longer duration of democracy harmful for income growth and 
inequality? After all, democrats are accountable to their constituents. In the following 
discussion we made an attempt to address these questions by shedding light on the 
Pakistan’s educational level, culture and democratic systems. We also briefly review 
and discuss various strategies adopted by military rulers to prolong their tenure or 
power. 
Pakistan’s democratic governments have always been politically unstable. Since 
independence, not a single government up to 2007 has completed a five-year 
parliamentary tenure. Between 1947 and 2010, the prime minister of Pakistan has 
changed hands nineteen times for one reason or another (see Chapter 3 for further 
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details). The average duration of a democratic government is 1.8 years (with a 
minimum of 13 days77), whereas the average duration of an autocratic regime is 10 
years (with a maximum of 13.2 years). It is clear that democratic regimes do not have 
sufficient time to devote to building good institutions, nor enough time to pursue a 
policy consistently and persistently. Ignorance about building good institutions and 
lack of policy persistence may explain why duration of a democratic regime has a 
negative but significant coefficient.  
The number of political parties may explain political un-stability. 78 A multi-party 
election system spreads votes among the parties, and it is difficult for one party to get 
an absolute majority to form a government in its own right. Rather, a government is 
usually formed by a coalition. Under this system, a party may want to pursue its own 
objectives, which may conflict with its coalition partners’ objectives. Differences in 
stakes and objectives force parties to bargain for compromise. As a result, budget 
resources are allocated on a political basis rather than on any economic justification. 
The result may be inefficiency.  
This is what has been observed in Pakistan over the last six decades. The Pakistan 
People’s Party (PPP) is one of the leading political parties, and has been in 
government four times: in 1970 (winning 27% of seats); in 1988 (45% of seats); in 
1993 (43% of seats); and in 2008 (36% of seats). For government, a party must have a 
two-thirds majority in parliament; otherwise, it must join hands with other parties. 
The above results show that each time, PPP did not have a two-thirds majority, so 
needed to form a coalition for government, and did so. The case is similar for another 
                                                          
77 Nurul Amin: in office from December 7, 1971 to December 20, 1971  
78 In October 2014 there were about 282 national and local political parties registered with the 
Pakistan Election Commission. However, 8 to 10 major national political parties are always active and 
are critical in the formation of a government. 
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major political party, the Pakistan Muslim League, which became the government 
twice in the 1990s. The average budget deficit of the coalition governments of the 
1990s was 7%, while for the military regime of 2000, the budget deficit was just 4 
percent. Comparisons of budget deficits alone do not completely prove our claims, but 
this comparison to some extent supports our argument.       
Theory says that democracy promotes economic growth and distribution because 
political parties are accountable to the electorate. For Pakistan this argument is not 
necessarily valid. Political governments mostly enjoyed tenure without consideration 
of electoral consequences. The reasons are twofold.  
First, Pakistan’s literacy rate and overall education levels are very low. In 1951, the 
literacy rate was around 18% (see Table 3.10); this has been gradually increasing, but 
in 2010 was still only 57.7%. The average year of schooling in 1951 was about one 
year, which gradually increased to around 4 years in 2001. It implies that the average 
citizen has not even completed primary education. Further, over two-thirds of the 
populations still live in rural areas. A high percentage of rural residents coupled with 
low literacy and education levels may indicate that a substantial number of Pakistanis 
are unaware of the power of the vote and the consequences on the prevailing political 
system. Pakistan’s politicians are very well aware of this situation and exploit citizen 
voting power.  
Secondly, Pakistan has a strong family or kinship system (known as Biradari system). 
If the head of a Biradari decides to vote a certain way, other family members must 
follow suit regardless of whether the prospective candidate is capable. Failure to obey 
Biradari advice can have severe consequences. Ahmed (2008) analyzed the impact of 
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the Biradari system on voting behavior and concluded that “Biradari seems to be 
stronger than political fidelity.” Shawar and Asim (2012) examine voting preference 
on the basis of the Biradari system and find that over 55% prefer to vote on the basis 
of the Biradari system. 
Another powerful class which influences the voting system resembles the feudal 
system (the Zamindar). If the Zamindar nominates someone for an election, the 
peasants must follow his advice or face severe consequences. The existence of these 
people make politicians accountable to powerful groups rather than to the ordinary 
citizen. 
By contrast, to legitimate and prolong the military regime, Pakistan’s autocrats 
adopted market-oriented policies. The first military ruler, General Ayub Khan, in his 
early years of government, soon realized the importance of finance for the 
development of the industrial and agriculture sectors. He set up two important 
financial institutions, the IDBP (Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan) and the 
ADBP (Agriculture Development Bank of Pakistan) in the early 1960s, to service the 
growing financial needs of the industrial and agriculture sectors.  
The IDBP provides medium-term to long-term loans for green and brown industrial 
projects, and offers advice on technical, managerial and financial matters to customers. 
It also provides guidelines on establishing new industrial projects. The ADBP plays 
the same role in the agricultural sector. As a result, domestic loans to the private 
sector rose from 11.1% of GDP in 1960 to around 30% in 1972.79 The third military 
regime strengthened the financial sector, improved banking governance structure, 
                                                          
79 Figures are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (web-page).   
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privatized the earlier nationalized banks and made it easier for foreign banks and 
branches to open in Pakistan. Consequently, the financial sectors were boosted and 
started to cater to the growing needs of the private sector.   
To protect the rights of investors, in 1969 the first military regime promulgated the 
Securities and Exchange Ordinance. In 1984 the second military regime promulgated 
a Companies Ordinance. This new legislation protects equity investors and creditor 
rights, promotes corporate structures and enable healthy growth of the business sector. 
In 1970, to monitor monopolist activities and promote a competitive domestic market 
environment, a Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Ordinance was promulgated by the 
first military government. This legislation was principally to establish a Monopoly 
Control Authority (MCA) to administer the law, with provisions for conducting 
inquiries into market power concentration, monopolies and restrictive trade practices. 
It also contained provisions for advising individuals, corporate entities and businesses 
about banned business activities and to promote competition. In 2007 the third 
military regime, converted the MCA into the Competition Commission of Pakistan, 
with an extended and updated mandate. 
Industrialization, corporatization and Islamization were other tools used by military 
governments to prolong tenure of power. The first military ruler promoted capitalism 
with free market economy principles. He drew up five-year development plans which 
helped boost private investment. This resulted in the industrial value relative to GDP 
increasing from 15.5% in 1960 to 23.2% in 1971. Later Bhutto, a democratic 
government leader, aborted Ayub’s state capitalism policies and introduced socialist 
policies, one of which was industrial nationalization; all industries were handed over 
to government control. His policy destroyed investor confidence in the business sector. 
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The second military leader countered this by initiating a corporatization program to 
promote the corporate sector and develop the private sector. In 1984 he promulgated 
the Companies Ordinance to regulate the corporate sector. He also introduced the 
concept of Islamic economics and legislated to promote Islamic finance principles. 
The third military ruler established a regulatory body (SMEDA: Small and Medium 
Enterprises Development Authority) to further develop the industrial sector and 
promote small and medium enterprises. 
The military government also decentralized power to the local level as a strategy to 
strengthen their government and to obtain public support. Ayub introduced the 
concept of ‘basic democracy’ with the promulgation of the Basic Democracies 
Ordinance (1959) and the Municipal Administration Ordinance (1960). The main aim 
was to establish a stronger link between the government and the people. He 
established local self-governing bodies and units to run local matters; but as it 
eventuated, the local government system was in practice controlled by bureaucrats 
through the offices of the Commissioner or his Deputy.  
In 1980 General Zia promulgated the Local Government Ordinance to empower local 
and provincial governments by delegating some power from the federal government 
to the provinces. In 2000 the third military government promulgated another Local 
Government Ordinance, by which certain provincial functions were delegated to the 
local level. Kang and Arshad (2012) argue that the apparent intention of all three 
military governments was to introduce a form of so-called democracy, while in 
practice it was in all cases a strategy to legitimize and prolong their governments.   
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3.7. Summary and Conclusion 
Whether democracy is better for economic prosperity is widely debated in the 
literature. Competing theoretical arguments and inconclusive empirical research 
motivate us to re-examine the relationship between a political regime and economic 
growth. Recognizing Pakistan’s geo-political importance in the South Asian region, 
an attempt is made to determine the effect of democracy on per capita GDP using 
Pakistan’s time series data for the last six decades (1951-2010).  
We start our analysis by briefly reviewing Pakistan’s political and economic 
situations since independence. Pakistan has remained politically unstable, having 
experienced three military coups, giving military regimes that each lasted for at least 8 
years, while growth remained volatile during each regime. Simple statistics show that, 
on average, Pakistan has performed better on the economic front during each 
autocratic regime. The question then arises: why is this so? A systematic analysis is 
then carried out to determine regime effect at both micro and macro levels. For the 
macro level, per capita GDP growth is used as an indicator for economic growth; 
income inequity is used to determine the regime effect at the micro level. 
It is postulated that a longer duration of a given regime makes it more possible to 
build economic as well as political institutions. An econometric model is designed for 
empirical validation of this postulate, recognizing a growing concern that political 
institutions are deep determinants of economic growth as well as functions of wealth. 
An attempt is made to deal with the endogeneity issue.   
Econometric findings support our claim that longer duration of a regime fosters the 
economic growth. This finding is robust to various specifications. However, we do 
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not find an empirical support on democracy-led growth hypothesis. Our analysis 
shows that an increase in democracy level reduces the economic growth. A possible 
explanation is that democratic regimes failed to build institutions that are necessary 
for economic growth. When democracy is interacted with duration, we find robust 
negative impact on economic growth. We interpret this result as democracy effect 
dominates over duration effect.   
Why are autocrats effective in Pakistan? A review of the autocratic regimes shows 
that the military rulers to some extent try to protect property rights and pursue good 
economic policies persistently and consistently to legitimate and prolong their 
regimes. They use industrialization, corporatization, privatization and decentralization 
of powers to the local level as strategies to strengthen government. Democratic 
governments are consistently politically unstable, using resources to get political 
support and strengthen elite groups.   
In conclusion, our findings show that duration of a regime matters but only as an 
auxiliary. If a democratic regime fails to provide environment which is conducive for 
economic growth, then further increase in democracy level may impede the economic 
growth and income distribution. 
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Table 3.1: Pakistan’s Political History 
Regime 
Type of Regime Duration (Period) Duration (Years) 
R – I Democratic 1947 – 1958 11 
R – II Autocratic 1958 – 1971 13 
R – III Democratic 1971 – 1977 06 
R – IV Autocratic 1977 – 1988 11 
R – V Democratic 1988 – 1999 11 
R – VI Autocratic 1999 – 2007 08 
R – VII Democratic 2007 – 2013 07 
Note: Democratic regime is defined as when chief executive assumes political power 
through open competition and election. Source: www.na.gov.pk (accessed on July 20, 
2013).  
 
 
Table 3.2: Pakistan’s Macroeconomic Situation 
Regime 
GDP  
per 
capita 
(US$) 
Growth (%) 
Inflationb  
(%) 
Investment 
Sharea  
(% of GDP) GDP
a Agri.b Manuf.b 
R – I (1947 – 1958) 630 2.3 - - - 7.3 
R – II (1958 – 1971) 748 6.0 5.1 9.9 3.5 22.5 
R – III (1971 – 
1977) 987 3.5 1.4 4.1 14.6 19.3 
R – IV (1977 – 
1988) 1232 6.0 3.9 8.4 7.3 20.2 
R – V (1988 – 1999) 1636 4.4 4.5 4.8 10.0 18.3 
R – VI (1999 – 
2007) 1870 4.7 3.2 8.1 5.3 15.2 
R – VII (2007 – 
2013) 2236 3.7 2.2 2.7 12.8 15.9 
Note: ‘a’ data contains from 1951 to 2010; ‘b’ data contains from 1960 to 2012; Source: Heston 
et al (2013) and World Bank (2013) 
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Table 3.3: Political Regime and Policy Matrix 
Regime Type/ 
Policy Type 
Democratic  
Regime 
Autocratic  
Regime 
Pro – Market 
• Tariff Reduction (D-II, D-III) 
• Land Reform (D-II) 
• Abolished Export Bonus 
Voucher Scheme (D-II) 
• Abolished Import Licensing (D-
III) 
• Private Sector Autonomy (D-III) 
• Removal of Subsidies (D-III) 
• Deregulation (D-III) 
 
• Ease of quantitative restriction – 
Free List for imports (M-I, M-II, 
M-III) 
• Introduction of Export Bonus 
Voucher System (M-I) 
• Land Reform (M-I) 
• Corporatization (M-II) 
• Islamization (M-II) 
• Introduction of Flexible 
Exchange Rate (M-II) 
• Privatization (M-III) 
• Deregulation (M-III) 
• Reduction of Subsidies (M-III) 
Anti - Market 
• Import Licensing (D-I) 
• Quantitative Restriction(D-I) 
• Exchange Rate Controls (D-I) 
• Nationalization (D-II) 
• Devaluation (D-II) 
• Agriculture Support Price (D-II, 
D-III, D-IV) 
• Indirect Taxation (D-III) 
• Subsidized Agriculture Credit 
(M-I) 
• Agriculture Support Price (M-I) 
• Controlled Interest Rate (M-II) 
Note: D-I refers to first democratic regime (1947-1958); D-II, second democratic regime (1971-1977); 
D-III, third democratic regime (1988-1999); and D-IV refers to fourth democratic regime (2007-2010). 
Similarly D-I refers to first military regime (1958-1971); M-II, second military regime (1977-1988); and 
M-III refers to third military regime (1999-2008). Source: Author’s compilation.   
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Table 3.4: Income Distribution under 2nd Democratic Regime 
 
Household Gini 
Co-efficient 
Household Income Shares 
Ratio of 
Highest 20% 
to Lowest 
20% 
Lowest 20% Middle 60% Highest 20%  
1970-71 0.33 8.4 50.1 41.5 4.9 
1971-72 0.345 7.9 49.1 43 5.4 
1979 0.373 7.4 47.6 45 6.1 
Date  Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (1998) 
 
Table 3.5: Share of Public Industrial Enterprises in Total Large-scale 
Manufacturing 
Years Employment Share (%) Value added (%) 
Public sector 
share in total 
industrial 
investment (%) 
1979 14.47 7.12 72.74 
1980 14.34 14.55 65.25 
1981 15.24 12.27 58.01 
1982 16.51 13.28 52.08 
1983 14.82 13.90 48.29 
1984 16.36 11.81 44.56 
1985 - - 31.38 
1986 - - 30.38 
1987 - - 21.64 
1988 - - 17.85 
Source: Zaidi (2005), table 7.5 (p.117)  
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Table 3.6: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Unit Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDPC US$ (PPP) 60 1,258 513 617 2,297 
GDPC Growth % age 60 2.2 3.0 -3.2 12.4 
Democracy Scale (0 to 10) 56 3.54 3.40 0 8 
Autocracy Scale (0 to 10) 56 2.73 2.95 0 7 
No. of years in Democracy Years 28 1.79 3.43 1 5 
No. of years in Autocracy Years 32 10.67 2.51 8 13 
School Thousand 61 2,032 1,652 250 5,445 
Yr_Sch Years 61 2.51 1.35 0.98 5.53 
Health % of GDP 61 0.57 0.27 0.05 1.19 
Dev. Exp. % of GDP 61 9.76 4.48 3.00 20.97 
Govt. % of GDP 61 9.56 2.08 6.15 14.78 
Open % of GDP 61 31.08 3.23 23.01 38.01 
FDIY % of GDP 61 0.60 0.80 0.01 3.78 
Privy % of GDP 51 24.06 3.88 11.15 29.84 
FA Share % of Total 50 52.51 15.94 19.46 78.36 
Depend % of Working 
Population 
51 84.40 6.75 65.76 90.60 
   Note: Detail of variables is at Appendix 3-B 
 
 
 
. 
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Table 3.7: Regime’s Duration Effect on Economic and Productivity Growth 
 Economic Growth  Productivity Growth 
 OLS 
(1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
 OLS 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
Democracy -0.006c -0.008b  -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Duration 0.006a 0.006a  0.003c 0.003b 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) 
Democracy*Duration -0.005a -0.005b  -0.002c -0.002b 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) 
GDPCt-1 -0.283b -0.268c    
 (0.103) (0.150)    
School 0.127b 0.120c    
 (0.048) (0.070)    
Δ Health -0.024 -0.025  0.000 -0.011 
 (0.022) (0.019)  (0.016) (0.014) 
Δ Gov -0.081a -0.081a  -0.073a -0.073a 
 (0.019) (0.017)  (0.025) (0.023) 
Δ FDI 0.003 0.003  0.005 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Δ Privy 0.052 0.047  0.076b 0.077a 
 (0.035) (0.029)  (0.033) (0.029) 
Δ Open -0.002 -0.005  -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.034) (0.031)  (0.041) (0.039) 
Δ Dev. Expt-1 0.040b 0.043b  0.040c 0.058a 
 (0.016) (0.021)  (0.021) (0.019) 
Δ FA Share -0.024b -0.024a  -0.021 -0.017 
 (0.009) (0.008)  (0.013) (0.011) 
Constant 1.076a 1.024c  -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.374) (0.542)  (0.011) (0.010) 
Diagnostic      
D-Watson 1.93   1.92  
Endogeneity Test (p-value)  0.43   0.76 
Overid Test (p-value)  0.60   0.16 
R2 0.56 0.54  0.31 0.33 
N 45 44  45 44 
Note: Dependent variables are real GDP per capita growth and total factor productivity growth. Robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis. All variables are in natural logarithm except duration variable. 
Estimations are based on annual time series for the period from 1951 to 2010 except 1969 – 1972 because 
data is missing for polity variables. For Model (2&4), coefficients are obtained from two stages least square 
(2SLS)  where democracy and duration are instrumented with amendment dummy, predicted value of duration 
and past lags of democracy. D – Watson refers Durbin Watson values after model transformation. For 2SLS, 
endogeneity test refer to p – value for Wooldridg’s (1995) robust score test with (𝐻0: variables are exogenous). 
Overid test refer to p – value of Sargan’s (1958) for 2SLS (𝐻0: Instruments are valid). See Appendix 3-B  for 
variables detail. a (p<0.01); b( p<0.05); c( p<0.1)  
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Table 3.8: Sensitivity Analysis – Regime’s Duration Effect with Alternative 
Specification 
 Per Capita 
Growth 
(1) 
Per Capita 
Growth 
(2) 
Per Worker 
Growth 
(3) 
GDP 
Growth 
(4) 
Democracy -0.007b 0.030c -0.002 -0.006b 
 (0.003) (0.018) (0.002) (0.003) 
Duration 0.006a 0.004b 0.003c 0.004b 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Democracy * Duration -0.006a -0.009a -0.003c -0.003b 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
D-Watson     
R2 0.74 0.69 0.65 0.58 
N 45 45 45 45 
Note: Dependent variable at column (1) and (2) is real GDP per capita growth rate. Dependent variable 
at column (3) is real GDP per worker growth rate .Dependent variable at column (4) is real GDP growth. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. We use the same controls as we use in Table 3.7. In column (1) 
we use growth of market capitalization, utilization of agriculture land, inflation and average rainfall as 
additional regressors. In column (2) we define democracy as a dichotomous variable whose value is equal 
to 1 if regime is democratic and zero otherwise. Estimations are based on annual time series for the 
period from 1951 to 2010 except 1969 – 1972 because data is missing for polity variables. See Appendix 
3-B for variables detail. c( p<0.1); b( p<0.05); a (p<0.01) 
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Table 3.9: Regime’s Duration Effect on Income Distribution 
 FGLS 
Duration -0.053a 
 (0.014) 
Democracy -0.036c 
 (0.019) 
Democracy x Duration 0.033a 
 (0.010) 
Income 4.526c 
 (2.397) 
Income Square -0.104b 
 (0.049) 
  
Controls Yes 
  
Diagnostics:  
D – Watson 1.86 
R2 0.73 
N 38 
Note: Dependent variable is growth of Gini coefficient. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. Estimations are based on annual time series for the period from 1963 to 2005. 
For correction of autocorrelation, coefficients are estimated from feasible generalized least 
square method (FGLS). Income refers to ln(GDP). Controls include ln(Yr_Sch), lag of 
ln(fdiy), Δln(depend), and inflation. D – Watson refers Durbin Watson values after model 
transformation.  See Appendix 3-B for variables detail. c( p<0.1); b( p<0.05); a (p<0.01) 
 
Table 3.10: Literacy Rate, Educational Level and Rural Population 
Census Year Literacy Rate (% age) 
Average Years of 
Schooling 
Rural Population 
(% age) 
1951 16.4 0.98 82.26 
1961 16.3 1.19 77.49 
1972 21.7 1.69 74.59 
1981 26.2 2.22 71.70 
1998 43.9 3.67 67.48 
2010 57 5.53 64.70 
Data Source: Literacy Rate – UNESCO; Years of Schooling – Barro and Lee (2013); 
Rural Population – SBP (2010) 
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Figure 3.1: Trend of Import of Principal Commodities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan (2010) 
 
Figure 3.2: Parliamentary, Presidential or Semi-Presidential form of Government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation  
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Figure 3.3: Investment Share and Institutionalized Democracy  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Democracy score shows the degree of democracy. Higher value 
means more democracy. Total investment is the share of total investment 
in GDP. Data Source: Democracy – Marshal et al (2012); Investment - 
Heston et al (2012) 
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Figure 3.4: Foreign Direct Investment and Institutionalized Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Democracy score shows the degree of democracy. Higher value means more 
democracy. Data Source: Democracy – Marshal et al (2012); FDI - WB (2013) 
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Figure 3.5: Government Spending on Military and Institutionalized Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Democracy score shows the degree of democracy. Higher value means more 
democracy. DWeeata Source: Democracy – Marshal et al (2012); Defense 
spending – State Bank of Pakistan (2010) 
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Appendix 3-A: Political Spectrum 
1) Chief Executive Recruitment 
 
 
AUTOCRACY 
 
 
DEMOCRACY 
 
Regulation Unregulated Regulated 
Competition Selection Election 
Openness Closed Open 
   
2) Independence of Executive Authority 
 
 
AUTOCRACY 
 
 
DEMOCRACY 
 
Executive Constraints Unlimited Authority Executive Parity 
 
3) Political Competition and Opposition 
 
 
AUTOCRACY 
 
 
DEMOCRACY 
 
Regulation of Participation Unregulated Regulated 
Competitiveness of Participation Repressed Competitive 
   
Source: Information extracted from Marshall et al (2012) 
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Appendix 3-B: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Rationale Data Source 
GDPC PPP Converted GDP Per Capita 
(Laspeyres) at 2005 Constant Prices 
Dependent variable; widely 
accepted as good proxy for 
Economic Growth 
Heston et al 
(2012) 
(GDPC)t-1 Captures ‘catch-up’ effect 
GINI 
Estimate of Gini index of inequality in 
equalized (square root scale) household 
disposable (post-tax, post-transfer) 
income 
Dependent variable; captures 
income inequality 
Solt (2009) 
TFP Total Factor Productivity Index 
Dependent variable, measures 
productivity  
Author’s 
compliation 
DEMOC 
Institutionalized Democracy 
(from 0 to 10 Scale) 
Measures the strength of 
democracy 
Marshal et al 
(2012) 
DURATION 
Regime Durability defined as “Number 
of years since the most recent regime 
change” 
Measures the duration effect of a 
given regime on growth 
SCHOOL 
School Enrollment at Middle Level  
(in thousands) 
Measure the stock of ‘human 
capital’ 
SBP (2010) 
HEALTH Health Expenditure as % of GDP 
Measures the quality of ‘human 
capital’ 
Yr_Sch Average Years of Schooling 
Measure the stock of ‘human 
capital’ 
Barro and Lee 
(2013) 
GOVT 
Net Government Consumption Share 
relative to GDP (in % age) Measure fiscal policy 
Heston et al 
(2012) 
OPEN 
Openness – sum of import and export 
relative to GDP (in % age) Measure trade policy 
Heston et al 
(2012) 
FDI 
Foreign Direct Investment  
(millions of US$) Measure FDI policy WB (2013) 
PRIVY 
Domestic Credit to Private Sector 
(% of GDP) Measure Financial Policy WB (2013) 
INF Inflation Rate (% annual) 
Measure macro-economic 
condition 
SBP (2010) 
DEPEND 
Age Dependency Ratio  
(% of working population) Measure family structure SBP (2010) 
Dummy 
Amendment Dummy 
(=1 if amended) 
Instrument for institutional 
variables 
Author 
Source: Author’s Compilation 
